North Korea’s Future International Relations
Giancarlo Elia Valori
| 15/04/2019
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (Photo: AP)
Rumors are rife in world diplomacy circles that the United States wanted to force the hand in the recent talks with North Korea held in Hanoi last March.
The US side, in particular, tried to achieve a broader definition of "denuclearization," a criterion capable of simultaneously eliminating the missile network, precisely the nuclear one, as well as the North Korean facilities for chemical warfare.
At the end of March, a report informed that the United States had asked North Korea to remove the whole stock of fissile material and relinquish all bacteriological warfare programs.
All this only in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Too much, considering the level reached by the previous negotiations.
Obviously, the North Korean delegation was certainly not very close to US requests, while North Korea’s deputy-Foreign Minister, Choe Son-hui, argued with Mike Pompeo and John Bolton because they created a strong "obstacle" to negotiations.
North Korea’s representatives in the Hanoi negotiations stopped the talks because they had not the qualifications nor the political mandate to treat the issue of denuclearization with the United States in this "global" way.
Nevertheless, John Bolton, who is certainly not a great supporter of dialogue between the United States and North Korea, seized the opportunity of the block of negotiations. In the lack of a precise North Korean policy line, he asked for an overall, quick and absolute denuclearization, being well aware that this request could not be accepted by the North Korean delegation.
Again following Bolton’s policy line, the United States added to this request – which was hardly likely to be accepted – the total destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons.
It is strange that, in Hanoi, experienced and skillful mediators conducted so tough negotiations, even naive in their harshness.
Furthermore, the United States asked North Korea for news about a "secret base for uranium enrichment" near the Yongbyon facilities.
Finally, the United States also asked for a "statement of all nuclear activities" in North Korea, as well as a clear roadmap for denuclearization.
As if the matter was only in North Korean hands.
A management of negotiations that may probably be fine for US internal political purposes, but certainly does not favor any positive evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
In his last meeting with President Trump, Kim brought to Hanoi the sole promise of fully scrapping, in a short period of time, the Yongbyon nuclear research center.
The United States, however, did not well understand whether the Yongbyon facilities to be closed regarded only the reactor that has been producing plutonium since 1980 or whether the closure offered by Kim Jong-un regarded the whole plant, with its many centrifuges for uranium and reactors.
Some US analysts think that the Yongbyon facilities are still at the core of the whole North Korean nuclear system, while other experts believe they are "obsolete" and, hence, Kim's offer is not particularly interesting.
Nevertheless, if there is nothing else besides the "obsolete" facilities, Kim Jong-un’s offer is meaningful and rational.
At the beginning of the Hanoi talks, North Korea hoped that economic sanctions would soon be partly lifted, considering that all the UN Security Council Resolutions on the North Korean issue stated that it would be possible to re-examine the sanctions in exchange for clear progress on the nuclear issue.
North Korea, however, has already imposed a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. It has also closed its nuclear test sites and has even started to destroy its missile test sites.
North Korea has even accepted a slow and progressive lifting of sanctions, in exchange for a step-by-step check of nuclear compliance.
From this viewpoint, the United States thought that sanctions really benefited it and hence they did not try to reduce them. Quite the reverse.
The United States must have thought that the more sanctions remain, the more North Korea is forced to negotiate.
Moreover, the Russian and Chinese proposals on the subject, developed within the UN Security Council, have always been blocked by the US contrary vote.
John Bolton’s and Mike Pompeo’s hard stance was not matched by any immediate negative reactions from the North Korean side, as is customary in North Korea's diplomacy. Nevertheless, three weeks after the crisis of the Hanoi talks, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister, Choe Son-hui, who enjoys Kim's full confidence, said that her country "is not particularly interested in the current negotiations with the United States for denuclearization."
Later, after the unexpected end of talks in Hanoi, the United States launched a defamation campaign against North Korea, claiming, for example, that North Korea was secretly continuing its missile tests and that this new fact had stopped the US efforts at the negotiating table.
It is hard to understand how nuclear tests can be stopped "secretly."
North Korea, however, has never promised to stop anything else but missile tests alone.
Hence, neither the uranium enrichment program nor the other biological and chemical activities have rightly ceased.
Currently, however, the negotiations door still remains half-open.
Again in March, the pictures of the Sohae site, which is used for launching satellites, showed a significant pace of facilities’ reconstruction.
