Truth and lies regarding the current security crisis: where might we be heading?
The rockets launched by Hezbollah were probably an Iranian revenge for recent actions attributed to the IDF – while Israel prefers the Hamas-Temple Mount narrative
Amir Rapaport
| 13/04/2023
Photo: Amos Ben-Gershom, GPO
On September 7th, 2007, Israeli Air Force jets attacked the Syrian nuclear reactor, an action which was cast under a media blackout by the Israeli censorship. The blackout’s purpose was to enable Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, so-called “room for denial”: If Israel does not assume public responsibility for the attack, nor does it speak about it – then he is not obligated to respond.
Some 16 years later, last week, in the midst of Passover, the heaviest rocket barrage since the Second Lebanon War was launched from Lebanon towards Israeli territory. This time, it was Israel which needed its own room for denial: for reasons of convenience, it attributed the attack only to the Hamas rocket force, stationed near tire in southern Lebanon.
Room for denial
The fact that Hezbollah and Iran did not assume responsibility for the launch allowed Israel to settle for a moderate reaction, only targeting Hamas, without dragging the entire region to a war that could have taken place on multiple fronts simultaneously, and during the holiday.
In Israel, there were even alleged leaks as if its intelligence forces estimated that Hamas’ action wasn’t coordinated with Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Could be, but the broad picture is unequivocal: the major conflict taking place these days is between Iran and Israel.
Hamas wouldn’t have been able to build a rocket force in southern Lebanon without Hezbollah’s approval. The latter was established by Iran, mostly as a force intended to cause Israel massive damage in case the Iranian nuclear facilities are attacked.
In the one case where Nasrallah acted on his own, during the kidnapping that brought to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the Iranians were highly dissatisfied, and Nasrallah pledged to fully obey all future orders from Tehran.
Either way, the photos from Beirut before and after the rocket barrage, which featured top officials from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian organizations – conveyed the message of a united front, without assuming responsibility of any attack against Israel.
One terror attack after another
At the same time, Israel is experiencing one terror attack after another. The attack in which a mother and her two daughters, members of the Dee family from Efrat, were murdered, appears to be more sophisticated and organized than the previous ones, as it was not carried out by a lone attacker who went to butcher Jews spontaneously, without prior planning.
And this is the major story, on which the defense establishment and the political echelon prefer not to hold briefings: these days, Iran has been exploiting the international geo-political changes that stemmed from the Russia-Ukraine war, especially its new alliances with Russia and China (while improving its relations with the Gulf states.)
This, in order to break through in its nuclear program, until it is a mere two weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to build its first nuclear bomb. Manufacturing the actual bomb will still take a year or two, according to various estimates in the West. Either way, it seems that the Iranian bomb can no longer be avoided.
Iran is also working to change the equation of the past few years, according to which Israel and the US carried out attacks against Iran in Syria, northern Iraq and even in Iranian territory – without it retaliating in Israel’s territory, except for sending a few successfully-intercepted drones.
This is the background for sending the terrorist for carrying out the terror attack in Meggido on March 13th (by all signs, a Hezbollah operative carried out this attack, but “room for denial” was maintained in this case as well). Apparently, two days before Passover, Israel carried out an attack against an Iranian target in Syria, killing two Iranian officers. They were given mass funerals. Therefore, the rocket attack on Israel during Passover wasn’t surprising, in the context of an expected retaliation.
In practice, Israel has been cooperating with the Hamas narrative, according to which the rockets were only in response to the conduct of the Israeli police at the al Aksa Mosque during Ramadan.
A war of religion
Hamas has a clear interest to position itself as “defender of Jerusalem” within its internal battle against Fatah in the Palestinian domestic arena – and all of our enemies have a clear interest in turning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a national-territorial dispute (one of hundreds around the world), to a unique religious conflict, a conflict that would stir up the public also among the Abraham Accords nations, the Arab population in Israel – and the entire Muslim world.
A war of religion is bad for Israel, but we have fallen into this trap with eyes wide open.
And here is another troubling element: for decades, it was well-known in our region that our enemies tend to make false, haughty statements, while Israel would talk less and attack more. Recently, the tables have turned in this context as well: those full of haughty statements are the Israelis, including quarrelsome members of Knesset and ministers from the middle ranks of Israeli politics – and even PM Netanyahu, during his press briefing on Monday night.
During his briefing, Netanyahu told of an Israeli attack against Hezbollah after the rockets were launched (never happened), as well as an attack against the Syrian army (which did happen). Sunday’s target was the headquarters of Maher Assad, the Syrian president’s brother, as a signal to the president himself following the firing of three additional rockets from Syrian territory to the Golan over the holiday.
