Seven Remarks Regarding the Latest Round of Fighting in Gaza
The current cycle in the southern sector is the outcome of the failure of the attempts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to achieve a significant effect through their "March of Return" and penetration attempts; one more accomplishment for the Iron Dome interception system, and all eyes are once again on the northern sector. Amir Rapaport with a few insights as another tense week ends
Amir Rapaport
| 01/06/2018
Israeli armored vehicles take up positions along the border with the Gaza Strip (Photo: AP)
1. Limited Confrontation: If the rocket that exploded last week in a Gaza Envelope kindergarten had been launched while the kindergarten was full of toddlers, the Israeli military response would, presumably, have been particularly harsh. Fortunately, the kindergarten was empty, and the Chief of Staff, who came to meet the children a few long hours later, conveyed a message: things are still under control. Both sides employ their fire judiciously.
The normal routine remained undisturbed even in the settlements closest to the Gaza Strip, at least in theory. In response to a rocket barrage the likes of which have not been seen since Operation Protective Edge (2014), the IDF bombed not less than 30 targets in a single strike (against seven different objectives), but no one in the Gaza Strip was hurt in this specific attack. In all, the IDF attacked 65 objectives during this cycle. The response could have been much harsher.
The ceasefire announced on Wednesday was as sudden as the outbreak itself.
2. A Diplomatic Solution or Occupation: The Israeli security-diplomatic cabinet did not hear any suggestion for a magic solution to the current situation. The moves being suggested will always remain within the range of options that extends between the total occupation of the Gaza Strip and the overthrowing of Hamas and "containment" (a laundered military term that actually means doing nothing in response to an attack against our side).
The previous Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz, used to say at such meetings that the solution vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip must be a diplomatic one. The current Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, in his final year in office, enjoys a unique level of prestige within the IDF and among the political echelon, and normally avoids such statements. His language (which is normally the same language Defense Minister Lieberman uses) is brute force. The current attempt is to avoid initiating an escalating series of blows (as was the case in countless escalation cycles opposite the Gaza Strip since the outset of the new millennium) while using a disproportionate blow that would place the option of a war on the table right from the opening whistle.
The recent escalation cycle came as no surprise and did not begin this week. It is the outcome of the failure of the attempts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to achieve a significant effect – neither through their "March of Return" toward the border fence, nor through their planting of explosive charges and attempts at intrusion along the fence. In an attempt to stop the current surge, the IDF raised its response bar and attacked Islamic Jihad personnel. This led the organization to launch a massive barrage of rockets and mortar bombs into Israel, for the first time since 2014. Hamas allowed this to happen initially but quickly found itself involved in the mayhem.
Sources within the Israeli defense establishment believe, even today, that the occupation of the Gaza Strip will not stop the launching of rockets into Israel. The thousands of launches that had begun even before the Israeli withdrawal in 2006 support this assumption. Overthrowing Hamas is not necessarily a good idea, as far as Israel is concerned, as the split vis-à-vis Fatah in the Judea and Samaria district plays, to a considerable extent, into Israel's hands. Fatah itself is currently experiencing a low period in view of what appears to be the twilight days of Abu Mazen's rule, and cannot be relied upon to assume command over the Gaza Strip under the cover of Israeli fire. What about an out-of-the-box diplomatic option? Many members of the Israeli cabinet support the idea of building an offshore or "island" seaport for Hamas, so that Israel can inspect every incoming ship. A decision is yet to be made, possibly because it is doubtful whether such an island will eliminate the claim of a siege Israel allegedly imposes on the Gaza Strip, for political reasons primarily. On Sunday, the cabinet will convene again, but it will not discuss this option again.
3. How do you Declare War? The new statute that will allow the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense to go to war without government authorization will only reflect the de-facto reality. In fact, the Netanyahu-Lieberman axis made the decisions regarding all of the significant defense-related moves of the recent period, and yes, Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot has been very influential.
Take, for example, the declaration by the Minister of Defense about two weeks ago, to the effect that an Iranian attack on Israel will lead to an Israeli response in Iran proper. When the time comes, the significance of this declaration may be far-reaching, but no broad government forum has ever discussed it. Lieberman just went ahead and made that statement.
The process was the same this week, too: the cabinet received updates primarily. It is not the leading decision-making forum.
4. The Mediator: None of the parties is interested in a war, but to avoid the misunderstandings that might lead to a war, the parties must communicate. Turkey could have served as an effective mediator following the reconciliation agreement with Israel, but the present conduct of Turkey's President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has made Turkey irrelevant as far as Israel and the USA are concerned. The most effective player capable of pressing Hamas where it really hurts is Egypt. Indeed, the leaders of Hamas traveled to Egypt on Tuesday night, to finalize the ceasefire that came into effect on Wednesday morning. Was it surrender? The answer is in the eyes of the beholder. As far as Hamas and Islamic Jihad are concerned, they did gain some achievements.
