A new balance of terror is required
With or without a resurrected nuclear deal, the only one to decide if and when to announce the existence of the first bomb is Iran itself. Israel must develop new tools to face this threat – the old strategy has exhausted itself. A special column by Amir Rapaport
Amir Rapaport
| 29/08/2022
Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid with current Mossad chied, David (Dadi) Barnea, earlier this month. Photo: Prime Minister’s Office
The nuclear agreement that is expected to be signed shortly between the US and the European power on one end, and Iran on the other, will not change a fundamental fact: Iran is de facto becoming a nuclear state. Its Ayatollah regime is the one that will decide when to make that tiny jump to the first nuclear bomb, and when to declare its existence.
Israel’s Minister of Defense, Benny Gantz, traveled to Washington, DC last week on this matter. But his visit will not change the course of history: the Europeans have already given the green light, US President Biden is determined to sign, and therefore Israel’s main point of attention should be towards developing a new strategy: how to contribute to an existence in which no Iranian regime would dare ware a nuclear war against Israel?
Those are in-depth discussions, which are taking place in private between the defense system and the government, and with long-term effects. The discussions with the US, in the final days before the deal is resurrected, are mostly ceremonial. The attempt is to make the deal a pill that’s a little less bitter to swallow.
The agreement’s core is already known: it will center around the level of uranium Iran is entitled to enrich, its quality and supervision. In the original JCPOA, signed in 2015 under Barack Obama and cancelled by Donald Trump in 2018, the amount of enriched uranium was limited to 280 km at a rate of up to 3.8%. Since the deal was nixed and supervision removed – the Iranians upped the enrichment rate to 60%. Obviously, the amount also grew substantially.
One thing is for sure: even if the new deal is fairly similar to the original one, times have changed since 2018 in favor of the Ayatollahs. Iran has proved it can face sanctions, and has greatly improved the quality of its centrifuges.
This quality is what will determine the time Iran will need to manufacture the first bomb with the tools it has left, once it will decide to retreat from the agreement and charge forwards (much like North Korea had once identified the opportunity to write off the US and declare itself a nuclear power).
Global conditions have also greatly tipped in favor of Iran. Russia is up to its neck with its war in Ukraine, and China is in the midst of a trade war with the US – and otherwise mostly concerned about taking over Taiwan. These two countries will not hurry to back up any move the West might take against Iran. Quite the contrary: Iran provides Russia with military supplies, and cooperates with China in the cyber sphere.
The 40-year strategy has exhausted itself
About 40 years have passed since Iran had made the decision, in principle, to become a nuclear nation. This decision was made following the Iraqi missile attack on Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. The first to identify this plan was then Mossad Head, Shabtai Shavit. Ever since, the Iranian nuclear efforts have taken place in an alternating pace, but with the same end goal: to achieve a bomb and launching capabilities, especially through long-range missiles.
On its part, Israel has repeatedly announced that it will not enable Iran to achieve a nuclear status. According to foreign media, over the years Israel has taken every possible method to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, aided by Western partners.
Nuclear facilities were sabotaged in many ways, Iranian nuclear scientists were repeatedly eliminated, and there was also the famous cyberattack using the Stuxnet worm, in which the attackers managed to penetrate the control and command array of the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facilities.
The centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. This is required because in nature, each kilogram of mixed uranium as 99.7% of uranium 238, and only 0.3% (a mere three grams) of uranium 235.
Uranium 235 is the substance needed in order to create a nuclear bomb, or activate nuclear power plants. The enrichment separates the different type of uranium with the end goal being a combination with a much higher rate of 235.
Each centrifuge is an elongated, narrow cylinder, made of thin and powerful metal. The cylinder is only a few meters long, and dozens of centimeters wide. It spins at a rate of up to 100,000 spins per minute.
Taking a centrifuge out of balance results in its immediate crash – which could also damage the centrifuges around it. This is what happened in Natanz following the Stuxnet attack, but the Iranians have equipped themselves with new ones.
The US as a deterrent factor
Is it still possible to make Iran withdraw from its nuclear program? Israeli MP Yuval Steinitz, in his previous position as Minister of Energy, had coordinated the classified discussions between Israel and the global nations during the last decade, before the original deal was signed. Steinitz believes, that with all due respect to Israel – the US is the only one with deterrent capabilities. The extent of deterrence hangs on the willingness they attribute the Americans in using their military capabilities – of which the Iranians have no doubt.
According to Steinitz, the only time the Iranians truly fully froze their nuclear program was in 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq. Muammar Gaddafi, ruler of Libya at the time, was also frightened by the American aggression, and decided to give up his nuclear program on his own initiative – a program of which Israel was not even aware.
