Dirty Bomb is Ultimate Tool to Get Budget Allocation, Nuclear Forum 193 Argues
Commentary: The question must be asked. Is a dirty bomb – one we imagine as a 'suitcase bomb' moved by a terrorist and placed in the center of busy shopping center – feasible? Would it result in hundreds or thousands of injured?
IsraelDefense
| 30/04/2020
Photo provided by the author
by Joseph Halevi
Articles are sometimes published about the dirty bomb (mainly quotes by senior people in the Israeli security system); about fears of terror organizations leaking radioactive materials and the possibility of them arming themselves with explosives and setting it off in a busy key city center.
Against this background, from time to time the need for an efficient system of tracing and identifying radioactive materials has been published, and in 2015, the State Comptroller severely criticized the Ministry of Environmental Protection for non-cooperating with other government factors to prevent dangerous material events.
And the question must be asked, is a dirty bomb – one we imagine as a 'suitcase bomb' moved by a terrorist and placed in the center of busy shopping center – feasible? Would it result in hundreds or thousands of injured? Is it really so terrible?
In February 2020, members of WNF-193 met in a hotel in Tel Aviv, including dozens of nuclear scientists and other experts in the field of preparedness for emergency and widespread disaster situations, and discussed these questions in depth.
How dangerous is it to build a dirty bomb?
Dr. Motti Brill, a member of the WNF-193, who served as the Chief Scientist of the nuclear reactor in Dimona (1976-2003), reviewed the feasibility of building a mobile dirty bomb. He determined that this is a most complex task, because its radiological part is unstable, difficult to change and suspend, and overall it is a dangerous task; because anyone exposed to this material in its preparation is likely to lose his life within minutes to hours.
Dr. Brill added that he has not knowledge of any past event when a dirty bomb was used, but emphasized, that publishing the threat will have a noticeable psychological effect and hence, result in allocating huge budgets, unnecessarily, to security systems. Such is the situation in the U.S.A., Germany and Canada and possibly in Israel too.
The true damage is panic, not radiant material
Another senior scientist and member of the WNF-193 who participated in the conference, Dr. Yehoshua Sokol, noted that employing expressions such as 'dirty bomb' and 'involvement of radioactive materials' in themselves, instill elements of panic and fear into the population. In his view, the most efficient method of integrating radioactive materials into a non-conventional terror scenario is not by adding radioactive materials to a bomb with the purpose of spreading them, but to hide a material that radiates for hours, about a meter from a population concentration such as a café – a complex task in itself. Alternatively, a terrorist can dissolve radioactive material in water and by spreading it, contaminate a wide area: in this scenario, the level of radiation is not dangerous at all, but is likely to create mass panic. In conclusion, a dirty bomb is not a real primary threat, but wide secondary damage can be expected from panicked reactions that will arise with publication of news about it. Dr. Sokol called in this context to ease radiation safety regulations to reduce the population’s level of anxiety.
Radioactive materials – how easy are they to steal?
The session on the dirty bomb at the conference was sealed by the Chairman of the WNF-193, Dr. Ori Nissim Levy. In his words, an efficient bomb of this type is a highly unlikely scenario, the most difficult to be carried out by a terror organization. However, Dr. Levy noted that materials for such bombs are much more accessible and stolen more often that we tend to think; some are used by hospitals, research institutions, universities, laboratories and more. Hence obtaining them is not a hurdle for terror organizations and it is not a problem to produce a bomb that will cause radiation counters in the environment to bounce. However, working with relevant radio-isotopic (radioactive isotopes) materials such as Cobalt-60, Cesium-137 or even strontium-90 is complicated and requires suitable capacitance and protective tools. To create a bomb whose radiation will cause real damage – is a highly complicated problem as mentioned above.
The World Nuclear Forum 193 is an independent organization made up of dozens of nuclear and radiological sciences and highly experienced experts in the fields of security, emergency preparedness and crisis management. The Forum meets monthly to discuss in-depth issues, mainly in the field of nuclear defense.
The field of Nuclear Defense is new and developing around the world. To date, most concern with the topic has been prevention and deterrence so as to avoid a nuclear or radiological incident. In the past two years in countries and cities such as Japan, U.S.A., South Korea, Belgium, Switzerland, Hawaii, Boston and Seoul, preparations are being made for the moment a nuclear incident occurs (mishap, terror, explosion) and focusing on how to cope with it to the point of rehabilitation and return to routine.
Among the topics the WNF-193 addresses are great-power countries' policies for activating nuclear weapons, dirty bomb, radioactive materials in checkpoints and at borders, electromagnetic pulse defense and attack, radiation in medicine risks and preparedness, constructing Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), legislation & regulations, writing position papers on professional topics and more.
At the International Conference for Nuclear Defense, NP1 Israel 2020, led by the WNF-193 in partnership with Expo and Ariel University on 15 July, an operational application to manage an emergency event of the dirty bomb incident will be presented, among other topics.