5. The Iron Dome System: This amazing interception system was the star of the cycle of fire of the last week, too. It even provided a surprise for the General Public – an announcement by the IDF Spokesperson that the system succeeded, for the very first time, in intercepting mortar bombs fired at settlements close to the border fence. Within the Israeli defense establishment, opinions differ as to whether "discussing" this issue in public was the right thing to do. As the secret is out, however, we may report that the attempt to find a solution to the mortar fire threat (as well as to the underground tunnel threat) was high on the list of priorities following Operation Protective Edge in 2014. In order to intercept mortar bombs that hit their targets within seconds, having traveled a relatively flat trajectory, the surveillance Radar had to be significantly improved, along with the software that enables the prompt launching of interceptors.
The ability to intercept mortar bombs is yet another achievement of the Israeli defense industries and IMOD. The solution includes dozens of Radars deployed, among other things, in order to alert the local population of the danger. This solution will be far from relevant in the context of a significant confrontation, however. IDF will not be able to launch thousands of missiles, each one costing hundreds of thousands of ILS, to intercept mortar bombs of which the enemy has an almost unlimited inventory.
6. UAVs: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). Presumably, the IAF had aimed a major portion of the blows it delivered this week at the airborne platform infrastructure of Hamas, regarded as a "surprise" Hamas is preparing for the next significant confrontation. In the next cycle, Hamas will employ their power to its fullest extent, rather than settling for limited launching of rockets and mortar fire. The extent of damage these UAV strikes are likely to inflict remains undetermined.
7. Meanwhile, in the Northern Sector: The speed at which the cycle of fighting in the south ended may be associated with the fact that the actual strategic challenge facing Israel is still in the north. As far as this front is concerned, the Israeli cabinet conducted a long series of discussions, following which it set forth a required achievement and a directive vis-à-vis Iran's attempts to consolidate its foothold in Syria, to deliver weapon systems of strategic significance and to manufacture advanced weapon systems on Lebanese soil (as the Prime Minister revealed only this week).
The Israeli directive reaches a climax following Netanyahu's recent visit to Moscow and his meeting with the real master of the region, Vladimir Putin. Israel made its position clear to the Russians: in order to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Damascus, the Iranians should return to Iran and Hezbollah should return to Lebanon.
Will the Russians push for the arrangement Israel demands? Only time (and not a very long time at that) will tell.
The current cycle in the southern sector is the outcome of the failure of the attempts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to achieve a significant effect through their "March of Return" and penetration attempts; one more accomplishment for the Iron Dome interception system, and all eyes are once again on the northern sector. Amir Rapaport with a few insights as another tense week ends
Israeli armored vehicles take up positions along the border with the Gaza Strip (Photo: AP)
1. Limited Confrontation: If the rocket that exploded last week in a Gaza Envelope kindergarten had been launched while the kindergarten was full of toddlers, the Israeli military response would, presumably, have been particularly harsh. Fortunately, the kindergarten was empty, and the Chief of Staff, who came to meet the children a few long hours later, conveyed a message: things are still under control. Both sides employ their fire judiciously.
The normal routine remained undisturbed even in the settlements closest to the Gaza Strip, at least in theory. In response to a rocket barrage the likes of which have not been seen since Operation Protective Edge (2014), the IDF bombed not less than 30 targets in a single strike (against seven different objectives), but no one in the Gaza Strip was hurt in this specific attack. In all, the IDF attacked 65 objectives during this cycle. The response could have been much harsher.
The ceasefire announced on Wednesday was as sudden as the outbreak itself.
2. A Diplomatic Solution or Occupation: The Israeli security-diplomatic cabinet did not hear any suggestion for a magic solution to the current situation. The moves being suggested will always remain within the range of options that extends between the total occupation of the Gaza Strip and the overthrowing of Hamas and "containment" (a laundered military term that actually means doing nothing in response to an attack against our side).
The previous Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz, used to say at such meetings that the solution vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip must be a diplomatic one. The current Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, in his final year in office, enjoys a unique level of prestige within the IDF and among the political echelon, and normally avoids such statements. His language (which is normally the same language Defense Minister Lieberman uses) is brute force. The current attempt is to avoid initiating an escalating series of blows (as was the case in countless escalation cycles opposite the Gaza Strip since the outset of the new millennium) while using a disproportionate blow that would place the option of a war on the table right from the opening whistle.
The recent escalation cycle came as no surprise and did not begin this week. It is the outcome of the failure of the attempts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to achieve a significant effect – neither through their "March of Return" toward the border fence, nor through their planting of explosive charges and attempts at intrusion along the fence. In an attempt to stop the current surge, the IDF raised its response bar and attacked Islamic Jihad personnel. This led the organization to launch a massive barrage of rockets and mortar bombs into Israel, for the first time since 2014. Hamas allowed this to happen initially but quickly found itself involved in the mayhem.
