Has a "Palestinian spring" really started?
Despite the protests that broke out last week in the Palestinian Authority, an "Arab spring" scenario seems unlikely due to strong internal restraints within the Palestinian system, writes Michael Milshtein, an expert on Palestinian affairs
IsraelDefense
| 04/07/2021
Demonstrators holding placards protest over the death of Nizar Banat in Hebron on June 27. Photo: REUTERS/Mussa Qawasma
By Michael Milshtein
Last week, a storm erupted in Palestinian society following the death of Nizar Banat, a human rights activist from the area of Hebron, who had been arrested by the Palestinian security services after he criticized the Palestinian Authority. He was severely beaten while under arrest, and died as a result of it. The incident sparked an unusual wave of protest against the Palestinian Authority at a number of locations in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian security forces cracked down on the demonstrators, which intensified criticism of the regime's human rights violations.
At the start of the protests, there was an attempt by Hamas to inflame and even lead them, which gave them the nature of an internal Palestinian political struggle (even though Banat was not a member of the movement, but rather an independent who was identified with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The efforts by Hamas sparked concern among Fatah, whose activists mobilized to defend Abu Mazen's regime by holding demonstrations of support and issuing public warnings that strong actions will be taken against anyone who tries to destabilize the regime in Ramallah.
At the protests, demonstrators chanted the slogan "the people want the regime to be toppled", which was the battle cry at the "Arab spring" protests, raising speculation as to whether a "Palestinian spring" has started. It came amid the backdrop of strong public criticism against the Palestinian security services, which were called "Shabiha" or "Baltagiya", the names given to the violent militias that operated on behalf of the regimes in Syria and Egypt, along with expressions of discontent within the Palestinian leadership, such as the announcement by one of the smaller parties of its resignation from the Palestinian government (the Palestinian labor minister also announced his resignation, but the resignation was not accepted).
The Banat affair reflects two powerful but conflicting trends that coexist in the Palestinian Authority. They pose a constant threat of destabilizing the existing order, but they demonstrate the strong internal restraints within the Palestinian system that prevent a rapid deterioration into the type of revolution that occurred in the Arab world over the last decade, which made the Palestinian Authority one of the only places in the region where the Arab spring did not take place.
On one hand, it demonstrates once again the strong alienation of the majority of the Palestinian public from the Palestinian Authority in general and Abu Mazen in particular. Most of the public thinks that the Palestinian regime is riddled with corruption and nepotism, and continuously and blatantly violates human rights and democratic principles. The latest expression of this was when Abu Mazen prevented general elections that were supposed to have been held about a month ago. A variety of public opinion polls that were held over the last decade in the Palestinian society reflect this mood, with the majority of the public yearning for Abu Mazen to relinquish the position that he has held for 16 consecutive years.
But on the other hand, as mentioned, the latest events demonstrate how difficult it is for a "Palestinian spring" to take place. The protest was unusual in its scale and characteristics, but even at its climax it only included several thousand demonstrators from around Judea and Samaria who did not act in a single framework and were not led by a single entity, and thus the protests did not reach a "critical mass" that could destabilize the regime. Furthermore, the Palestinian security forces and Fatah demonstrated unity and a common goal due to the shared threat, and thus signaled to the wider public that the regime is stable and ready to fight for its survival.
In many respects, the Banat affair strengthened basic assumptions regarding the strategic reality in Judea and Samaria that have been continuously validated for more than a decade. In this framework, the dominating aspect is the desire by the regime and the public to maintain civilian life and stable rule, while rejecting a widespread national uprising or a wave of violence directed against Israel or the Palestinian Authority. All of this comes despite many crises experienced by the Palestinian system, such as fierce wars in the Gaza Strip, continuing deadlock in the political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as a deep rift between the two sides, the moving of the American embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018, and violent clashes between Jews and Arabs in Judea and Samaria.
The "quiet formula" in Judea and Samaria appears to be based on a collective basic assumption that is predominant in the Palestinian public that although the situation is not ideal, and the public is faced with restrictions imposed by Israel and the Palestinian regime, the reality is still relatively better than that of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, not to mention than in the rest of the Arab world.
Familiarity with the situation on the other fronts in the region, and the poor results of the revolutions that broke out in them, along with the collective memory of the results of the conflicts with Israel during the last 20 years, have created a clear understanding of the price paid for loss as well as avoidance of widespread mobilization for internal struggles or ones against Israel. This was expressed recently during operation "Guardian of the Walls". The war in the Gaza Strip did not spark a wave of terror or a widespread popular uprising in Judea and Samaria as had been hoped by Hamas, just like in operation "Protective Edge".