In all likelihood, despite Kim Jong-un's promise to dismantle the site soon, North Korea still plans to keep and develop it, with a view to also maintaining some diplomatic pressure on the United States, but above all to organizing a new round of talks in the future.
The next important events will be the meeting between Donald J. Trump and the South Korean leader – already scheduled for April 11 – designed to break the ice between North and South Korea on the denuclearization issue and, on April 15, the North Korea’s great celebrations for the 107th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, namely the "Day of the Sun."
As some US analysts claim, should we go back to the strict and effective style of the old Six-Party Talks?
Instead of a team that – at least in the US case – knows the complex issue of relations between the United States and North Korea only superficially, a new negotiation would be useful, with a traditional preliminary document and clear purposes.
A new negotiation that – as was the case with the Six-Party Talks – makes the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister and the Deputy Secretary of State, as well as many US experts of the academic and intelligence worlds sit around the negotiating table.
Certainly, we need to imagine that the negotiation is and will be long and complex. Simple negotiations are those that do not succeed in reaching the goal.
Hence, it will be useful to imagine multiple and different tradeoff and mutual satisfaction factors, compared to a harsh and brutal negotiation on nuclear potential alone.
Kim Jong-un knows all too well that what is at stake here is the future of his country, not only nuclear and bacteriological-chemical disarmament.
His nuclear and bacteriological-chemical network has led North Korea to be a member of the world decision-making system.
If this happens even in a shift from the nuclear threat to a major economic role, Kim Jong-un will have won his bet.
If this does not happen, the United States shall not believe that North Korea will consume itself on its own. Quite the reverse.
In any case, it will be necessary to clarify that, as usual, the North Korean issue cannot be resolved with a mere bilateral negotiation mechanism.
The North Korean strategic role is a vital problem for Japan, for South Korea, but also for China and the Russian Federation.
Without a project that is good for all these actors, and not only for the United States, no peace nor disarmament will be possible. Not even for the United States alone.
China does not certainly want a nuclear, bacteriological and chemical system on its border that is, however, completely out of its control.
This is the real reason for the initial tensions between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping.
Any increase in military tension in North Korea also spreads suspicions in China.
Nevertheless, it is a factor that the United States – in agreement with China – could use to reach North Korea’s denuclearization.
In particular, however, China wants neither a new war on the Korean peninsula – an interest obviously shared with South Korea – nor the US Armed Forces on its border, if North Korea’s complete nuclear demilitarization is achieved.
And if the United States and South Korea are still able to quickly reach the nuclear threshold in an initially conventional conflict with North Korea.
Hence, for China, high conventional and credible militarization for North Korea, but also with a non-negligible anti-US nuclear deterrent, albeit certainly not capable of setting fire to the whole Southeast Asia.
The same strategic paradigm largely applies to the Russian Federation.
It is not in favor of a demilitarized North Korea, which would be easy prey to the US-South Korea axis, and would not serve as a military buffer for Russia. However, it is even against a North Korea capable of threatening South Korea, and hence even the countries on its Northern border.
Therefore, considering the scenario of the negotiations between North Korea and the United States, the current stalemate will serve – after the Hanoi talks – to select the rational requests of the two actors and to shape the possible responses.
For example, the spreading of nuclear technology from North Korea to other States is a new topic to be included in the negotiation agenda.
As well as the decrease in conventional North Korean forces, to be linked to a rational decrease in the US and South Korean Armed Forces.
The five sanctions that North Korea wants to be lifted concern only the civilian economy and the well-being of the North Korean people, while we need to note that also Kim Jong-un is put under pressure by the North Korean people and, even more, by his ruling class.
The North Korean Foreign Minister, Ri Yong-ho, said so explicitly: in fact, he has clarified that the North Korean power is aimed – in a rational negotiation – "at the complete dismantling of the Yongbyon site."
Ri Yong-ho also added that the dismantling of Yongbyon facilities would take place "with the presence of US experts."
Clearly, Kim Jong-un now has China’s full protection.
Certainly, China does not want to have the huge mass of migrants from North Korea within its borders and, above all, is not interested in a "sister" country which, besides threatening the United States and South Korea, forces even the great China to follow its policy.
This could lead the North Korean leadership to seek economic compensation at any time of the denuclearization talks.
So, will the US leadership be able to finalize negotiations with North Korea without too many mistakes and wrong moves?
Will the US leadership be capable of actively involving China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in a radical dismantling of the North Korean nuclear capacity?