During his press briefing, Netanyahu called recent events a “terror attack.” This, too, isn’t accurate. The terror wave which has begun in early 2022, and has been rising since (19 dead since the start of 2023 until Passover eve) seems to be a lengthy terror period, rather than an “attack.”
It is possible that, in retrospect, the period will become more similar to the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), or the first and second Intifadas (1987-1991 and 2000-2004, respectively). An entire Palestinian generation had already forgotten the heavy price of the Intifada. It is possible that we have too.
A strategic crisis between Israel and the US?
And here are a few more questions that have become more acute following the Passover events: is there a strategic crisis in the Israel-US relations? The answer is both yes and no. Allegedly, the deep cooperation between Israel and the US, including in the most sensitive intelligence arenas, is still underway on all levels.
The overt diplomatic crisis, included President Biden’s statements and Netanyahu’s non-invitation to the White House, have been cooling the relations of the working echelons – this is the impression of officials engaged in coordination between both countries, including on the Iranian issue. Furthermore: Israel’s internal, public crisis has been weakening Israel’s powerful image even more, and has been encouraging our enemies to seize the opportunity and attack.
Have the demonstrations in Israel been encouraging terrorism? It is possible that this internal crisis has also been a contributing force to Israel’s weak image these days. It is important to note that Iran and Hezbollah have a similar weak point: Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon to escalate the situation with Israel is nonexistent, while Iran is experiencing the “Hijab Protests” and constant unrest against the Ayatollah regime. These are weak points Israel has known to exploit quite well in the past.
En route to war?
The main question is if Israel is headed to a multi-front war, meaning to a direct conflict with Hamas in Gaza and with Hezbollah from Lebanon, parallel to terror attacks from the West Bank and perhaps even attacks from Iran and the involvement of Israel’s Arab population in attacks and riots.
This nightmare scenario is still far from realization. Despite what happened on the Tel Aviv boardwalk on Saturday night, which most likely was a terror attack, the vast majority of Israel’s Arab citizens have stayed out of the events.
Also in the West Bank, the general public has not joined this violence round like it did during the two Intifadas. At the same time, the possibility of a major round of fighting with Hamas and Hezbollah simultaneously could materialize every day, due to an “excessive response” by one of the parties.
This is what Israel tried its best to avoid this week. After Independence Day, Israel’s tolerance for attacks against it is likely to diminish. In the short term, this weekend Iran is marking its Quds (Jerusalem) Day.
One week before the end of Ramadan, the air is full of the smell of gunpowder.
The rockets launched by Hezbollah were probably an Iranian revenge for recent actions attributed to the IDF – while Israel prefers the Hamas-Temple Mount narrative
Photo: Amos Ben-Gershom, GPO
On September 7th, 2007, Israeli Air Force jets attacked the Syrian nuclear reactor, an action which was cast under a media blackout by the Israeli censorship. The blackout’s purpose was to enable Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, so-called “room for denial”: If Israel does not assume public responsibility for the attack, nor does it speak about it – then he is not obligated to respond.
Some 16 years later, last week, in the midst of Passover, the heaviest rocket barrage since the Second Lebanon War was launched from Lebanon towards Israeli territory. This time, it was Israel which needed its own room for denial: for reasons of convenience, it attributed the attack only to the Hamas rocket force, stationed near tire in southern Lebanon.
Room for denial
The fact that Hezbollah and Iran did not assume responsibility for the launch allowed Israel to settle for a moderate reaction, only targeting Hamas, without dragging the entire region to a war that could have taken place on multiple fronts simultaneously, and during the holiday.
In Israel, there were even alleged leaks as if its intelligence forces estimated that Hamas’ action wasn’t coordinated with Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Could be, but the broad picture is unequivocal: the major conflict taking place these days is between Iran and Israel.
Hamas wouldn’t have been able to build a rocket force in southern Lebanon without Hezbollah’s approval. The latter was established by Iran, mostly as a force intended to cause Israel massive damage in case the Iranian nuclear facilities are attacked.
In the one case where Nasrallah acted on his own, during the kidnapping that brought to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the Iranians were highly dissatisfied, and Nasrallah pledged to fully obey all future orders from Tehran.
Either way, the photos from Beirut before and after the rocket barrage, which featured top officials from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian organizations – conveyed the message of a united front, without assuming responsibility of any attack against Israel.
One terror attack after another
At the same time, Israel is experiencing one terror attack after another. The attack in which a mother and her two daughters, members of the Dee family from Efrat, were murdered, appears to be more sophisticated and organized than the previous ones, as it was not carried out by a lone attacker who went to butcher Jews spontaneously, without prior planning.
And this is the major story, on which the defense establishment and the political echelon prefer not to hold briefings: these days, Iran has been exploiting the international geo-political changes that stemmed from the Russia-Ukraine war, especially its new alliances with Russia and China (while improving its relations with the Gulf states.)
