From natural gas to the Temple Mount: Turkey’s interests in normalizing relations with Israel
Ankara has been increasingly turning to local media in order to send cautious signals of rapprochement to Jerusalem, which in turn is enjoying recent regional developments that have strengthened its position and made it a key partner in security, economy and energy issues
Mandi Kogosowski
| 15/03/2021
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: REUTERS/Umit Bektas
For several hours this past Friday, the headline "Israel in talks with Turkey over East Med" maintained its top position on the Turkish pro-government website "Daily Sabah". The piece itself stated that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an electoral event that his government is in contact with several countries, Turkey included, about natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. While this did not spark headlines in Israel, the website stated that "Netanyahu’s remarks are the first to be publicly announced about talks with Turkey".
Earlier last week, Turkish media widely reported similar comments made by Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, who had mentioned that the two countries had previously held talks on natural gas exports, which did not mature to an agreement, but that he was hopeful Turkey could join the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in the future. In addition, Admiral Jihat Yaizi, founder of Turkey’s "Blue Homeland" doctrine, who has close ties with President Erdoğan, gave an interview to the Jewish magazine "Shalom", and stated that it is a joint interest of both Turkey and Israel to re-normalize their relations (this was reported in "Israel Hayom" by Dean Shmuel Elmas). A few months ago, Yaizi also publicly suggested that Israel and Turkey regulate their maritime border.
These signals from Ankara follow various reports regarding overt and covert communication, in an attempt to normalize the relations again – and of course, Erdoğan’s own statement at the end of last year that his country is interested in improving relations with Israel, but has a problem with those who lead it. Following the president’s statement, Israel’s Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi instructed ministry officials to start putting out feelers to try and find out the seriousness of Erdoğan’s intentions.
A combination of economic, energy, intelligence and political interests
What lies at the heart of Turkey’s interest in rapprochement with Israel, after so many years of tension and hostility? The prominent DC think tank Atlantic Council looked into this in a comprehensive essay it published last week, and concluded that "growing isolation in its neighborhood and strained ties with the United States are driving a bid by Ankara to normalize relations with countries in the region, including Israel…A combination of economic, energy, intelligence, and political interests may have also persuaded Ankara to rethink its policy".
The core change in the Turkish attitude, according to the essay’s author, Karel Valanci, stems mostly from the pressure of the last few months, following the regional shifts in power: Israel’s normalization with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan under the "Abraham Accords", and the end of the Arab boycott of Qatar, Turkey’s ally (it should be noted that one of the reasons for that boycott was the close connection between the two).
Also, regarding the US, Turkey is not expecting an easy road ahead. It had already been sanctioned by the Trump administration over its purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia. The Biden administration is also strongly opposed to this, citing fears of Russian espionage, and Turkey is in need of additional allies. Furthermore, as far as diplomacy is concerned, Valanci points out that an improved relationship with Israel could open a few doors in Washington.
Another area of concern for Ankara is the various energy agreements signed by its neighbors, while it remains excluded. As stated, Turkey is not currently part of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum which includes Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority—in addition to Israel, of course. As for other major energy collaborations—such as the MoU for the connection of the Israeli, Greek and Cypriot electric grid signed last week, or the linking of Israel’s "Leviathan" gas field to Egypt’s liquified gas plants—Turkey has been watching from the sidelines.
The energy realm is a particularly sensitive one for Turkey, which aspires to be a leading regional economic force through control of the Mediterranean Sea and its resources. It has been engaged in a long, bitter maritime territorial dispute with both Cyprus and Greece, and only a few days ago suffered another blow, as Greece and Egypt managed to sort out differences they had regarding their own maritime borders, and came to an agreement on territories that are partly claimed by Turkey as its own.
In that context, Turkey suffered an additional embarrassment after the Egyptian Foreign Ministry denied Turkish reports that bilateral talks were underway on their maritime borders and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, eight years after the Egyptian government expelled the Turkish ambassador from Cairo. "The expectation is that any country interested in fostering normal relations with Egypt would obey by international law and the principles of good neighbor policy, and stop intervening in the internal affairs of regional countries", was the official message—which referred, among other things, to the Turkish involvement in the Libyan war, which Egypt views as a serious threat.
Israel: concerned over Temple Mount, less in need of selling weapons
The Atlantic Council report refers to Israel’s hesitancy in taking steps towards normalizing the relations, to its interests and to its fears. The author points out that while Turkey had previously been a significant arms sales market for Israel, it has now been replaced by larger markets such as India. In addition, the dominance of Turkish Airlines in the Israeli aviation industry is also in jeopardy following the Abraham Accords that led to flight agreements.
The report also notes Israel’s concern over Turkey’s increased interest in Jerusalem, and its belief that Erdoğan "wants to boost his quest for leadership of the Muslim world by claiming the custodianship of Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), that currently rests in Jordanian custody". Additional points of contention: Turkey is one of the most vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause (as it was even before the “Mavi Marmara” incident) and is often known to use harsh rhetoric against Israel on this matter. And of course, there’s the matter of its strong ties with Hamas and with Iran.
Despite everything, though, the essay concludes that while the bilateral relationship between Israel and Turkey "suffered considerably over the past decade, the two countries continue to share common interests. Restarting a dialogue that seeks areas of cooperation—such as technology, agriculture, and climate change—would be a first step. Cultural exchanges and friendly sports tournaments could help change public opinion in both countries. Most of all, however, political will is needed in both countries."