We do not yet know.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (Photo: AP)
Rumors are rife in world diplomacy circles that the United States wanted to force the hand in the recent talks with North Korea held in Hanoi last March.
The US side, in particular, tried to achieve a broader definition of "denuclearization," a criterion capable of simultaneously eliminating the missile network, precisely the nuclear one, as well as the North Korean facilities for chemical warfare.
At the end of March, a report informed that the United States had asked North Korea to remove the whole stock of fissile material and relinquish all bacteriological warfare programs.
All this only in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Too much, considering the level reached by the previous negotiations.
Obviously, the North Korean delegation was certainly not very close to US requests, while North Korea’s deputy-Foreign Minister, Choe Son-hui, argued with Mike Pompeo and John Bolton because they created a strong "obstacle" to negotiations.
North Korea’s representatives in the Hanoi negotiations stopped the talks because they had not the qualifications nor the political mandate to treat the issue of denuclearization with the United States in this "global" way.
Nevertheless, John Bolton, who is certainly not a great supporter of dialogue between the United States and North Korea, seized the opportunity of the block of negotiations. In the lack of a precise North Korean policy line, he asked for an overall, quick and absolute denuclearization, being well aware that this request could not be accepted by the North Korean delegation.
Again following Bolton’s policy line, the United States added to this request – which was hardly likely to be accepted – the total destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons.
It is strange that, in Hanoi, experienced and skillful mediators conducted so tough negotiations, even naive in their harshness.
Furthermore, the United States asked North Korea for news about a "secret base for uranium enrichment" near the Yongbyon facilities.
Finally, the United States also asked for a "statement of all nuclear activities" in North Korea, as well as a clear roadmap for denuclearization.
As if the matter was only in North Korean hands.
A management of negotiations that may probably be fine for US internal political purposes, but certainly does not favor any positive evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
In his last meeting with President Trump, Kim brought to Hanoi the sole promise of fully scrapping, in a short period of time, the Yongbyon nuclear research center.
The United States, however, did not well understand whether the Yongbyon facilities to be closed regarded only the reactor that has been producing plutonium since 1980 or whether the closure offered by Kim Jong-un regarded the whole plant, with its many centrifuges for uranium and reactors.
Some US analysts think that the Yongbyon facilities are still at the core of the whole North Korean nuclear system, while other experts believe they are "obsolete" and, hence, Kim's offer is not particularly interesting.
Nevertheless, if there is nothing else besides the "obsolete" facilities, Kim Jong-un’s offer is meaningful and rational.
At the beginning of the Hanoi talks, North Korea hoped that economic sanctions would soon be partly lifted, considering that all the UN Security Council Resolutions on the North Korean issue stated that it would be possible to re-examine the sanctions in exchange for clear progress on the nuclear issue.
North Korea, however, has already imposed a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. It has also closed its nuclear test sites and has even started to destroy its missile test sites.
North Korea has even accepted a slow and progressive lifting of sanctions, in exchange for a step-by-step check of nuclear compliance.
From this viewpoint, the United States thought that sanctions really benefited it and hence they did not try to reduce them. Quite the reverse.
The United States must have thought that the more sanctions remain, the more North Korea is forced to negotiate.
Moreover, the Russian and Chinese proposals on the subject, developed within the UN Security Council, have always been blocked by the US contrary vote.
John Bolton’s and Mike Pompeo’s hard stance was not matched by any immediate negative reactions from the North Korean side, as is customary in North Korea's diplomacy. Nevertheless, three weeks after the crisis of the Hanoi talks, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister, Choe Son-hui, who enjoys Kim's full confidence, said that her country "is not particularly interested in the current negotiations with the United States for denuclearization."
Later, after the unexpected end of talks in Hanoi, the United States launched a defamation campaign against North Korea, claiming, for example, that North Korea was secretly continuing its missile tests and that this new fact had stopped the US efforts at the negotiating table.
It is hard to understand how nuclear tests can be stopped "secretly."
North Korea, however, has never promised to stop anything else but missile tests alone.
Hence, neither the uranium enrichment program nor the other biological and chemical activities have rightly ceased.
Currently, however, the negotiations door still remains half-open.
Again in March, the pictures of the Sohae site, which is used for launching satellites, showed a significant pace of facilities’ reconstruction.