The Palestinian public considers the regime of Abu Mazen to be far from ideal, and its legitimacy is in doubt, but it is considered to be an asset due to its success in maintaining and even improving civilian life in Judea and Samaria, and due to the understanding that any alternative that develops in its place, including a Hamas takeover, may be worse and mainly threaten the continuation of the current situation in the region, which as mentioned is perceived – at the moment at least – as less bad. Thus, during a period in which a political arrangement appears to be becoming less likely, and the path of opposition is not so attractive, the majority of Palestinians prefer to focus on an idea that has been called in Arabic "bidna naish", meaning "We want to live".
During the last decade, the public took to the streets because of two main issues: religious matters (especially following claims of violation of the status quo on the Temple Mount, an issue proven in May to cause an outburst in Gaza as well as in Arab society in Israel) and economic matters, mainly salary cuts, the raising of prices or violation of the conditions of workers in various sectors, which led to mass demonstrations against the Palestinian regime.
But this stability that has continued for more than a decade should not give Israel the feeling that it can last forever. The "quiet formula" proved itself in dealing with various challenges, but is still based on foundations that can rapidly deteriorate, first and foremost via a serious economic crisis, especially following such a crisis in Israel; developments on the Temple Mount, which as previously mentioned almost always serve as a trigger for an outburst of violence; or the strengthening of the influence of the young generation, which has a shorter collective memory than their parents' generation and thus it is less influenced by the memory of traumas such as the second intifada.
It would be wise for Israel to deeply understand that the relative stability in Judea and Samaria is a strategic asset that is not a given, and should be maintained and even strengthened using a variety of tools, first and foremost the expansion of the economic support of the Palestinian Authority, improvement of civilian life in Judea and Samaria, the reinforcement of the strength of the Palestinian security services, and continuously preventing Hamas from consolidating its power on every level. This kind of policy is not a permanent solution in the Palestinian context, but it may give Israel the opportunity to overcome serious crises in the future, or at least reduce their effects, including "the day after" Abu Mazen.
Dr. Michael Milshtein serves as a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and as Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
This article was originally published in Hebrew on the IPS website.
Despite the protests that broke out last week in the Palestinian Authority, an "Arab spring" scenario seems unlikely due to strong internal restraints within the Palestinian system, writes Michael Milshtein, an expert on Palestinian affairs
Demonstrators holding placards protest over the death of Nizar Banat in Hebron on June 27. Photo: REUTERS/Mussa Qawasma
By Michael Milshtein
Last week, a storm erupted in Palestinian society following the death of Nizar Banat, a human rights activist from the area of Hebron, who had been arrested by the Palestinian security services after he criticized the Palestinian Authority. He was severely beaten while under arrest, and died as a result of it. The incident sparked an unusual wave of protest against the Palestinian Authority at a number of locations in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian security forces cracked down on the demonstrators, which intensified criticism of the regime's human rights violations.
At the start of the protests, there was an attempt by Hamas to inflame and even lead them, which gave them the nature of an internal Palestinian political struggle (even though Banat was not a member of the movement, but rather an independent who was identified with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The efforts by Hamas sparked concern among Fatah, whose activists mobilized to defend Abu Mazen's regime by holding demonstrations of support and issuing public warnings that strong actions will be taken against anyone who tries to destabilize the regime in Ramallah.
At the protests, demonstrators chanted the slogan "the people want the regime to be toppled", which was the battle cry at the "Arab spring" protests, raising speculation as to whether a "Palestinian spring" has started. It came amid the backdrop of strong public criticism against the Palestinian security services, which were called "Shabiha" or "Baltagiya", the names given to the violent militias that operated on behalf of the regimes in Syria and Egypt, along with expressions of discontent within the Palestinian leadership, such as the announcement by one of the smaller parties of its resignation from the Palestinian government (the Palestinian labor minister also announced his resignation, but the resignation was not accepted).
The Banat affair reflects two powerful but conflicting trends that coexist in the Palestinian Authority. They pose a constant threat of destabilizing the existing order, but they demonstrate the strong internal restraints within the Palestinian system that prevent a rapid deterioration into the type of revolution that occurred in the Arab world over the last decade, which made the Palestinian Authority one of the only places in the region where the Arab spring did not take place.
