Land Ahoy: Adapting the Navy to the Modern Battlefield
To remain relevant in the age of asymmetric warfare, naval forces must revise their doctrines, acquire dedicated weapon systems and relinquish the autonomous status that has been their hallmark in the last centuries
Yotam Gutman & Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 30/08/2018
Photo: IDF
The transition to asymmetrical warfare in recent years has dictated various revisions in the employment of the Navy. As in the case of the identity crisis the Ground Arm underwent, the Navy has found itself irrelevant in the fight against terrorist and guerrilla organizations. To remain relevant on the modern battlefield, the Navy must subordinate itself to the ground forces command during wartime.
The technological innovations pertaining to the naval theater in such fields as high-precision navigation, satellite, communication and computer systems have intensified the demand presented to the naval forces – to contribute to the ground operations. This change in concept requires that the naval forces revise their doctrines, acquire dedicated weapon systems and mainly relinquish the autonomous status that has been the hallmark of naval forces in the last centuries.
In retrospect, this is not surprising. The original essence and function of warships was to mobilize forces across the sea and provide logistic and kinetic support to the ground forces. As the ships of ancient times were very limited in their navigation capabilities and survivability, they sailed close to the shore to begin with, so it was natural for the armed forces to regard them as the naval arm of the ground force.
This concept prevailed until modern times, when the naval vessels, navigation measures, charts/maps and weapon systems improved significantly. That concept assured naval commanders of autonomy in maneuvering, selection of tactics and development of dedicated combat doctrines. The British were the first to establish the position of 'Admiral' – a full-time commander of the fleet. In doing so, they were ahead of their time and created for themselves a significant competitive edge in the naval medium vis-à-vis the naval elements of other European military forces, who still regarded ships as a form of transportation.
The overwhelming British victory against the Catholic invasion fleet ("The Armada") in 1588 was achieved, to a considerable extent, owing to the autonomy granted to the Admiral and the commanders of the forces subordinated to him. They were free to attack the enemy forces on the high seas using a relatively new weapon – accurate, long-range cannons. The British employed the same advantage in the war over the Low Countries and in their confrontations with such naval powers as the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal – who had placed the emphasis on the navy as a means for transporting goods while attempting to avoid battles on the high seas.
The success of the British led to the birth of the British Empire and the emergence of the ethos of "the British Navy that rules the seven seas." During the first and second world wars, the "Blue Water" concept was perfected, and British and German forces, and subsequently Japanese and American forces too, clashed over vast expanses of ocean autonomously, with no support from their ground forces.
A Fly in the Ointment
The Israeli Navy took this combat doctrine to new heights during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when it sank dozens of Syrian and Egyptian naval vessels with no losses to the Israeli side. The Navy operated with full autonomy (while often disregarding the instructions of the IDF General Staff, which demanded that the Navy adopt a defensive posture), which proved its effectiveness opposite the naval enemies of that period.
However, the successful results of the combat encounters notwithstanding, and despite the contribution it made to the fighting deep inside enemy territory and to the escorting of vital shipping (arms shipments), the contribution the Navy made to the primary operations was marginal. The reason for it was the fact that the primary combat operations took place on land. Another change that took place at a later stage involved the transition to a confrontation against guerrilla organizations. These changes led to a decline in the contribution naval forces made to the ground forces. For example, the contribution the IDF Navy made during the confrontations in Lebanon (the First Lebanon War of 1982 and the Second Lebanon War of 2006) was limited, and the same applies to the confrontations in the Gaza Strip over the years. This phenomenon is not unique to the IDF. The US Navy was unable to defeat inferior ground-based enemies in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The above notwithstanding, it seems that the contribution made by the Navy may be restored to its former glory. Technological developments for the naval theater now enable naval forces to be relevant to the fighting once again by providing support to the ground operations. The 'stand-off fire' concept, namely – engaging the enemy from beyond the range of his weapons, is not new, but has recently returned to center stage.
Various naval forces tested the ability of naval platforms to carry heavy weapons to long ranges repeatedly over the course of history. Some examples: The English attack on the Spanish treasure fleet at Santa Cruz de Tenerife, in which they destroyed most of the Spanish ships (1797); The barges fitted with heavy cannons that supported the allies' siege on Sebastopol during the Crimean War (1854-1855); The massive bombardments of the US Navy on the Japanese forces occupying the islands in the Pacific during World War II (1941-1945); The bombardment using the guns of WWII battleships against the Iraqi forces entrenched in the desert during the First Gulf War (1991); The precision attacks using Tomahawk missiles launched from naval vessels at al-Qaeda terrorist targets in the Middle East and in the Arabian Peninsula.