Sources within the Israeli defense establishment believe, even today, that the occupation of the Gaza Strip will not stop the launching of rockets into Israel. The thousands of launches that had begun even before the Israeli withdrawal in 2006 support this assumption. Overthrowing Hamas is not necessarily a good idea, as far as Israel is concerned, as the split vis-à-vis Fatah in the Judea and Samaria district plays, to a considerable extent, into Israel's hands. Fatah itself is currently experiencing a low period in view of what appears to be the twilight days of Abu Mazen's rule, and cannot be relied upon to assume command over the Gaza Strip under the cover of Israeli fire. What about an out-of-the-box diplomatic option? Many members of the Israeli cabinet support the idea of building an offshore or "island" seaport for Hamas, so that Israel can inspect every incoming ship. A decision is yet to be made, possibly because it is doubtful whether such an island will eliminate the claim of a siege Israel allegedly imposes on the Gaza Strip, for political reasons primarily. On Sunday, the cabinet will convene again, but it will not discuss this option again.
3. How do you Declare War? The new statute that will allow the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense to go to war without government authorization will only reflect the de-facto reality. In fact, the Netanyahu-Lieberman axis made the decisions regarding all of the significant defense-related moves of the recent period, and yes, Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot has been very influential.
Take, for example, the declaration by the Minister of Defense about two weeks ago, to the effect that an Iranian attack on Israel will lead to an Israeli response in Iran proper. When the time comes, the significance of this declaration may be far-reaching, but no broad government forum has ever discussed it. Lieberman just went ahead and made that statement.
The process was the same this week, too: the cabinet received updates primarily. It is not the leading decision-making forum.
4. The Mediator: None of the parties is interested in a war, but to avoid the misunderstandings that might lead to a war, the parties must communicate. Turkey could have served as an effective mediator following the reconciliation agreement with Israel, but the present conduct of Turkey's President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has made Turkey irrelevant as far as Israel and the USA are concerned. The most effective player capable of pressing Hamas where it really hurts is Egypt. Indeed, the leaders of Hamas traveled to Egypt on Tuesday night, to finalize the ceasefire that came into effect on Wednesday morning. Was it surrender? The answer is in the eyes of the beholder. As far as Hamas and Islamic Jihad are concerned, they did gain some achievements.
5. The Iron Dome System: This amazing interception system was the star of the cycle of fire of the last week, too. It even provided a surprise for the General Public – an announcement by the IDF Spokesperson that the system succeeded, for the very first time, in intercepting mortar bombs fired at settlements close to the border fence. Within the Israeli defense establishment, opinions differ as to whether "discussing" this issue in public was the right thing to do. As the secret is out, however, we may report that the attempt to find a solution to the mortar fire threat (as well as to the underground tunnel threat) was high on the list of priorities following Operation Protective Edge in 2014. In order to intercept mortar bombs that hit their targets within seconds, having traveled a relatively flat trajectory, the surveillance Radar had to be significantly improved, along with the software that enables the prompt launching of interceptors.
The ability to intercept mortar bombs is yet another achievement of the Israeli defense industries and IMOD. The solution includes dozens of Radars deployed, among other things, in order to alert the local population of the danger. This solution will be far from relevant in the context of a significant confrontation, however. IDF will not be able to launch thousands of missiles, each one costing hundreds of thousands of ILS, to intercept mortar bombs of which the enemy has an almost unlimited inventory.
6. UAVs: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). Presumably, the IAF had aimed a major portion of the blows it delivered this week at the airborne platform infrastructure of Hamas, regarded as a "surprise" Hamas is preparing for the next significant confrontation. In the next cycle, Hamas will employ their power to its fullest extent, rather than settling for limited launching of rockets and mortar fire. The extent of damage these UAV strikes are likely to inflict remains undetermined.
7. Meanwhile, in the Northern Sector: The speed at which the cycle of fighting in the south ended may be associated with the fact that the actual strategic challenge facing Israel is still in the north. As far as this front is concerned, the Israeli cabinet conducted a long series of discussions, following which it set forth a required achievement and a directive vis-à-vis Iran's attempts to consolidate its foothold in Syria, to deliver weapon systems of strategic significance and to manufacture advanced weapon systems on Lebanese soil (as the Prime Minister revealed only this week).
The Israeli directive reaches a climax following Netanyahu's recent visit to Moscow and his meeting with the real master of the region, Vladimir Putin. Israel made its position clear to the Russians: in order to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Damascus, the Iranians should return to Iran and Hezbollah should return to Lebanon.
Will the Russians push for the arrangement Israel demands? Only time (and not a very long time at that) will tell.
