Abbas already likely to be biggest loser of Palestinian elections, if they are held
Commentary: The Palestinian Authority has paid a heavy price for bitter internal struggles, including damage to its image at home and abroad, demonstrating the difference between the PA and Hamas. However, if the elections are cancelled, a “Palestinian Spring” should not be expected, writes Dr. Michael Milshtein, Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University
Michael Milstein
| 22/04/2021
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attends a virtual meeting with Palestinian factions over Israel and the United Arab Emirates' deal to normalise ties, in Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank September 3, 2020. Alaa Badarneh/Pool via REUTERS
By Dr. Michael Milshtein
For a moment, it appeared that the situation is different this time around. After a decade and a half of attempts to hold elections in the Palestinian Authority, which all ended with a resonating failure, it seemed that the efforts of the past six months will indeed bear fruit. There have been some clues, in the form of certain steps which have not been seen since the 2006 elections: scheduling dates for all the election campaigns (the first being elections for the Palestinian parliament, on May 22nd), compiling a voter registry, and compiling lists of candidates on behalf of the political bodies.
However, in the past few weeks a new tune is being heard, which among many Palestinians raises concern that, once again, nothing will come of the “elections episode”. In the background are increasing hints from the PA about the possibility of considering either postponing or halting the elections, as Israel has not agreed to allow them to also be held in East Jerusalem, as had been the case in the past. This situation is accompanied by PA efforts to exert international pressure on Israel—so that it, in return, will agree to the claims regarding Jerusalem—and by a public campaign aimed at preparing the field for a possible withdrawal from the elections altogether.
Most Palestinians are cynical about this attempt, often described as a mere excuse to enable a climbdown in a seemingly respectable way. The motive behind this change of heart is clear: Fatah is in a deep slump, split between three lists that are hostile to each other, and suffering from public image issues, while Hamas has been showing unity and a strong ambition to reap an accomplishment that will advance it towards its coveted end goal—leading the entire Palestinian system.
With this in the background, the PA is becoming anxious, fearing a possible repeat of the 2006 precedent when it lost to Hamas in the polls, which ended in the movement taking over the Gaza strip and banishing the PA from the area in summer 2007.
At this current point in time, it is difficult to assess whether the elections will indeed take place. However, it appears that Mahmoud Abbas can already be crowned the main loser: the PA has paid a heavy price of bitter internal struggles and suffered damage to its image at home and abroad—which clearly demonstrated the differences between it and Hamas. It is likely that the PA will be presented as the one that caused the failure of a strategic move meant to bring about national unity and democratization of the Palestinian political arena.
Should postponement of the election be announced soon, it is likely that Abbas will not face exceptionally harsh consequences. The public displays mistrust towards him as is, and does not estimate that the elections will take place—and therefore is not likely to suffer great disappointment. Hamas, it appears, is expected to use harsher rhetoric against Abbas and will also try to promote a public outcry against the PA.
However, the movement’s spheres of operation and influence in the West Bank are fairly limited, and it is unlikely to be able to bring about a “Palestinian Spring”. Furthermore, the international community, including the US and the Arab world, has been showing limited interest in these elections, and to a great extent is even expected to breathe a sigh of relief following the cancellation of a move that could have benefited the Muslim Brotherhood camp in the region.
And yet, cancelling the elections—which even Israel considers a risky strategic move—does not mean reassurance. The current move represents the deep ailments of the Palestinian regime, and serves as a warning of threats that could erupt in the future.
In addition to the clear divide between Fatah and Hamas, the PA’s conduct illustrates several fundamental problems: the lack of a clear strategy, an orderly decision-making process and compatibility between planned goals and the actual reality, as well as the absence of balancing factors alongside Abbas, which have the power to prevent the recurrence of traumatic “historic accidents” similar to ones he was responsible for in the past.
All of this deepens the concern from the various scenarios that could unfold “the day after”, when Abbas is no longer in power and the PA will have to demonstrate strength, judgment and unity, while facing complex internal and external challenges.
