The United States in Iraq and the New Offensives in the Region
Giancarlo Elia Valori
| 16/04/2019
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with Iraqi President Barham Salih, in Baghdad, Iraq, January 2019 (Photo: AP)
Over the last few days, particularly on March 6, new US troops arrived in Iraq. They arrived in the Iraqi area of Al Anbar, leaving from bases located in both Israel and Jordan, particularly from the Mowaffaq Salti and H-4 airbases.
The troops, which were quickly attacked by the Iraqi Shi’ite, probably arrived from other bases outside Iraq as well.
Those US forces had the primary goal of quickly crushing an operation of Shi’ite brigades connected to Iran, but coordinated by the People’s Mobilization Forces that, albeit linked to Iran, are the political and military axis of the major groups elected to Parliament.
Moreover, last year, it was exactly the Iraqi legislative Assembly that adopted legislation making the Shi’ite militias an essential and official asset of the Iraqi political system.
The Hashd al-Shabi forces – in their new “civilian” group, Fatah, which is their new political alliance – have also become the second group in terms of seats in the election held last May.
The Hashd al-Shabi forces consist of at least 120,000 well-armed men, who were the first to declare victory on the Iraqi forces of ISIS – although we do not know yet to what extent this victory can be considered final.
It should also be recalled that with the recent election held in Iraq on May 12, 2018, almost all the traditional ethnic-religious fragmentation and tension among Iraqi voters have slackened.
The real cleavage among Iraqi political groups is now more focused on the defense of territorial interests and on the welfare share to be transferred from the center to the periphery than on the traditional “rift” between religious and ethnic groups.
Currently, the real fragmentations are the internal and economic ones within the various political groups.
The precarious Iraqi government is led by the Shi’ite leader, Adil Abdul Mahdi, a member of the party known as the “Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq” (ISCI), linked and derived directly from the old Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Shi’ite and Khomeinist organization founded in 2007 upon Imam Baqir al-Hakim’s initiative.
The Sunnis also gathered and supported their traditional electorate, especially within the rebalancing of financial transfers between their regions and the central State.
Moreover, the Kurds are increasingly present in the administration and in the central political system, but – as can be easily imagined – to favor their autonomous welfare and international and Iraqi investments in Erbil and in their great province between Kirkuk and the non-Iraqi Kurdish areas.
Later, however, the Iraqi Shi’ite Prime Minister met with resistance even in his traditional Shi’ite bloc, among the “Sadrists” of the Sairoon Party and even in some Kurdish sectors.
Furthermore, with their Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Kurds already have 45 seats out of 100 and traditionally obtain many votes from the Christian and Turkmen minorities.
Certainly, the economic and political relations with Turkey – which constantly acquires many of the Iraqi waters – are essential for both oil extraction and agriculture.
Another variable between Shi’ites, Kurds and the United States, as well as in the local relations among Russians.
It should be also noted that ISIS is coming back to the scene, particularly in northwestern Iraq.
In all likelihood, the “Caliphate” does not intend to conquer the cities – which are currently difficult to hold for a long time – but, from now on, it wants to operate as a mobile guerrilla group, possibly with further artillery actions and proposing itself again as the main political-military actor of the Al Anbar region.
It will be exactly the “Caliphate” to keep Iraq fragmented and weak. This is its primary strategic aim.
Even this particular Iraqi internal political setup leads Iran to consider Iraq the most important strategic pawn of its future foreign policy, especially in the framework of its nuclear issue.
Certainly, the nuclear reactors in Iran’s hands, but present on Iraq’s territory, would be the ideal solution for Iran.
It should also be recalled that Iran sets great store by Iraq, considering that this country is at the origin of the new “corridor” that – upon the de facto end of the clashes in Syria – will go from the internal areas of Shi’ite Iraq to Syria up to Beirut and the Lebanese areas controlled by Hezbollah.
The statement made in July 2018 in relation to the United States by General Soleimani, the leader of the Al Quds militias of the Iranian Pasdaran, “We are near you, where you cannot even imagine...” is probably the key to understanding the current situation.
The visit paid by the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on March 6, 2019, is a further factor in understanding the Iraqi situation and the region that US analysts define as Syraq.