On one hand, it demonstrates once again the strong alienation of the majority of the Palestinian public from the Palestinian Authority in general and Abu Mazen in particular. Most of the public thinks that the Palestinian regime is riddled with corruption and nepotism, and continuously and blatantly violates human rights and democratic principles. The latest expression of this was when Abu Mazen prevented general elections that were supposed to have been held about a month ago. A variety of public opinion polls that were held over the last decade in the Palestinian society reflect this mood, with the majority of the public yearning for Abu Mazen to relinquish the position that he has held for 16 consecutive years.
But on the other hand, as mentioned, the latest events demonstrate how difficult it is for a "Palestinian spring" to take place. The protest was unusual in its scale and characteristics, but even at its climax it only included several thousand demonstrators from around Judea and Samaria who did not act in a single framework and were not led by a single entity, and thus the protests did not reach a "critical mass" that could destabilize the regime. Furthermore, the Palestinian security forces and Fatah demonstrated unity and a common goal due to the shared threat, and thus signaled to the wider public that the regime is stable and ready to fight for its survival.
In many respects, the Banat affair strengthened basic assumptions regarding the strategic reality in Judea and Samaria that have been continuously validated for more than a decade. In this framework, the dominating aspect is the desire by the regime and the public to maintain civilian life and stable rule, while rejecting a widespread national uprising or a wave of violence directed against Israel or the Palestinian Authority. All of this comes despite many crises experienced by the Palestinian system, such as fierce wars in the Gaza Strip, continuing deadlock in the political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as a deep rift between the two sides, the moving of the American embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018, and violent clashes between Jews and Arabs in Judea and Samaria.
The "quiet formula" in Judea and Samaria appears to be based on a collective basic assumption that is predominant in the Palestinian public that although the situation is not ideal, and the public is faced with restrictions imposed by Israel and the Palestinian regime, the reality is still relatively better than that of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, not to mention than in the rest of the Arab world.
Familiarity with the situation on the other fronts in the region, and the poor results of the revolutions that broke out in them, along with the collective memory of the results of the conflicts with Israel during the last 20 years, have created a clear understanding of the price paid for loss as well as avoidance of widespread mobilization for internal struggles or ones against Israel. This was expressed recently during operation "Guardian of the Walls". The war in the Gaza Strip did not spark a wave of terror or a widespread popular uprising in Judea and Samaria as had been hoped by Hamas, just like in operation "Protective Edge".
The Palestinian public considers the regime of Abu Mazen to be far from ideal, and its legitimacy is in doubt, but it is considered to be an asset due to its success in maintaining and even improving civilian life in Judea and Samaria, and due to the understanding that any alternative that develops in its place, including a Hamas takeover, may be worse and mainly threaten the continuation of the current situation in the region, which as mentioned is perceived – at the moment at least – as less bad. Thus, during a period in which a political arrangement appears to be becoming less likely, and the path of opposition is not so attractive, the majority of Palestinians prefer to focus on an idea that has been called in Arabic "bidna naish", meaning "We want to live".
During the last decade, the public took to the streets because of two main issues: religious matters (especially following claims of violation of the status quo on the Temple Mount, an issue proven in May to cause an outburst in Gaza as well as in Arab society in Israel) and economic matters, mainly salary cuts, the raising of prices or violation of the conditions of workers in various sectors, which led to mass demonstrations against the Palestinian regime.
But this stability that has continued for more than a decade should not give Israel the feeling that it can last forever. The "quiet formula" proved itself in dealing with various challenges, but is still based on foundations that can rapidly deteriorate, first and foremost via a serious economic crisis, especially following such a crisis in Israel; developments on the Temple Mount, which as previously mentioned almost always serve as a trigger for an outburst of violence; or the strengthening of the influence of the young generation, which has a shorter collective memory than their parents' generation and thus it is less influenced by the memory of traumas such as the second intifada.
It would be wise for Israel to deeply understand that the relative stability in Judea and Samaria is a strategic asset that is not a given, and should be maintained and even strengthened using a variety of tools, first and foremost the expansion of the economic support of the Palestinian Authority, improvement of civilian life in Judea and Samaria, the reinforcement of the strength of the Palestinian security services, and continuously preventing Hamas from consolidating its power on every level. This kind of policy is not a permanent solution in the Palestinian context, but it may give Israel the opportunity to overcome serious crises in the future, or at least reduce their effects, including "the day after" Abu Mazen.
Dr. Michael Milshtein serves as a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and as Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
This article was originally published in Hebrew on the IPS website.
