Estimate: Iran is 3.5 months away from producing fissile material for nuclear bomb
The main claim in the most recent IAEA report is that enrichment of uranium to 4.5 percent instead of 3.5 percent saves Iran about a quarter of the time needed to produce weapons-grade fissile material
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 08/09/2020
http://www.president.ir/en/117111
According to a report by the Institute for Science and International Security, the breakout time that Iran needs to manufacture fissile material for two small nuclear bombs is between 5.5 months and a year. The estimate strengthens the claim that Iran is a nuclear threshold state, and in effect, the likelihood of stopping an Iranian bomb with an external attack is close to zero. Assuming that it is not possible to destroy Iran's nuclear capability by air, and occupation of land is needed, such an operation would take several months to organize and be hard to conceal. If the Iranians detected it, they would apparently speed up development of the bombs to prevent an attack against them.
"Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late September 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. A new development is that Iran may have enough low enriched uranium to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon, where the second one could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons," the report says.
"Iran is starting the process of installing advanced centrifuges in the underground halls of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, only minimal activity has happened thus far, and Iran has already shifted its plans," says the report. "Iran has restarted the Heavy Water Production Plant, but its stock of heavy water decreased to 128.5 metric tonnes, below the JCPOA’s heavy water limit."
Regarding the "carpet warehouse" revealed by Israel in Tehran that allegedly contained traces of uranium, the International Atomic Energy Agency did not supply new information. "The IAEA reported limited new information about the results from its investigation into the IAEA’s detection of refined uranium particles at a warehouse in the Turquz-Abad neighborhood of Tehran. The agency first visited the site in February 2019 and detected 'natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin.' Neither the site nor the presence of nuclear material had been declared to the IAEA. The investigation is on-going."
The report by the Institute for Science and International Security adds details regarding the inspections that the IAEA is going to carry out at two facilities in Iran that Israel exposed. Ones that were not known to the agency previously. Although it was not covered in detail in this estimate, the agency published a second report connected to the Islamic Republic of Iran that discusses the IAEA's requests to inspect two sites connected to the Iranian Amad program – Tehran's nuclear weapon program that started in the 2000s.
"These sites are alleged to have used undeclared nuclear material (e.g. uranium) or to have conducted undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA visited one site recently and will inspect the other later in September, although it did not identify which site it visited. One of the sites is a dismantled pilot uranium conversion facility near Tehran that was razed in 2004," the report says.
"The other is the Marivan, Abadeh site in a remote part of Iran that was involved in high explosive experiments critical to the development of nuclear weapons. 2 Iran razed this site only in July 2019, suggesting that it may have continued nuclear weapons related activities after the end of the Amad Plan up to 2019, or that it kept the location on standby in case a decision was made to perform additional experiments. The Institute will discuss this second IAEA report in a separate analysis."
According to the report, the breakout time is based on the centrifuges in the Fordow and Natanz facilities, and on the fact that that Iran enriches uranium to a level of 4.5 percent. The report states that one percent increase in enrichment can provide a reduction of 20-25 percent in breakout time. Each bomb needs about 25kg of uranium enriched to a level of about 90 percent.
"The greater enrichment level also means that the production of 25 kilograms of weapon grade uranium requires less LEU than if it were enriched to 3.5 percent: 900 kilograms of 4.5 percent LEU vs. 1250 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU in hexafluoride mass," the report says.
The main claim in the most recent IAEA report is that enrichment of uranium to 4.5 percent instead of 3.5 percent saves Iran about a quarter of the time needed to produce weapons-grade fissile material
http://www.president.ir/en/117111
According to a report by the Institute for Science and International Security, the breakout time that Iran needs to manufacture fissile material for two small nuclear bombs is between 5.5 months and a year. The estimate strengthens the claim that Iran is a nuclear threshold state, and in effect, the likelihood of stopping an Iranian bomb with an external attack is close to zero. Assuming that it is not possible to destroy Iran's nuclear capability by air, and occupation of land is needed, such an operation would take several months to organize and be hard to conceal. If the Iranians detected it, they would apparently speed up development of the bombs to prevent an attack against them.
"Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late September 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. A new development is that Iran may have enough low enriched uranium to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon, where the second one could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons," the report says.
"Iran is starting the process of installing advanced centrifuges in the underground halls of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, only minimal activity has happened thus far, and Iran has already shifted its plans," says the report. "Iran has restarted the Heavy Water Production Plant, but its stock of heavy water decreased to 128.5 metric tonnes, below the JCPOA’s heavy water limit."
Regarding the "carpet warehouse" revealed by Israel in Tehran that allegedly contained traces of uranium, the International Atomic Energy Agency did not supply new information. "The IAEA reported limited new information about the results from its investigation into the IAEA’s detection of refined uranium particles at a warehouse in the Turquz-Abad neighborhood of Tehran. The agency first visited the site in February 2019 and detected 'natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin.' Neither the site nor the presence of nuclear material had been declared to the IAEA. The investigation is on-going."
The report by the Institute for Science and International Security adds details regarding the inspections that the IAEA is going to carry out at two facilities in Iran that Israel exposed. Ones that were not known to the agency previously. Although it was not covered in detail in this estimate, the agency published a second report connected to the Islamic Republic of Iran that discusses the IAEA's requests to inspect two sites connected to the Iranian Amad program – Tehran's nuclear weapon program that started in the 2000s.
"These sites are alleged to have used undeclared nuclear material (e.g. uranium) or to have conducted undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA visited one site recently and will inspect the other later in September, although it did not identify which site it visited. One of the sites is a dismantled pilot uranium conversion facility near Tehran that was razed in 2004," the report says.
"The other is the Marivan, Abadeh site in a remote part of Iran that was involved in high explosive experiments critical to the development of nuclear weapons. 2 Iran razed this site only in July 2019, suggesting that it may have continued nuclear weapons related activities after the end of the Amad Plan up to 2019, or that it kept the location on standby in case a decision was made to perform additional experiments. The Institute will discuss this second IAEA report in a separate analysis."
According to the report, the breakout time is based on the centrifuges in the Fordow and Natanz facilities, and on the fact that that Iran enriches uranium to a level of 4.5 percent. The report states that one percent increase in enrichment can provide a reduction of 20-25 percent in breakout time. Each bomb needs about 25kg of uranium enriched to a level of about 90 percent.
"The greater enrichment level also means that the production of 25 kilograms of weapon grade uranium requires less LEU than if it were enriched to 3.5 percent: 900 kilograms of 4.5 percent LEU vs. 1250 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU in hexafluoride mass," the report says.