Steinitz says that in the previous decade, Iran reduced its stocks of uranium even before the JCPOA was signed, and increased enrichment only after Biden won the election. It didn’t dare do so during the Trump days.
A new kind of deterrence
The Israeli defense system is in consensus about the inability to end the Iranian nuclear program with one military action, like Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. The Iranians have learned from this and scattered their plants in various locations, in the thick of the earth.
And so, assuming that it is only Iran that will decide when to make the break towards the bomb, a new strategic concept is required.
Late Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, was considered the “brain” who came up with Israel’s strategy on this matter for many years. Dagan’s evaluation was that at some point in time, Israel would be required to shift from the strategy of preventing an Iranian bomb at all costs – to the strategy of conducting itself under the assumption that Iran is a nuclear power.
Dagan is already long gone. Many defense officials who were his brainstorming partners, tend to estimate that the window of that strategic change should have already taken place 3-4 years ago, in close proximity to Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. The Israeli moves for this new nuclear age are accelerating now.
In this new position, the strategy which dominated the Cold War era is less relevant, the main reason being that the Ayatollah regime is also driven by Messianic considerations, meaning that the worse it is for them here on earth – it will be better come judgement day.
In a central square in Tehran is a clock, counting down the time the “Zionist entity” is annihilated – give or take, 20 years from now. This could be viewed as a curiosity. It probably shouldn’t, though.
Intelligence supremacy
According to foreign media, Israel is developing a second-strike capability, that is, the ability to attack Iran with nuclear measures, even if Israel suffers extensive damage due to being hit first. Some of those reports claim that this is what stands behind Israel’s decision to acquire new submarines, and also behind massive new bombers procurement deals, to be decided upon in 2023.
But all of this is not enough.
What else, then? Facing this new era, Israel will be forced to increase its intelligence supremacy via Iran even more, and make the regime feel completely transparent, so it doesn’t dare make that final step towards the bomb.
In addition, developing interception measures like the “Hetz 3” and “David’s Sling” (“Magic Wand”) is important. At the same time, even if Israel is equipped with countless interception means, one can imagine a mass exodus out of central Israel and if there is an imminent threat. No one will take the chances of staying home, as is the came when there are non-nuclear threats from Gaza or Lebanon.
New Ideas
Brig. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Nuriel, a former executive at the National Security Council, suggested (in an article he wrote for the Hebrew version of Israel Defense) a new concept of “deterrence until paralysis”. According to Nuriel, the Abraham Accords could serve as infrastructure for a multi-dimensional, regional defense doctrine, led by the US.
The meaning is a combined system that will enable the creation of a comprehensive network of radars – which, when linked together to satellites, will enable a broad picture of detection. Simultaneously, a combined array of various interception measures, encompassing all layers, will also be built – so that there will be multi-layer offensive defense that will be able to handle any warhead at any trajectory.
This proposed array would be able to intercept a warhead over the launching area, a mere seconds following the launch (and in special cases, before that). This would promote substantial deterrence, leading to paralysis on the other side.
In practical terms, no one is interested in having their own warhead intercepted in their terror and suffering all of the damage meant to be inflicted upon the enemy – and especially when unconventional warheads are at stake. Such a system could also suit other places in the world and thereby fully neutralize substantial threats.
According to Nuriel, what needs to be done is to declare this strategy, hold a demonstration, deliver messages both to the Iranian regime and its partners and to the Iranian people (your leadership will get you killed), and make use of the time to formulate additional moves that will topple the regime.
A new regime might not withdraw from the nuclear plan, but could very well be more rational. Could the Ayatollah regime crumble, just like the Soviet Union. The answer is yes.
The problem is that former Mossad head, Efraim Halevy, anticipated such a collapse in 2000, and it didn’t happen. Furthermore, in 2011, Israeli intelligence mathematicians calculated that the Assad regime expectancy in Syria is a mere few months. Ehud Barak, Israel’s Minister of Defense at the time, shared this with the Americans. But as we know, this didn’t happen either.
All of this leads to the conclusion that one cannot rely in an Iranian regime change as a component in the new strategy.
Deceitful calm
What is expected in the first few years after the nuclear deal is signed? Probably, relative calm, both intoxicating and deceiving. Israel has already basked in three very quiet years in the past, between the end of the War of Attrition in 1970 and the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1983. In retrospect, it became known that the hiatus was being used to change things on the ground, courtesy of USSER surface-to-air missiles.
Regarding the new nuclear deal, Israel has already declared it is neither a party in it not committed, meaning, Israel is maintaining its freedom of action in Iran. But the situation is of great concern and requires far-reaching changes in Israel’s military measures and their activation concept, not just talking.