The “reformist” President – according to the simplistic Western thinking – is sending a clear signal, above all to the United States, that Shi’ite Iran values Iraq very much, mainly its de facto hegemony on it, but also the possibility that Iran immediately and directly clashes with the United States, right on the Iraqi ground, but only and solely where Iran wants.
The Iranian President has also said that Iraq is the primary solution “to bypass America’s unjust sanctions imposed on Iran.”
In this regard, we should also recall the “International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq,” held in Kuwait in March 2018.
Its main document, drawn up directly by the World Bank, envisages as many as 157 primary projects for a total value of $88.7 billion, 23 of which are short-term and the remaining ones are medium-long term projects.
Ii is worth recalling that Iraq is OPEC’s second-largest oil producer, and ranks fifth in terms of proven oil and gas reserves.
Hence, the Saudi specific interest in the Kuwait International Conference, although Saudi Arabia has not yet credible points of reference in the Iraqi ruling class.
Iraq is the real stake between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the strategic key is the separation of military continuity between Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia has already provided over $1 billion for aid and $500 million for export support. Also, the Emirate of Qatar granted another billion dollars, and Kuwait followed suit, while the United States itself promised as many as $3 billion.
As can be easily imagined, everyone is interested in differentiating their support for Iraq and above all avoiding Iraq falling entirely into Iran’s hands.
It should be noted that the 39 million inhabitants of present-day Iraq are increasing at a very quick pace (one million per year), which is certainly the fastest growth rate in the Middle East. It should also be recalled that the whole Iraqi social and economic system is characterized by the highest number of poor and unemployed people across the Middle East.
It is therefore obvious that Iran wants to acquire the Iraqi oil market in its entirety and use it – as a political and economic weapon – against the whole Sunni axis and particularly against the United States and its allies within OPEC.
In fact, after the Shi’ite forces’ attacks on some US military targets in Iraq – coincidentally carried out during Iranian President Rouhani's visit – the United States immediately called back their forces in Israel and Jordan, as well as those in the Gulf, and – as always happens in these cases – also alerted its forces in Romania and Bulgaria.
The two groups that attacked the US forces on March 6 and later are directly linked to Iran.
It is a first militia called Kata'ib Hezbollah, while the other Shi’ite organization is known as Hasaib Ahl al-Haq, i.e., the Khazali network.
Both organizations stem directly from the Lebanese Hezbollah.
The Kataib Hezbollah was founded by the Iranian Pasdaran and the military organization known as Al Quds Force, which is linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Hezbollah in Lebanon was born from the will of Imam Khomeini, who considered the Shi’ite group “the light of his life.”
It should be recalled that Kataib is also one of the six groups that established the “People’s Mobilization Forces,” from which the current majority political bloc in Iraq stemmed.
The Khazali network is also a party in the Iraqi Parliament, with 15 representatives, who are said to be the result of electoral fraud. It was also officially established by the Al Quds Force and, during the war in Iraq, it organized over 6,000 attacks on US and Western targets.
Nevertheless, the very recent operations against the US military – in clear connection with Rouhani’s visit and his declarations on the now unique Iranian hegemony on Iraq – were carried out exactly one day after the United States had imposed further sanctions, but against a third Iranian Shi’ite military network, namely Al-Nujaba.
More precisely, it is the Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, an organization created in 2013, which has four brigades between Iraq and some cells hidden in the Gulf (hence the apparently obscure reference in the above quoted statement by General Soleimani), including the military group that is explicitly devoted to the anti-Israeli operations on the Golan Heights.
There is also an Al-Nujaba brigade carrying out special operations in Syria for Bashar al-Assad’s forces – a brigade equipped with several Russian T-72 tanks and, above all, Iranian missiles.
Furthermore, a very strong signal for the US armed forces came from the statements made by Iraqi parliamentarian Nessar al Rabee, linked to the Sadrist movement and, hence, having direct relations also with the quasi-majority currently in power in Iraq, who asked that “all foreign forces should leave the Iraqi territory.”
The Shi’ite Sadrist parliamentarian also added that this request would rescue Iraq from the “terrorist forces” that want to enter the country “under new labels.” Definitely clear language and terminology.
