It’s Not Just the Sentry's Fault
How has an operational entanglement led to the resignation of the Minister of Defense and to a resounding Hamas victory, and what really deters Israel? Amir Rapaport's weekly column tackles the burning questions that arise after the dust of war has settled
Amir Rapaport
| 16/11/2018
Smoke rises from a mortar attack by Gaza militants on Israel (Photo: AP)
It was not really necessary to wait for the resounding resignation of the Minister of Defense to know that Hamas emerged victorious from the last round – big time. Avigdor Lieberman's announcement on Wednesday only enhanced Hamas' accomplishment, which would have substantial future implications in various theaters.
The Sentry's Fault
The tumultuous week started out differently. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had already arrived at the world leaders' conference in Paris on the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, a specialist IDF force prepared to operate deep inside the Gaza Strip, in the Khan Yunis area. As per the normal procedure for operations on the other side of the border, the IDF had submitted this special operation, conducted on Sunday, for the approval of the political echelon. A forum known as Special Operations & Sorties, headed by the Minister of Defense, authorizes such operations.
In Paris, Netanyahu invested his best efforts in an attempt to set up a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is still furious over the incident involving the shooting-down of the Russian aircraft over Syria. The Russians regard Israel as the party responsible for that incident. The special relations with Putin are an asset for Netanyahu. This time, his aides were unable to schedule an official meeting between the two leaders, but they did meet for a short, intensive chat on the sidelines of the conference. This was a satisfactory achievement for Netanyahu, so he had no trouble making the decision to leave Paris and return to Israel earlier than planned, following the entanglement in the Gaza Strip. The trip to Paris had accomplished its modest objectives on the first day.
Prior to that, when Netanyahu received the first reports regarding the incident, the rescue operation was still underway. It soon became clear that an operation that should have remained a secret indefinitely became public knowledge in real time – probably owing to the exceptional alertness of a Palestinian sentry.
Once Hamas had spotted the Israeli force, they set up a blockade along the escape route. A heroic battle developed at the blockade, under a heavy air strike by IAF. The results were extremely painful, but the Israeli force left no WIAs or MIAs in the field, thanks to the extrication plan prepared in advance and the bravery discussed publicly, but without revealing the name of the hero (the late Lt. Col. M.) or any other persons who were there.
Blitzkrieg
The entanglement in the Gaza Strip had the potential of deteriorating into a war, as it almost compelled Hamas to respond. Indeed, the response took the form of the firing of a Kornet anti-tank missile at a bus in IDF service and of exceptionally heavy barrages of rocket and mortar fire on Monday and Tuesday.
The inferno notwithstanding, the IDF had no intention, even for one minute, of being forced into a war, as evidenced by the atmosphere in the command centers of IAF and IDF Southern Command, where the IDF hardly employed any reinforcements.
When the Israeli Cabinet convened on Tuesday morning, after a night of IDF air strikes that had taken particular care to avoid inflicting excessive destruction and severe casualties on the Gaza Strip, the cabinet ministers invested the lion's share of their energy in the reinstatement of the settlement that had collapsed with the first shot fired on Sunday. The Egyptians played a major role in the mediation process, as usual.
Lateral Victory
Within less than 24 hours it was evident that Hamas is about to win this round of fighting. Many articles and columns will be written about the political implications of Hamas' victory, reflected in Lieberman's resignation, when the picture of the political coalition has become clear.
From a military viewpoint, one can already conclude that the victory was lateral:
Initiative: with regard to this element, Hamas has had the upper hand for the past eight months, since it decided to violate the tranquility and harass Israel in a number of ways – from arson balloons to actual firing, which Hamas resumes often. Against the background of this fire, Israel always strives for a settlement, as was the case this week.
Technology: the technological gaps between the two sides are enormous, but this week proved that "dumb" rockets are definitely capable of challenging the "genius" Iron Dome system. As a lesson from previous rounds of fighting, Hamas generated concentrated fire into dense areas, mainly in the city of Ashqelon, and managed to break through the Israeli protective layer several times. The upgraded explosive warheads of the rockets inflicted substantial damage.
This was an important lesson for Hezbollah, which prepares for the next war against Israel in the northern theater, with a rocket arsenal many times more substantial than the one in the Gaza Strip. At the bottom line, Hamas succeeded in launching its rockets almost without interruption, despite the state-of-the-art surveillance and fire employment resources available to the IDF. The use of the Kornet anti-tank missile demonstrated that Hamas also possesses "smart" munitions.