With or without a resurrected nuclear deal, the only one to decide if and when to announce the existence of the first bomb is Iran itself. Israel must develop new tools to face this threat – the old strategy has exhausted itself. A special column by Amir Rapaport
Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid with current Mossad chied, David (Dadi) Barnea, earlier this month. Photo: Prime Minister’s Office
The nuclear agreement that is expected to be signed shortly between the US and the European power on one end, and Iran on the other, will not change a fundamental fact: Iran is de facto becoming a nuclear state. Its Ayatollah regime is the one that will decide when to make that tiny jump to the first nuclear bomb, and when to declare its existence.
Israel’s Minister of Defense, Benny Gantz, traveled to Washington, DC last week on this matter. But his visit will not change the course of history: the Europeans have already given the green light, US President Biden is determined to sign, and therefore Israel’s main point of attention should be towards developing a new strategy: how to contribute to an existence in which no Iranian regime would dare ware a nuclear war against Israel?
Those are in-depth discussions, which are taking place in private between the defense system and the government, and with long-term effects. The discussions with the US, in the final days before the deal is resurrected, are mostly ceremonial. The attempt is to make the deal a pill that’s a little less bitter to swallow.
The agreement’s core is already known: it will center around the level of uranium Iran is entitled to enrich, its quality and supervision. In the original JCPOA, signed in 2015 under Barack Obama and cancelled by Donald Trump in 2018, the amount of enriched uranium was limited to 280 km at a rate of up to 3.8%. Since the deal was nixed and supervision removed – the Iranians upped the enrichment rate to 60%. Obviously, the amount also grew substantially.
One thing is for sure: even if the new deal is fairly similar to the original one, times have changed since 2018 in favor of the Ayatollahs. Iran has proved it can face sanctions, and has greatly improved the quality of its centrifuges.
This quality is what will determine the time Iran will need to manufacture the first bomb with the tools it has left, once it will decide to retreat from the agreement and charge forwards (much like North Korea had once identified the opportunity to write off the US and declare itself a nuclear power).
Global conditions have also greatly tipped in favor of Iran. Russia is up to its neck with its war in Ukraine, and China is in the midst of a trade war with the US – and otherwise mostly concerned about taking over Taiwan. These two countries will not hurry to back up any move the West might take against Iran. Quite the contrary: Iran provides Russia with military supplies, and cooperates with China in the cyber sphere.
The 40-year strategy has exhausted itself
About 40 years have passed since Iran had made the decision, in principle, to become a nuclear nation. This decision was made following the Iraqi missile attack on Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. The first to identify this plan was then Mossad Head, Shabtai Shavit. Ever since, the Iranian nuclear efforts have taken place in an alternating pace, but with the same end goal: to achieve a bomb and launching capabilities, especially through long-range missiles.
On its part, Israel has repeatedly announced that it will not enable Iran to achieve a nuclear status. According to foreign media, over the years Israel has taken every possible method to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, aided by Western partners.
Nuclear facilities were sabotaged in many ways, Iranian nuclear scientists were repeatedly eliminated, and there was also the famous cyberattack using the Stuxnet worm, in which the attackers managed to penetrate the control and command array of the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facilities.
The centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. This is required because in nature, each kilogram of mixed uranium as 99.7% of uranium 238, and only 0.3% (a mere three grams) of uranium 235.
Uranium 235 is the substance needed in order to create a nuclear bomb, or activate nuclear power plants. The enrichment separates the different type of uranium with the end goal being a combination with a much higher rate of 235.
Each centrifuge is an elongated, narrow cylinder, made of thin and powerful metal. The cylinder is only a few meters long, and dozens of centimeters wide. It spins at a rate of up to 100,000 spins per minute.
Taking a centrifuge out of balance results in its immediate crash – which could also damage the centrifuges around it. This is what happened in Natanz following the Stuxnet attack, but the Iranians have equipped themselves with new ones.
The US as a deterrent factor
Is it still possible to make Iran withdraw from its nuclear program? Israeli MP Yuval Steinitz, in his previous position as Minister of Energy, had coordinated the classified discussions between Israel and the global nations during the last decade, before the original deal was signed. Steinitz believes, that with all due respect to Israel – the US is the only one with deterrent capabilities. The extent of deterrence hangs on the willingness they attribute the Americans in using their military capabilities – of which the Iranians have no doubt.
According to Steinitz, the only time the Iranians truly fully froze their nuclear program was in 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq. Muammar Gaddafi, ruler of Libya at the time, was also frightened by the American aggression, and decided to give up his nuclear program on his own initiative – a program of which Israel was not even aware.