Moreover, Prime Minister Al Mahdi stated he had spoken directly on the phone with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. He also said that the United States can no longer legally establish their new bases on the Iraqi territory and added that the current US military presence is confined only to combating ISIS and training the Iraqi armed forces.
The United States, however, is repositioning itself on the border between Iraq and Syria and, particularly, in the western area of Al Anbar province and among the Kurds of Kirkuk.
Nevertheless, it is strange that, also for the Sadrists, this new composition of Iraqi Shi’ite forces comes after a long struggle of the Iraqi military and political Shi’ism against Iran’s increasingly heavier hegemony.
Initially quasi-enemies and certainly Iraqi "nationalists", probably enemies of the Khomeinist doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqih, but currently increasingly linked to Iran’s ideologies and, above all, interests.
Hence, the greater Iran’s economic and strategic reaction against the US denunciation of the nuclear agreement, the greater the Iranian strongly adverse presence against the United States in Iraq, an inevitable axis for opposing the US troops, who are withdrawing from Syria and repositioning themselves right on the border with Iraq and, above all, at the starting point of the Shi’ite “corridor” that already reaches Lebanon through the Syrian-Israeli border.
Another essential factor of the Iranian strategy has recently been the organization of a fundamental meeting between Bashar al-Assad and Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – a meeting that took place in Tehran on February 27.
Bashar al-Assad is the only Middle East leader who “kissed the hand” of Iran’s Supreme Leader.
The primary signal of the meeting – again sent directly to the United States – is that Bashar al-Assad will never abandon Iran.
Are we sure, however, that this new collocation of relations between Iran and Syria is really ideal for the Russian Federation?
We shall see at a later stage.
In his meeting with Rouhani, Bashar al-Assad also explicitly said that Syria will still be part of Iran’s “Resistance Axis” and currently also of all the guerrilla, terrorist and paramilitary entities that the Iranians have so far organized between the Shi’ite areas and the covert structures operating in the Gulf Sunni world.
The issue of the Syrian-Iranian relationship also concerns the whole connection between Syria, Iran, and Iraq, considering that – during Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Tehran – General Soleimani said – very clearly, as usual – “Our safest border is the one between our two countries and Iraq.”
Here is, in fact, the real problem at the core of Khamenei’s and Assad’s fears, as well as of the current Iraqi leaders. Both Syria and Iran think they must absolutely avoid the United States being their stable pocket, a strong buffer zone in Syria, always connected to Israeli strong air operations in Syria and, in the future, between the Bekaa Valley and the Golan Heights towards the Iraqi areas and, possibly, even on the Iranian border.
For this reason, in both Assad’s and Khamenei’s statements and recent actions, there are strong signs that make us foresee a new great offensive inside Syria, a massive action that could hit both some remaining Sunni-Caliphate pockets, between Idlib and Deir-Ezzor, and above all the US areas (the Al Tanf base) and, more precisely, some Israeli targets.
In fact, addressing to Israel, in mid-January 2019, General Soleimani said that the Jewish State must “greatly fear Iranian high-precision missiles” and that “in any case, Iran will keep all the military advisers and armed forces it deems appropriate.”
Hence, a new area of contrast is emerging between the Jewish State and the Shi’ite world, while the true solution to the equation could be a de facto agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to contain Iran and make Israel safe, also on the border between Israel and Lebanon.
In fact, two days after the meeting between Assad and Ali Khamenei, Vladimir Putin met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, Tamir Hayman.
The Russian leader explicitly ensured to give a free hand – also in relation to the Russian presence in Syria and in other regions – to a possible Israeli attack against the Iranian positions in Syria.
Putin also asked Netanyahu to formally accept the Russian primary role in the Syrian “peace-building process.” Hence, he implicitly asked Israel to avoid future attacks on Iranian targets in Syria being targeted to areas shared between Iran and Russia and, above all, to implicitly favor the Russian presence on the ground.
Obviously, the Iranian leaders are well aware of this and have therefore asked Assad to declare that any Israeli attack on Iranian targets in Syria will be considered a direct attack on Bashar al-Assad’s forces.