The US Navy continues to upgrade and perfect these capabilities, which include kinetic ordnance to constantly increasing ranges. Along with kinetic weapons, precision sea-to-land munitions were developed as far back as during the 1950s, with the intention of delivering nuclear weapons to the enemy's rear area. Ballistic missiles launched from submarines were (and still are) the most intimidating and lethal weapon of the Cold War. Tomahawk missiles may be launched from an extensive range of platforms. They can carry conventional or nuclear warheads to ranges of thousands of kilometers and hit their targets with a high degree of accuracy.
The astronomical cost of these missiles placed them out of the reach of all of the world's naval forces except the US Navy. However, the availability of inertial navigation technologies, satellite navigation, long-range encrypted communication and image processing and interpretation capabilities facilitated the development of a market of products in the same category. Today, naval forces can launch various types of missiles from a diversified range of naval vessels and engage shore-based targets deep inside enemy territory very effectively.
War Games
Naval forces can support the ground operations in indirect ways as well. They can execute maneuvers that would indicate an intention to land forces on the enemy's shore, thereby pinning enemy forces down to the coastal sector. They can employ EW and cyber warfare measures to disrupt the operations of enemy ground forces. They can serve as the rear area logistic support for friendly ground forces and provide medical evacuation support. Naval vessels can also employ their onboard intelligence collection resources or use such unmanned platforms as UAVs, USVs or UUVs launched from the naval vessels.
Active and effective participation in the ground operations depends on two other factors – command and control and command and supervision. As far as the technological aspect is concerned, the sea and ground forces should use a unified C2 system that would enable real-time decision-making. This capability will include an on-going indication of the actual locations of all friendly forces (both naval and ground, to prevent 'friendly fire' situations), dissemination of intelligence and allocation of targets. Such cooperation will enable cooperative, timed attacks against enemy targets as well as the engagement of targets of opportunity, based on shared position data and a joint command.
In addition to the technological change, the Navy must revise its doctrine. It must relinquish its traditional autonomy and subordinate itself to the ground forces command during wartime. This is the only way in which the Navy may remain relevant to modern asymmetrical warfare that lacks such "classic" targets as enemy surface vessels and submarines.
To remain relevant in the age of asymmetric warfare, naval forces must revise their doctrines, acquire dedicated weapon systems and relinquish the autonomous status that has been their hallmark in the last centuries
Photo: IDF
The transition to asymmetrical warfare in recent years has dictated various revisions in the employment of the Navy. As in the case of the identity crisis the Ground Arm underwent, the Navy has found itself irrelevant in the fight against terrorist and guerrilla organizations. To remain relevant on the modern battlefield, the Navy must subordinate itself to the ground forces command during wartime.
The technological innovations pertaining to the naval theater in such fields as high-precision navigation, satellite, communication and computer systems have intensified the demand presented to the naval forces – to contribute to the ground operations. This change in concept requires that the naval forces revise their doctrines, acquire dedicated weapon systems and mainly relinquish the autonomous status that has been the hallmark of naval forces in the last centuries.
In retrospect, this is not surprising. The original essence and function of warships was to mobilize forces across the sea and provide logistic and kinetic support to the ground forces. As the ships of ancient times were very limited in their navigation capabilities and survivability, they sailed close to the shore to begin with, so it was natural for the armed forces to regard them as the naval arm of the ground force.
This concept prevailed until modern times, when the naval vessels, navigation measures, charts/maps and weapon systems improved significantly. That concept assured naval commanders of autonomy in maneuvering, selection of tactics and development of dedicated combat doctrines. The British were the first to establish the position of 'Admiral' – a full-time commander of the fleet. In doing so, they were ahead of their time and created for themselves a significant competitive edge in the naval medium vis-à-vis the naval elements of other European military forces, who still regarded ships as a form of transportation.
The overwhelming British victory against the Catholic invasion fleet ("The Armada") in 1588 was achieved, to a considerable extent, owing to the autonomy granted to the Admiral and the commanders of the forces subordinated to him. They were free to attack the enemy forces on the high seas using a relatively new weapon – accurate, long-range cannons. The British employed the same advantage in the war over the Low Countries and in their confrontations with such naval powers as the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal – who had placed the emphasis on the navy as a means for transporting goods while attempting to avoid battles on the high seas.