Joseph Halevi, who served as head of the National Situation Room in the Prime Minister’s Office, is a member of the World Nuclear Forum 193 and is a consultant in the field of preparedness for emergency situations and managing crises
Commentary: The question must be asked. Is a dirty bomb – one we imagine as a 'suitcase bomb' moved by a terrorist and placed in the center of busy shopping center – feasible? Would it result in hundreds or thousands of injured?
IsraelDefense
| 30/04/2020
Photo provided by the author
by Joseph Halevi
Articles are sometimes published about the dirty bomb (mainly quotes by senior people in the Israeli security system); about fears of terror organizations leaking radioactive materials and the possibility of them arming themselves with explosives and setting it off in a busy key city center.
Against this background, from time to time the need for an efficient system of tracing and identifying radioactive materials has been published, and in 2015, the State Comptroller severely criticized the Ministry of Environmental Protection for non-cooperating with other government factors to prevent dangerous material events.
And the question must be asked, is a dirty bomb – one we imagine as a 'suitcase bomb' moved by a terrorist and placed in the center of busy shopping center – feasible? Would it result in hundreds or thousands of injured? Is it really so terrible?
In February 2020, members of WNF-193 met in a hotel in Tel Aviv, including dozens of nuclear scientists and other experts in the field of preparedness for emergency and widespread disaster situations, and discussed these questions in depth.
How dangerous is it to build a dirty bomb?
Dr. Motti Brill, a member of the WNF-193, who served as the Chief Scientist of the nuclear reactor in Dimona (1976-2003), reviewed the feasibility of building a mobile dirty bomb. He determined that this is a most complex task, because its radiological part is unstable, difficult to change and suspend, and overall it is a dangerous task; because anyone exposed to this material in its preparation is likely to lose his life within minutes to hours.
Dr. Brill added that he has not knowledge of any past event when a dirty bomb was used, but emphasized, that publishing the threat will have a noticeable psychological effect and hence, result in allocating huge budgets, unnecessarily, to security systems. Such is the situation in the U.S.A., Germany and Canada and possibly in Israel too.
The true damage is panic, not radiant material
Another senior scientist and member of the WNF-193 who participated in the conference, Dr. Yehoshua Sokol, noted that employing expressions such as 'dirty bomb' and 'involvement of radioactive materials' in themselves, instill elements of panic and fear into the population. In his view, the most efficient method of integrating radioactive materials into a non-conventional terror scenario is not by adding radioactive materials to a bomb with the purpose of spreading them, but to hide a material that radiates for hours, about a meter from a population concentration such as a café – a complex task in itself. Alternatively, a terrorist can dissolve radioactive material in water and by spreading it, contaminate a wide area: in this scenario, the level of radiation is not dangerous at all, but is likely to create mass panic. In conclusion, a dirty bomb is not a real primary threat, but wide secondary damage can be expected from panicked reactions that will arise with publication of news about it. Dr. Sokol called in this context to ease radiation safety regulations to reduce the population’s level of anxiety.
Radioactive materials – how easy are they to steal?
The session on the dirty bomb at the conference was sealed by the Chairman of the WNF-193, Dr. Ori Nissim Levy. In his words, an efficient bomb of this type is a highly unlikely scenario, the most difficult to be carried out by a terror organization. However, Dr. Levy noted that materials for such bombs are much more accessible and stolen more often that we tend to think; some are used by hospitals, research institutions, universities, laboratories and more. Hence obtaining them is not a hurdle for terror organizations and it is not a problem to produce a bomb that will cause radiation counters in the environment to bounce. However, working with relevant radio-isotopic (radioactive isotopes) materials such as Cobalt-60, Cesium-137 or even strontium-90 is complicated and requires suitable capacitance and protective tools. To create a bomb whose radiation will cause real damage – is a highly complicated problem as mentioned above.
The World Nuclear Forum 193 is an independent organization made up of dozens of nuclear and radiological sciences and highly experienced experts in the fields of security, emergency preparedness and crisis management. The Forum meets monthly to discuss in-depth issues, mainly in the field of nuclear defense.
The field of Nuclear Defense is new and developing around the world. To date, most concern with the topic has been prevention and deterrence so as to avoid a nuclear or radiological incident. In the past two years in countries and cities such as Japan, U.S.A., South Korea, Belgium, Switzerland, Hawaii, Boston and Seoul, preparations are being made for the moment a nuclear incident occurs (mishap, terror, explosion) and focusing on how to cope with it to the point of rehabilitation and return to routine.
Among the topics the WNF-193 addresses are great-power countries' policies for activating nuclear weapons, dirty bomb, radioactive materials in checkpoints and at borders, electromagnetic pulse defense and attack, radiation in medicine risks and preparedness, constructing Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), legislation & regulations, writing position papers on professional topics and more.
At the International Conference for Nuclear Defense, NP1 Israel 2020, led by the WNF-193 in partnership with Expo and Ariel University on 15 July, an operational application to manage an emergency event of the dirty bomb incident will be presented, among other topics.
Joseph Halevi, who served as head of the National Situation Room in the Prime Minister’s Office, is a member of the World Nuclear Forum 193 and is a consultant in the field of preparedness for emergency situations and managing crises
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