Awareness: The IDF managed to disrupt the broadcasts of Hamas TV for about thirty minutes following an air strike, but the propaganda clip Hamas published, which showed that they could have engaged the bus while the soldiers were still on it – rather than just a single soldier, had a devastating effect. It proved that contrary to the statements that a "gang of terrorists" was operating out of the Gaza Strip, we are actually facing a trained, competent, and disciplined military force, which operates according to directives it receives from a political echelon. Hamas definitely controls the intensity of the flames.
Additionally, the final image of this round is an "awareness knockout" delivered by Hamas: joyful rejoicing in the Gaza Strip as opposed to outraged demonstrations in Israel followed by the Defense Minister's dramatic press conference.
Deterrence: the undisputed victory of Hamas in this week's round of fighting has further eroded Israel's deterrence and proved that Israel is the one deterred. At the same time, deterrence is mutual, not just opposite Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but in the northern theater as well.
What would Ariel Sharon have done?
The question of what Ariel Sharon, as Prime Minister, would have done in a situation similar to the one Israel faced vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip this week, will forever remain hypothetical. However, Shaul Mofaz, who served under Sharon as IDF Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense during the worst periods of terrorist attacks in the last decade, claimed "There is no way Sharon would have conducted himself as Netanyahu has done. The events of the recent period, when Israel appeared to be begging for a ceasefire, are the antithesis of everything Ariel Sharon had believed in. The implications of this groveling will be severe."
Could the Situation be any worse?
Absolutely. All of the harsh public criticism notwithstanding, Benjamin Netanyahu definitely remembers how popular Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was, owing to the determination he demonstrated opposite Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War, and how his term in office ended. As the objective was to return to a period of tranquility opposite the Gaza Strip anyway, apparently the Prime Minister and the cabinet ministers preferred to face mild criticism and demonstrations now, rather than a commission of inquiry following yet another war.
All of the above has never mentioned the concerns that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah only wait for an Israeli entanglement in the Gaza Strip in order to exact a toll for the open account they have opposite Israel, jointly and severally. The Israeli Cabinet decided to do everything it could to avoid that. As far as the resigning Minister of Defense is concerned – it was too much.
How has an operational entanglement led to the resignation of the Minister of Defense and to a resounding Hamas victory, and what really deters Israel? Amir Rapaport's weekly column tackles the burning questions that arise after the dust of war has settled
Smoke rises from a mortar attack by Gaza militants on Israel (Photo: AP)
It was not really necessary to wait for the resounding resignation of the Minister of Defense to know that Hamas emerged victorious from the last round – big time. Avigdor Lieberman's announcement on Wednesday only enhanced Hamas' accomplishment, which would have substantial future implications in various theaters.
The Sentry's Fault
The tumultuous week started out differently. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had already arrived at the world leaders' conference in Paris on the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, a specialist IDF force prepared to operate deep inside the Gaza Strip, in the Khan Yunis area. As per the normal procedure for operations on the other side of the border, the IDF had submitted this special operation, conducted on Sunday, for the approval of the political echelon. A forum known as Special Operations & Sorties, headed by the Minister of Defense, authorizes such operations.
In Paris, Netanyahu invested his best efforts in an attempt to set up a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is still furious over the incident involving the shooting-down of the Russian aircraft over Syria. The Russians regard Israel as the party responsible for that incident. The special relations with Putin are an asset for Netanyahu. This time, his aides were unable to schedule an official meeting between the two leaders, but they did meet for a short, intensive chat on the sidelines of the conference. This was a satisfactory achievement for Netanyahu, so he had no trouble making the decision to leave Paris and return to Israel earlier than planned, following the entanglement in the Gaza Strip. The trip to Paris had accomplished its modest objectives on the first day.
Prior to that, when Netanyahu received the first reports regarding the incident, the rescue operation was still underway. It soon became clear that an operation that should have remained a secret indefinitely became public knowledge in real time – probably owing to the exceptional alertness of a Palestinian sentry.
Once Hamas had spotted the Israeli force, they set up a blockade along the escape route. A heroic battle developed at the blockade, under a heavy air strike by IAF. The results were extremely painful, but the Israeli force left no WIAs or MIAs in the field, thanks to the extrication plan prepared in advance and the bravery discussed publicly, but without revealing the name of the hero (the late Lt. Col. M.) or any other persons who were there.