Dr. Michael Milshtein is the Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. He also serves as a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.
Commentary: The Palestinian Authority has paid a heavy price for bitter internal struggles, including damage to its image at home and abroad, demonstrating the difference between the PA and Hamas. However, if the elections are cancelled, a “Palestinian Spring” should not be expected, writes Dr. Michael Milshtein, Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attends a virtual meeting with Palestinian factions over Israel and the United Arab Emirates' deal to normalise ties, in Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank September 3, 2020. Alaa Badarneh/Pool via REUTERS
By Dr. Michael Milshtein
For a moment, it appeared that the situation is different this time around. After a decade and a half of attempts to hold elections in the Palestinian Authority, which all ended with a resonating failure, it seemed that the efforts of the past six months will indeed bear fruit. There have been some clues, in the form of certain steps which have not been seen since the 2006 elections: scheduling dates for all the election campaigns (the first being elections for the Palestinian parliament, on May 22nd), compiling a voter registry, and compiling lists of candidates on behalf of the political bodies.
However, in the past few weeks a new tune is being heard, which among many Palestinians raises concern that, once again, nothing will come of the “elections episode”. In the background are increasing hints from the PA about the possibility of considering either postponing or halting the elections, as Israel has not agreed to allow them to also be held in East Jerusalem, as had been the case in the past. This situation is accompanied by PA efforts to exert international pressure on Israel—so that it, in return, will agree to the claims regarding Jerusalem—and by a public campaign aimed at preparing the field for a possible withdrawal from the elections altogether.
Most Palestinians are cynical about this attempt, often described as a mere excuse to enable a climbdown in a seemingly respectable way. The motive behind this change of heart is clear: Fatah is in a deep slump, split between three lists that are hostile to each other, and suffering from public image issues, while Hamas has been showing unity and a strong ambition to reap an accomplishment that will advance it towards its coveted end goal—leading the entire Palestinian system.
With this in the background, the PA is becoming anxious, fearing a possible repeat of the 2006 precedent when it lost to Hamas in the polls, which ended in the movement taking over the Gaza strip and banishing the PA from the area in summer 2007.
At this current point in time, it is difficult to assess whether the elections will indeed take place. However, it appears that Mahmoud Abbas can already be crowned the main loser: the PA has paid a heavy price of bitter internal struggles and suffered damage to its image at home and abroad—which clearly demonstrated the differences between it and Hamas. It is likely that the PA will be presented as the one that caused the failure of a strategic move meant to bring about national unity and democratization of the Palestinian political arena.
Should postponement of the election be announced soon, it is likely that Abbas will not face exceptionally harsh consequences. The public displays mistrust towards him as is, and does not estimate that the elections will take place—and therefore is not likely to suffer great disappointment. Hamas, it appears, is expected to use harsher rhetoric against Abbas and will also try to promote a public outcry against the PA.
However, the movement’s spheres of operation and influence in the West Bank are fairly limited, and it is unlikely to be able to bring about a “Palestinian Spring”. Furthermore, the international community, including the US and the Arab world, has been showing limited interest in these elections, and to a great extent is even expected to breathe a sigh of relief following the cancellation of a move that could have benefited the Muslim Brotherhood camp in the region.
And yet, cancelling the elections—which even Israel considers a risky strategic move—does not mean reassurance. The current move represents the deep ailments of the Palestinian regime, and serves as a warning of threats that could erupt in the future.
In addition to the clear divide between Fatah and Hamas, the PA’s conduct illustrates several fundamental problems: the lack of a clear strategy, an orderly decision-making process and compatibility between planned goals and the actual reality, as well as the absence of balancing factors alongside Abbas, which have the power to prevent the recurrence of traumatic “historic accidents” similar to ones he was responsible for in the past.
All of this deepens the concern from the various scenarios that could unfold “the day after”, when Abbas is no longer in power and the PA will have to demonstrate strength, judgment and unity, while facing complex internal and external challenges.
Dr. Michael Milshtein is the Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. He also serves as a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.