In their designs, this could force Russia to have a milder approach vis-à-vis Iran.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with Iraqi President Barham Salih, in Baghdad, Iraq, January 2019 (Photo: AP)
Over the last few days, particularly on March 6, new US troops arrived in Iraq. They arrived in the Iraqi area of Al Anbar, leaving from bases located in both Israel and Jordan, particularly from the Mowaffaq Salti and H-4 airbases.
The troops, which were quickly attacked by the Iraqi Shi’ite, probably arrived from other bases outside Iraq as well.
Those US forces had the primary goal of quickly crushing an operation of Shi’ite brigades connected to Iran, but coordinated by the People’s Mobilization Forces that, albeit linked to Iran, are the political and military axis of the major groups elected to Parliament.
Moreover, last year, it was exactly the Iraqi legislative Assembly that adopted legislation making the Shi’ite militias an essential and official asset of the Iraqi political system.
The Hashd al-Shabi forces – in their new “civilian” group, Fatah, which is their new political alliance – have also become the second group in terms of seats in the election held last May.
The Hashd al-Shabi forces consist of at least 120,000 well-armed men, who were the first to declare victory on the Iraqi forces of ISIS – although we do not know yet to what extent this victory can be considered final.
It should also be recalled that with the recent election held in Iraq on May 12, 2018, almost all the traditional ethnic-religious fragmentation and tension among Iraqi voters have slackened.
The real cleavage among Iraqi political groups is now more focused on the defense of territorial interests and on the welfare share to be transferred from the center to the periphery than on the traditional “rift” between religious and ethnic groups.
Currently, the real fragmentations are the internal and economic ones within the various political groups.
The precarious Iraqi government is led by the Shi’ite leader, Adil Abdul Mahdi, a member of the party known as the “Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq” (ISCI), linked and derived directly from the old Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Shi’ite and Khomeinist organization founded in 2007 upon Imam Baqir al-Hakim’s initiative.
The Sunnis also gathered and supported their traditional electorate, especially within the rebalancing of financial transfers between their regions and the central State.
Moreover, the Kurds are increasingly present in the administration and in the central political system, but – as can be easily imagined – to favor their autonomous welfare and international and Iraqi investments in Erbil and in their great province between Kirkuk and the non-Iraqi Kurdish areas.
Later, however, the Iraqi Shi’ite Prime Minister met with resistance even in his traditional Shi’ite bloc, among the “Sadrists” of the Sairoon Party and even in some Kurdish sectors.
Furthermore, with their Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Kurds already have 45 seats out of 100 and traditionally obtain many votes from the Christian and Turkmen minorities.
Certainly, the economic and political relations with Turkey – which constantly acquires many of the Iraqi waters – are essential for both oil extraction and agriculture.
Another variable between Shi’ites, Kurds and the United States, as well as in the local relations among Russians.
It should be also noted that ISIS is coming back to the scene, particularly in northwestern Iraq.
In all likelihood, the “Caliphate” does not intend to conquer the cities – which are currently difficult to hold for a long time – but, from now on, it wants to operate as a mobile guerrilla group, possibly with further artillery actions and proposing itself again as the main political-military actor of the Al Anbar region.
It will be exactly the “Caliphate” to keep Iraq fragmented and weak. This is its primary strategic aim.
Even this particular Iraqi internal political setup leads Iran to consider Iraq the most important strategic pawn of its future foreign policy, especially in the framework of its nuclear issue.
Certainly, the nuclear reactors in Iran’s hands, but present on Iraq’s territory, would be the ideal solution for Iran.
It should also be recalled that Iran sets great store by Iraq, considering that this country is at the origin of the new “corridor” that – upon the de facto end of the clashes in Syria – will go from the internal areas of Shi’ite Iraq to Syria up to Beirut and the Lebanese areas controlled by Hezbollah.
The statement made in July 2018 in relation to the United States by General Soleimani, the leader of the Al Quds militias of the Iranian Pasdaran, “We are near you, where you cannot even imagine...” is probably the key to understanding the current situation.
The visit paid by the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on March 6, 2019, is a further factor in understanding the Iraqi situation and the region that US analysts define as Syraq.