Ankara has been increasingly turning to local media in order to send cautious signals of rapprochement to Jerusalem, which in turn is enjoying recent regional developments that have strengthened its position and made it a key partner in security, economy and energy issues
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: REUTERS/Umit Bektas
For several hours this past Friday, the headline "Israel in talks with Turkey over East Med" maintained its top position on the Turkish pro-government website "Daily Sabah". The piece itself stated that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an electoral event that his government is in contact with several countries, Turkey included, about natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. While this did not spark headlines in Israel, the website stated that "Netanyahu’s remarks are the first to be publicly announced about talks with Turkey".
Earlier last week, Turkish media widely reported similar comments made by Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, who had mentioned that the two countries had previously held talks on natural gas exports, which did not mature to an agreement, but that he was hopeful Turkey could join the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in the future. In addition, Admiral Jihat Yaizi, founder of Turkey’s "Blue Homeland" doctrine, who has close ties with President Erdoğan, gave an interview to the Jewish magazine "Shalom", and stated that it is a joint interest of both Turkey and Israel to re-normalize their relations (this was reported in "Israel Hayom" by Dean Shmuel Elmas). A few months ago, Yaizi also publicly suggested that Israel and Turkey regulate their maritime border.
These signals from Ankara follow various reports regarding overt and covert communication, in an attempt to normalize the relations again – and of course, Erdoğan’s own statement at the end of last year that his country is interested in improving relations with Israel, but has a problem with those who lead it. Following the president’s statement, Israel’s Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi instructed ministry officials to start putting out feelers to try and find out the seriousness of Erdoğan’s intentions.
A combination of economic, energy, intelligence and political interests
What lies at the heart of Turkey’s interest in rapprochement with Israel, after so many years of tension and hostility? The prominent DC think tank Atlantic Council looked into this in a comprehensive essay it published last week, and concluded that "growing isolation in its neighborhood and strained ties with the United States are driving a bid by Ankara to normalize relations with countries in the region, including Israel…A combination of economic, energy, intelligence, and political interests may have also persuaded Ankara to rethink its policy".
The core change in the Turkish attitude, according to the essay’s author, Karel Valanci, stems mostly from the pressure of the last few months, following the regional shifts in power: Israel’s normalization with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan under the "Abraham Accords", and the end of the Arab boycott of Qatar, Turkey’s ally (it should be noted that one of the reasons for that boycott was the close connection between the two).
Also, regarding the US, Turkey is not expecting an easy road ahead. It had already been sanctioned by the Trump administration over its purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia. The Biden administration is also strongly opposed to this, citing fears of Russian espionage, and Turkey is in need of additional allies. Furthermore, as far as diplomacy is concerned, Valanci points out that an improved relationship with Israel could open a few doors in Washington.
Another area of concern for Ankara is the various energy agreements signed by its neighbors, while it remains excluded. As stated, Turkey is not currently part of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum which includes Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority—in addition to Israel, of course. As for other major energy collaborations—such as the MoU for the connection of the Israeli, Greek and Cypriot electric grid signed last week, or the linking of Israel’s "Leviathan" gas field to Egypt’s liquified gas plants—Turkey has been watching from the sidelines.
The energy realm is a particularly sensitive one for Turkey, which aspires to be a leading regional economic force through control of the Mediterranean Sea and its resources. It has been engaged in a long, bitter maritime territorial dispute with both Cyprus and Greece, and only a few days ago suffered another blow, as Greece and Egypt managed to sort out differences they had regarding their own maritime borders, and came to an agreement on territories that are partly claimed by Turkey as its own.
In that context, Turkey suffered an additional embarrassment after the Egyptian Foreign Ministry denied Turkish reports that bilateral talks were underway on their maritime borders and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, eight years after the Egyptian government expelled the Turkish ambassador from Cairo. "The expectation is that any country interested in fostering normal relations with Egypt would obey by international law and the principles of good neighbor policy, and stop intervening in the internal affairs of regional countries", was the official message—which referred, among other things, to the Turkish involvement in the Libyan war, which Egypt views as a serious threat.
Israel: concerned over Temple Mount, less in need of selling weapons
The Atlantic Council report refers to Israel’s hesitancy in taking steps towards normalizing the relations, to its interests and to its fears. The author points out that while Turkey had previously been a significant arms sales market for Israel, it has now been replaced by larger markets such as India. In addition, the dominance of Turkish Airlines in the Israeli aviation industry is also in jeopardy following the Abraham Accords that led to flight agreements.
The report also notes Israel’s concern over Turkey’s increased interest in Jerusalem, and its belief that Erdoğan "wants to boost his quest for leadership of the Muslim world by claiming the custodianship of Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), that currently rests in Jordanian custody". Additional points of contention: Turkey is one of the most vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause (as it was even before the “Mavi Marmara” incident) and is often known to use harsh rhetoric against Israel on this matter. And of course, there’s the matter of its strong ties with Hamas and with Iran.
Despite everything, though, the essay concludes that while the bilateral relationship between Israel and Turkey "suffered considerably over the past decade, the two countries continue to share common interests. Restarting a dialogue that seeks areas of cooperation—such as technology, agriculture, and climate change—would be a first step. Cultural exchanges and friendly sports tournaments could help change public opinion in both countries. Most of all, however, political will is needed in both countries."