Steinitz says that in the previous decade, Iran reduced its stocks of uranium even before the JCPOA was signed, and increased enrichment only after Biden won the election. It didn’t dare do so during the Trump days.
A new kind of deterrence
The Israeli defense system is in consensus about the inability to end the Iranian nuclear program with one military action, like Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. The Iranians have learned from this and scattered their plants in various locations, in the thick of the earth.
And so, assuming that it is only Iran that will decide when to make the break towards the bomb, a new strategic concept is required.
Late Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, was considered the “brain” who came up with Israel’s strategy on this matter for many years. Dagan’s evaluation was that at some point in time, Israel would be required to shift from the strategy of preventing an Iranian bomb at all costs – to the strategy of conducting itself under the assumption that Iran is a nuclear power.
Dagan is already long gone. Many defense officials who were his brainstorming partners, tend to estimate that the window of that strategic change should have already taken place 3-4 years ago, in close proximity to Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. The Israeli moves for this new nuclear age are accelerating now.
In this new position, the strategy which dominated the Cold War era is less relevant, the main reason being that the Ayatollah regime is also driven by Messianic considerations, meaning that the worse it is for them here on earth – it will be better come judgement day.
In a central square in Tehran is a clock, counting down the time the “Zionist entity” is annihilated – give or take, 20 years from now. This could be viewed as a curiosity. It probably shouldn’t, though.
Intelligence supremacy
According to foreign media, Israel is developing a second-strike capability, that is, the ability to attack Iran with nuclear measures, even if Israel suffers extensive damage due to being hit first. Some of those reports claim that this is what stands behind Israel’s decision to acquire new submarines, and also behind massive new bombers procurement deals, to be decided upon in 2023.
But all of this is not enough.
What else, then? Facing this new era, Israel will be forced to increase its intelligence supremacy via Iran even more, and make the regime feel completely transparent, so it doesn’t dare make that final step towards the bomb.
In addition, developing interception measures like the “Hetz 3” and “David’s Sling” (“Magic Wand”) is important. At the same time, even if Israel is equipped with countless interception means, one can imagine a mass exodus out of central Israel and if there is an imminent threat. No one will take the chances of staying home, as is the came when there are non-nuclear threats from Gaza or Lebanon.
New Ideas
Brig. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Nuriel, a former executive at the National Security Council, suggested (in an article he wrote for the Hebrew version of Israel Defense) a new concept of “deterrence until paralysis”. According to Nuriel, the Abraham Accords could serve as infrastructure for a multi-dimensional, regional defense doctrine, led by the US.
The meaning is a combined system that will enable the creation of a comprehensive network of radars – which, when linked together to satellites, will enable a broad picture of detection. Simultaneously, a combined array of various interception measures, encompassing all layers, will also be built – so that there will be multi-layer offensive defense that will be able to handle any warhead at any trajectory.
This proposed array would be able to intercept a warhead over the launching area, a mere seconds following the launch (and in special cases, before that). This would promote substantial deterrence, leading to paralysis on the other side.
In practical terms, no one is interested in having their own warhead intercepted in their terror and suffering all of the damage meant to be inflicted upon the enemy – and especially when unconventional warheads are at stake. Such a system could also suit other places in the world and thereby fully neutralize substantial threats.
According to Nuriel, what needs to be done is to declare this strategy, hold a demonstration, deliver messages both to the Iranian regime and its partners and to the Iranian people (your leadership will get you killed), and make use of the time to formulate additional moves that will topple the regime.
A new regime might not withdraw from the nuclear plan, but could very well be more rational. Could the Ayatollah regime crumble, just like the Soviet Union. The answer is yes.
The problem is that former Mossad head, Efraim Halevy, anticipated such a collapse in 2000, and it didn’t happen. Furthermore, in 2011, Israeli intelligence mathematicians calculated that the Assad regime expectancy in Syria is a mere few months. Ehud Barak, Israel’s Minister of Defense at the time, shared this with the Americans. But as we know, this didn’t happen either.
All of this leads to the conclusion that one cannot rely in an Iranian regime change as a component in the new strategy.
Deceitful calm
What is expected in the first few years after the nuclear deal is signed? Probably, relative calm, both intoxicating and deceiving. Israel has already basked in three very quiet years in the past, between the end of the War of Attrition in 1970 and the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1983. In retrospect, it became known that the hiatus was being used to change things on the ground, courtesy of USSER surface-to-air missiles.
Regarding the new nuclear deal, Israel has already declared it is neither a party in it not committed, meaning, Israel is maintaining its freedom of action in Iran. But the situation is of great concern and requires far-reaching changes in Israel’s military measures and their activation concept, not just talking.