The “reformist” President – according to the simplistic Western thinking – is sending a clear signal, above all to the United States, that Shi’ite Iran values Iraq very much, mainly its de facto hegemony on it, but also the possibility that Iran immediately and directly clashes with the United States, right on the Iraqi ground, but only and solely where Iran wants.
The Iranian President has also said that Iraq is the primary solution “to bypass America’s unjust sanctions imposed on Iran.”
In this regard, we should also recall the “International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq,” held in Kuwait in March 2018.
Its main document, drawn up directly by the World Bank, envisages as many as 157 primary projects for a total value of $88.7 billion, 23 of which are short-term and the remaining ones are medium-long term projects.
Ii is worth recalling that Iraq is OPEC’s second-largest oil producer, and ranks fifth in terms of proven oil and gas reserves.
Hence, the Saudi specific interest in the Kuwait International Conference, although Saudi Arabia has not yet credible points of reference in the Iraqi ruling class.
Iraq is the real stake between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the strategic key is the separation of military continuity between Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia has already provided over $1 billion for aid and $500 million for export support. Also, the Emirate of Qatar granted another billion dollars, and Kuwait followed suit, while the United States itself promised as many as $3 billion.
As can be easily imagined, everyone is interested in differentiating their support for Iraq and above all avoiding Iraq falling entirely into Iran’s hands.
It should be noted that the 39 million inhabitants of present-day Iraq are increasing at a very quick pace (one million per year), which is certainly the fastest growth rate in the Middle East. It should also be recalled that the whole Iraqi social and economic system is characterized by the highest number of poor and unemployed people across the Middle East.
It is therefore obvious that Iran wants to acquire the Iraqi oil market in its entirety and use it – as a political and economic weapon – against the whole Sunni axis and particularly against the United States and its allies within OPEC.
In fact, after the Shi’ite forces’ attacks on some US military targets in Iraq – coincidentally carried out during Iranian President Rouhani's visit – the United States immediately called back their forces in Israel and Jordan, as well as those in the Gulf, and – as always happens in these cases – also alerted its forces in Romania and Bulgaria.
The two groups that attacked the US forces on March 6 and later are directly linked to Iran.
It is a first militia called Kata'ib Hezbollah, while the other Shi’ite organization is known as Hasaib Ahl al-Haq, i.e., the Khazali network.
Both organizations stem directly from the Lebanese Hezbollah.
The Kataib Hezbollah was founded by the Iranian Pasdaran and the military organization known as Al Quds Force, which is linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Hezbollah in Lebanon was born from the will of Imam Khomeini, who considered the Shi’ite group “the light of his life.”
It should be recalled that Kataib is also one of the six groups that established the “People’s Mobilization Forces,” from which the current majority political bloc in Iraq stemmed.
The Khazali network is also a party in the Iraqi Parliament, with 15 representatives, who are said to be the result of electoral fraud. It was also officially established by the Al Quds Force and, during the war in Iraq, it organized over 6,000 attacks on US and Western targets.
Nevertheless, the very recent operations against the US military – in clear connection with Rouhani’s visit and his declarations on the now unique Iranian hegemony on Iraq – were carried out exactly one day after the United States had imposed further sanctions, but against a third Iranian Shi’ite military network, namely Al-Nujaba.
More precisely, it is the Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, an organization created in 2013, which has four brigades between Iraq and some cells hidden in the Gulf (hence the apparently obscure reference in the above quoted statement by General Soleimani), including the military group that is explicitly devoted to the anti-Israeli operations on the Golan Heights.
There is also an Al-Nujaba brigade carrying out special operations in Syria for Bashar al-Assad’s forces – a brigade equipped with several Russian T-72 tanks and, above all, Iranian missiles.
Furthermore, a very strong signal for the US armed forces came from the statements made by Iraqi parliamentarian Nessar al Rabee, linked to the Sadrist movement and, hence, having direct relations also with the quasi-majority currently in power in Iraq, who asked that “all foreign forces should leave the Iraqi territory.”
The Shi’ite Sadrist parliamentarian also added that this request would rescue Iraq from the “terrorist forces” that want to enter the country “under new labels.” Definitely clear language and terminology.