Blitzkrieg
The entanglement in the Gaza Strip had the potential of deteriorating into a war, as it almost compelled Hamas to respond. Indeed, the response took the form of the firing of a Kornet anti-tank missile at a bus in IDF service and of exceptionally heavy barrages of rocket and mortar fire on Monday and Tuesday.
The inferno notwithstanding, the IDF had no intention, even for one minute, of being forced into a war, as evidenced by the atmosphere in the command centers of IAF and IDF Southern Command, where the IDF hardly employed any reinforcements.
When the Israeli Cabinet convened on Tuesday morning, after a night of IDF air strikes that had taken particular care to avoid inflicting excessive destruction and severe casualties on the Gaza Strip, the cabinet ministers invested the lion's share of their energy in the reinstatement of the settlement that had collapsed with the first shot fired on Sunday. The Egyptians played a major role in the mediation process, as usual.
Lateral Victory
Within less than 24 hours it was evident that Hamas is about to win this round of fighting. Many articles and columns will be written about the political implications of Hamas' victory, reflected in Lieberman's resignation, when the picture of the political coalition has become clear.
From a military viewpoint, one can already conclude that the victory was lateral:
Initiative: with regard to this element, Hamas has had the upper hand for the past eight months, since it decided to violate the tranquility and harass Israel in a number of ways – from arson balloons to actual firing, which Hamas resumes often. Against the background of this fire, Israel always strives for a settlement, as was the case this week.
Technology: the technological gaps between the two sides are enormous, but this week proved that "dumb" rockets are definitely capable of challenging the "genius" Iron Dome system. As a lesson from previous rounds of fighting, Hamas generated concentrated fire into dense areas, mainly in the city of Ashqelon, and managed to break through the Israeli protective layer several times. The upgraded explosive warheads of the rockets inflicted substantial damage.
This was an important lesson for Hezbollah, which prepares for the next war against Israel in the northern theater, with a rocket arsenal many times more substantial than the one in the Gaza Strip. At the bottom line, Hamas succeeded in launching its rockets almost without interruption, despite the state-of-the-art surveillance and fire employment resources available to the IDF. The use of the Kornet anti-tank missile demonstrated that Hamas also possesses "smart" munitions.
Awareness: The IDF managed to disrupt the broadcasts of Hamas TV for about thirty minutes following an air strike, but the propaganda clip Hamas published, which showed that they could have engaged the bus while the soldiers were still on it – rather than just a single soldier, had a devastating effect. It proved that contrary to the statements that a "gang of terrorists" was operating out of the Gaza Strip, we are actually facing a trained, competent, and disciplined military force, which operates according to directives it receives from a political echelon. Hamas definitely controls the intensity of the flames.
Additionally, the final image of this round is an "awareness knockout" delivered by Hamas: joyful rejoicing in the Gaza Strip as opposed to outraged demonstrations in Israel followed by the Defense Minister's dramatic press conference.
Deterrence: the undisputed victory of Hamas in this week's round of fighting has further eroded Israel's deterrence and proved that Israel is the one deterred. At the same time, deterrence is mutual, not just opposite Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but in the northern theater as well.
What would Ariel Sharon have done?
The question of what Ariel Sharon, as Prime Minister, would have done in a situation similar to the one Israel faced vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip this week, will forever remain hypothetical. However, Shaul Mofaz, who served under Sharon as IDF Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense during the worst periods of terrorist attacks in the last decade, claimed "There is no way Sharon would have conducted himself as Netanyahu has done. The events of the recent period, when Israel appeared to be begging for a ceasefire, are the antithesis of everything Ariel Sharon had believed in. The implications of this groveling will be severe."
Could the Situation be any worse?
Absolutely. All of the harsh public criticism notwithstanding, Benjamin Netanyahu definitely remembers how popular Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was, owing to the determination he demonstrated opposite Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War, and how his term in office ended. As the objective was to return to a period of tranquility opposite the Gaza Strip anyway, apparently the Prime Minister and the cabinet ministers preferred to face mild criticism and demonstrations now, rather than a commission of inquiry following yet another war.
All of the above has never mentioned the concerns that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah only wait for an Israeli entanglement in the Gaza Strip in order to exact a toll for the open account they have opposite Israel, jointly and severally. The Israeli Cabinet decided to do everything it could to avoid that. As far as the resigning Minister of Defense is concerned – it was too much.