This, in order to break through in its nuclear program, until it is a mere two weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to build its first nuclear bomb. Manufacturing the actual bomb will still take a year or two, according to various estimates in the West. Either way, it seems that the Iranian bomb can no longer be avoided.
Iran is also working to change the equation of the past few years, according to which Israel and the US carried out attacks against Iran in Syria, northern Iraq and even in Iranian territory – without it retaliating in Israel’s territory, except for sending a few successfully-intercepted drones.
This is the background for sending the terrorist for carrying out the terror attack in Meggido on March 13th (by all signs, a Hezbollah operative carried out this attack, but “room for denial” was maintained in this case as well). Apparently, two days before Passover, Israel carried out an attack against an Iranian target in Syria, killing two Iranian officers. They were given mass funerals. Therefore, the rocket attack on Israel during Passover wasn’t surprising, in the context of an expected retaliation.
In practice, Israel has been cooperating with the Hamas narrative, according to which the rockets were only in response to the conduct of the Israeli police at the al Aksa Mosque during Ramadan.
A war of religion
Hamas has a clear interest to position itself as “defender of Jerusalem” within its internal battle against Fatah in the Palestinian domestic arena – and all of our enemies have a clear interest in turning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a national-territorial dispute (one of hundreds around the world), to a unique religious conflict, a conflict that would stir up the public also among the Abraham Accords nations, the Arab population in Israel – and the entire Muslim world.
A war of religion is bad for Israel, but we have fallen into this trap with eyes wide open.
And here is another troubling element: for decades, it was well-known in our region that our enemies tend to make false, haughty statements, while Israel would talk less and attack more. Recently, the tables have turned in this context as well: those full of haughty statements are the Israelis, including quarrelsome members of Knesset and ministers from the middle ranks of Israeli politics – and even PM Netanyahu, during his press briefing on Monday night.
During his briefing, Netanyahu told of an Israeli attack against Hezbollah after the rockets were launched (never happened), as well as an attack against the Syrian army (which did happen). Sunday’s target was the headquarters of Maher Assad, the Syrian president’s brother, as a signal to the president himself following the firing of three additional rockets from Syrian territory to the Golan over the holiday.
During his press briefing, Netanyahu called recent events a “terror attack.” This, too, isn’t accurate. The terror wave which has begun in early 2022, and has been rising since (19 dead since the start of 2023 until Passover eve) seems to be a lengthy terror period, rather than an “attack.”
It is possible that, in retrospect, the period will become more similar to the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), or the first and second Intifadas (1987-1991 and 2000-2004, respectively). An entire Palestinian generation had already forgotten the heavy price of the Intifada. It is possible that we have too.
A strategic crisis between Israel and the US?
And here are a few more questions that have become more acute following the Passover events: is there a strategic crisis in the Israel-US relations? The answer is both yes and no. Allegedly, the deep cooperation between Israel and the US, including in the most sensitive intelligence arenas, is still underway on all levels.
The overt diplomatic crisis, included President Biden’s statements and Netanyahu’s non-invitation to the White House, have been cooling the relations of the working echelons – this is the impression of officials engaged in coordination between both countries, including on the Iranian issue. Furthermore: Israel’s internal, public crisis has been weakening Israel’s powerful image even more, and has been encouraging our enemies to seize the opportunity and attack.
Have the demonstrations in Israel been encouraging terrorism? It is possible that this internal crisis has also been a contributing force to Israel’s weak image these days. It is important to note that Iran and Hezbollah have a similar weak point: Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon to escalate the situation with Israel is nonexistent, while Iran is experiencing the “Hijab Protests” and constant unrest against the Ayatollah regime. These are weak points Israel has known to exploit quite well in the past.
En route to war?
The main question is if Israel is headed to a multi-front war, meaning to a direct conflict with Hamas in Gaza and with Hezbollah from Lebanon, parallel to terror attacks from the West Bank and perhaps even attacks from Iran and the involvement of Israel’s Arab population in attacks and riots.
This nightmare scenario is still far from realization. Despite what happened on the Tel Aviv boardwalk on Saturday night, which most likely was a terror attack, the vast majority of Israel’s Arab citizens have stayed out of the events.
Also in the West Bank, the general public has not joined this violence round like it did during the two Intifadas. At the same time, the possibility of a major round of fighting with Hamas and Hezbollah simultaneously could materialize every day, due to an “excessive response” by one of the parties.
This is what Israel tried its best to avoid this week. After Independence Day, Israel’s tolerance for attacks against it is likely to diminish. In the short term, this weekend Iran is marking its Quds (Jerusalem) Day.
One week before the end of Ramadan, the air is full of the smell of gunpowder.