Moreover, Prime Minister Al Mahdi stated he had spoken directly on the phone with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. He also said that the United States can no longer legally establish their new bases on the Iraqi territory and added that the current US military presence is confined only to combating ISIS and training the Iraqi armed forces.
The United States, however, is repositioning itself on the border between Iraq and Syria and, particularly, in the western area of Al Anbar province and among the Kurds of Kirkuk.
Nevertheless, it is strange that, also for the Sadrists, this new composition of Iraqi Shi’ite forces comes after a long struggle of the Iraqi military and political Shi’ism against Iran’s increasingly heavier hegemony.
Initially quasi-enemies and certainly Iraqi "nationalists", probably enemies of the Khomeinist doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqih, but currently increasingly linked to Iran’s ideologies and, above all, interests.
Hence, the greater Iran’s economic and strategic reaction against the US denunciation of the nuclear agreement, the greater the Iranian strongly adverse presence against the United States in Iraq, an inevitable axis for opposing the US troops, who are withdrawing from Syria and repositioning themselves right on the border with Iraq and, above all, at the starting point of the Shi’ite “corridor” that already reaches Lebanon through the Syrian-Israeli border.
Another essential factor of the Iranian strategy has recently been the organization of a fundamental meeting between Bashar al-Assad and Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – a meeting that took place in Tehran on February 27.
Bashar al-Assad is the only Middle East leader who “kissed the hand” of Iran’s Supreme Leader.
The primary signal of the meeting – again sent directly to the United States – is that Bashar al-Assad will never abandon Iran.
Are we sure, however, that this new collocation of relations between Iran and Syria is really ideal for the Russian Federation?
We shall see at a later stage.
In his meeting with Rouhani, Bashar al-Assad also explicitly said that Syria will still be part of Iran’s “Resistance Axis” and currently also of all the guerrilla, terrorist and paramilitary entities that the Iranians have so far organized between the Shi’ite areas and the covert structures operating in the Gulf Sunni world.
The issue of the Syrian-Iranian relationship also concerns the whole connection between Syria, Iran, and Iraq, considering that – during Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Tehran – General Soleimani said – very clearly, as usual – “Our safest border is the one between our two countries and Iraq.”
Here is, in fact, the real problem at the core of Khamenei’s and Assad’s fears, as well as of the current Iraqi leaders. Both Syria and Iran think they must absolutely avoid the United States being their stable pocket, a strong buffer zone in Syria, always connected to Israeli strong air operations in Syria and, in the future, between the Bekaa Valley and the Golan Heights towards the Iraqi areas and, possibly, even on the Iranian border.
For this reason, in both Assad’s and Khamenei’s statements and recent actions, there are strong signs that make us foresee a new great offensive inside Syria, a massive action that could hit both some remaining Sunni-Caliphate pockets, between Idlib and Deir-Ezzor, and above all the US areas (the Al Tanf base) and, more precisely, some Israeli targets.
In fact, addressing to Israel, in mid-January 2019, General Soleimani said that the Jewish State must “greatly fear Iranian high-precision missiles” and that “in any case, Iran will keep all the military advisers and armed forces it deems appropriate.”
Hence, a new area of contrast is emerging between the Jewish State and the Shi’ite world, while the true solution to the equation could be a de facto agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to contain Iran and make Israel safe, also on the border between Israel and Lebanon.
In fact, two days after the meeting between Assad and Ali Khamenei, Vladimir Putin met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, Tamir Hayman.
The Russian leader explicitly ensured to give a free hand – also in relation to the Russian presence in Syria and in other regions – to a possible Israeli attack against the Iranian positions in Syria.
Putin also asked Netanyahu to formally accept the Russian primary role in the Syrian “peace-building process.” Hence, he implicitly asked Israel to avoid future attacks on Iranian targets in Syria being targeted to areas shared between Iran and Russia and, above all, to implicitly favor the Russian presence on the ground.
Obviously, the Iranian leaders are well aware of this and have therefore asked Assad to declare that any Israeli attack on Iranian targets in Syria will be considered a direct attack on Bashar al-Assad’s forces.
In their designs, this could force Russia to have a milder approach vis-à-vis Iran.