In all likelihood, despite Kim Jong-un's promise to dismantle the site soon, North Korea still plans to keep and develop it, with a view to also maintaining some diplomatic pressure on the United States, but above all to organizing a new round of talks in the future.
The next important events will be the meeting between Donald J. Trump and the South Korean leader – already scheduled for April 11 – designed to break the ice between North and South Korea on the denuclearization issue and, on April 15, the North Korea’s great celebrations for the 107th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, namely the "Day of the Sun."
As some US analysts claim, should we go back to the strict and effective style of the old Six-Party Talks?
Instead of a team that – at least in the US case – knows the complex issue of relations between the United States and North Korea only superficially, a new negotiation would be useful, with a traditional preliminary document and clear purposes.
A new negotiation that – as was the case with the Six-Party Talks – makes the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister and the Deputy Secretary of State, as well as many US experts of the academic and intelligence worlds sit around the negotiating table.
Certainly, we need to imagine that the negotiation is and will be long and complex. Simple negotiations are those that do not succeed in reaching the goal.
Hence, it will be useful to imagine multiple and different tradeoff and mutual satisfaction factors, compared to a harsh and brutal negotiation on nuclear potential alone.
Kim Jong-un knows all too well that what is at stake here is the future of his country, not only nuclear and bacteriological-chemical disarmament.
His nuclear and bacteriological-chemical network has led North Korea to be a member of the world decision-making system.
If this happens even in a shift from the nuclear threat to a major economic role, Kim Jong-un will have won his bet.
If this does not happen, the United States shall not believe that North Korea will consume itself on its own. Quite the reverse.
In any case, it will be necessary to clarify that, as usual, the North Korean issue cannot be resolved with a mere bilateral negotiation mechanism.
The North Korean strategic role is a vital problem for Japan, for South Korea, but also for China and the Russian Federation.
Without a project that is good for all these actors, and not only for the United States, no peace nor disarmament will be possible. Not even for the United States alone.
China does not certainly want a nuclear, bacteriological and chemical system on its border that is, however, completely out of its control.
This is the real reason for the initial tensions between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping.
Any increase in military tension in North Korea also spreads suspicions in China.
Nevertheless, it is a factor that the United States – in agreement with China – could use to reach North Korea’s denuclearization.
In particular, however, China wants neither a new war on the Korean peninsula – an interest obviously shared with South Korea – nor the US Armed Forces on its border, if North Korea’s complete nuclear demilitarization is achieved.
And if the United States and South Korea are still able to quickly reach the nuclear threshold in an initially conventional conflict with North Korea.
Hence, for China, high conventional and credible militarization for North Korea, but also with a non-negligible anti-US nuclear deterrent, albeit certainly not capable of setting fire to the whole Southeast Asia.
The same strategic paradigm largely applies to the Russian Federation.
It is not in favor of a demilitarized North Korea, which would be easy prey to the US-South Korea axis, and would not serve as a military buffer for Russia. However, it is even against a North Korea capable of threatening South Korea, and hence even the countries on its Northern border.
Therefore, considering the scenario of the negotiations between North Korea and the United States, the current stalemate will serve – after the Hanoi talks – to select the rational requests of the two actors and to shape the possible responses.
For example, the spreading of nuclear technology from North Korea to other States is a new topic to be included in the negotiation agenda.
As well as the decrease in conventional North Korean forces, to be linked to a rational decrease in the US and South Korean Armed Forces.
The five sanctions that North Korea wants to be lifted concern only the civilian economy and the well-being of the North Korean people, while we need to note that also Kim Jong-un is put under pressure by the North Korean people and, even more, by his ruling class.
The North Korean Foreign Minister, Ri Yong-ho, said so explicitly: in fact, he has clarified that the North Korean power is aimed – in a rational negotiation – "at the complete dismantling of the Yongbyon site."
Ri Yong-ho also added that the dismantling of Yongbyon facilities would take place "with the presence of US experts."
Clearly, Kim Jong-un now has China’s full protection.
Certainly, China does not want to have the huge mass of migrants from North Korea within its borders and, above all, is not interested in a "sister" country which, besides threatening the United States and South Korea, forces even the great China to follow its policy.
This could lead the North Korean leadership to seek economic compensation at any time of the denuclearization talks.
So, will the US leadership be able to finalize negotiations with North Korea without too many mistakes and wrong moves?
Will the US leadership be capable of actively involving China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in a radical dismantling of the North Korean nuclear capacity?
We do not yet know.