The success of the British led to the birth of the British Empire and the emergence of the ethos of "the British Navy that rules the seven seas." During the first and second world wars, the "Blue Water" concept was perfected, and British and German forces, and subsequently Japanese and American forces too, clashed over vast expanses of ocean autonomously, with no support from their ground forces.
A Fly in the Ointment
The Israeli Navy took this combat doctrine to new heights during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when it sank dozens of Syrian and Egyptian naval vessels with no losses to the Israeli side. The Navy operated with full autonomy (while often disregarding the instructions of the IDF General Staff, which demanded that the Navy adopt a defensive posture), which proved its effectiveness opposite the naval enemies of that period.
However, the successful results of the combat encounters notwithstanding, and despite the contribution it made to the fighting deep inside enemy territory and to the escorting of vital shipping (arms shipments), the contribution the Navy made to the primary operations was marginal. The reason for it was the fact that the primary combat operations took place on land. Another change that took place at a later stage involved the transition to a confrontation against guerrilla organizations. These changes led to a decline in the contribution naval forces made to the ground forces. For example, the contribution the IDF Navy made during the confrontations in Lebanon (the First Lebanon War of 1982 and the Second Lebanon War of 2006) was limited, and the same applies to the confrontations in the Gaza Strip over the years. This phenomenon is not unique to the IDF. The US Navy was unable to defeat inferior ground-based enemies in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The above notwithstanding, it seems that the contribution made by the Navy may be restored to its former glory. Technological developments for the naval theater now enable naval forces to be relevant to the fighting once again by providing support to the ground operations. The 'stand-off fire' concept, namely – engaging the enemy from beyond the range of his weapons, is not new, but has recently returned to center stage.
Various naval forces tested the ability of naval platforms to carry heavy weapons to long ranges repeatedly over the course of history. Some examples: The English attack on the Spanish treasure fleet at Santa Cruz de Tenerife, in which they destroyed most of the Spanish ships (1797); The barges fitted with heavy cannons that supported the allies' siege on Sebastopol during the Crimean War (1854-1855); The massive bombardments of the US Navy on the Japanese forces occupying the islands in the Pacific during World War II (1941-1945); The bombardment using the guns of WWII battleships against the Iraqi forces entrenched in the desert during the First Gulf War (1991); The precision attacks using Tomahawk missiles launched from naval vessels at al-Qaeda terrorist targets in the Middle East and in the Arabian Peninsula.
The US Navy continues to upgrade and perfect these capabilities, which include kinetic ordnance to constantly increasing ranges. Along with kinetic weapons, precision sea-to-land munitions were developed as far back as during the 1950s, with the intention of delivering nuclear weapons to the enemy's rear area. Ballistic missiles launched from submarines were (and still are) the most intimidating and lethal weapon of the Cold War. Tomahawk missiles may be launched from an extensive range of platforms. They can carry conventional or nuclear warheads to ranges of thousands of kilometers and hit their targets with a high degree of accuracy.
The astronomical cost of these missiles placed them out of the reach of all of the world's naval forces except the US Navy. However, the availability of inertial navigation technologies, satellite navigation, long-range encrypted communication and image processing and interpretation capabilities facilitated the development of a market of products in the same category. Today, naval forces can launch various types of missiles from a diversified range of naval vessels and engage shore-based targets deep inside enemy territory very effectively.
War Games
Naval forces can support the ground operations in indirect ways as well. They can execute maneuvers that would indicate an intention to land forces on the enemy's shore, thereby pinning enemy forces down to the coastal sector. They can employ EW and cyber warfare measures to disrupt the operations of enemy ground forces. They can serve as the rear area logistic support for friendly ground forces and provide medical evacuation support. Naval vessels can also employ their onboard intelligence collection resources or use such unmanned platforms as UAVs, USVs or UUVs launched from the naval vessels.
Active and effective participation in the ground operations depends on two other factors – command and control and command and supervision. As far as the technological aspect is concerned, the sea and ground forces should use a unified C2 system that would enable real-time decision-making. This capability will include an on-going indication of the actual locations of all friendly forces (both naval and ground, to prevent 'friendly fire' situations), dissemination of intelligence and allocation of targets. Such cooperation will enable cooperative, timed attacks against enemy targets as well as the engagement of targets of opportunity, based on shared position data and a joint command.
In addition to the technological change, the Navy must revise its doctrine. It must relinquish its traditional autonomy and subordinate itself to the ground forces command during wartime. This is the only way in which the Navy may remain relevant to modern asymmetrical warfare that lacks such "classic" targets as enemy surface vessels and submarines.
