Estimate: “Tehran to Withdraw from JCPOA, Renew Nuclear Program within Months”
Sima Shine, a senior research fellow at INSS and a former senior officer of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the Mossad, addressed the Iranian nuclear issue during the Israel Defense annual conference. “Israel's intelligence potential is well known in Iran and is a cause for concern for the Iranians”
Dan Arkin and Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 17/05/2018
Photo credit: Gilad Kavalerchik
“It is my estimate that within a few months, the Iranians will announce their withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and return to their original nuclear program,” says Sima Shine, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and a former senior officer of the Mossad and the IDF Intelligence Directorate.
In Shine's estimate, “The Iranians will not pull out of Syria easily and promptly. Consequently, if we spot, for example, the transfer of weapon systems risking Israel's security, we should attack. At the same time, diplomatic efforts should be made through a third party, in an attempt to reach a settlement that would guarantee that Israel's Red Lines, which are essential to Israel's national security, are maintained.” Ms. Shine spoke during the Israel Defense annual Fire, Maneuvering & Intelligence Conference.
Possessing extensive experience gained over many years of service with the Israeli intelligence community, Shine argued: “Israel's intelligence potential is well known in Iran and is a cause for concern for the Iranians. It was proven that the various branches of Israeli intelligence possess the ability to penetrate certain necessary objectives in Iran.” With regard to the Iranian presence in Syria, Shine reasoned that Israel should not keep announcing that it would not tolerate the presence of even a single Iranian in Syria, as there is no military way to get all of the Iranians out of Syria. According to current estimates, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 Iranian servicemen in Syria. They had shed blood there, as had Hezbollah, but the Iranians do not intend to leave Syria any time soon.
Shine analyzed Iran's current state and said that apparently, Iran had some accomplishments: it established itself as a major player in the Middle East and claims that it dominates four Middle Eastern capitals. However, some changes have taken place in recent years, with one of the indicators being the demonstrations initiated in the cities of Iran every day by youngsters born after the Islamist revolution. These youngsters currently demand labor and wages or demonstrate against environmental pollution – but they also chant “Death to the Leader” – which indicates that these are demonstrations against the republic.
Following President Trump's announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, the Iranians are currently checking whether the agreement can be adhered to even without the US. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is traveling around the world in an attempt to buy time and find out what happens if the sanctions are renewed. “It is my estimate that within a few months, the Iranians will announce their withdrawal from the agreement and renewal of their nuclear program,” Shine concluded.
“The Problem of the Intelligence Services is Dealing with Voice Information”
“The IDF Intelligence Directorate faces three billion bits of information per day. Within minutes, you have to derive insights from that mass. It is difficult to describe the significance of this Big Data revolution. A massive data storing and processing capability is required,” said Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, formerly the Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, during a special panel at the Israel Defense annual conference.
“By 2025, the objective is to obtain a video stream of every objective and target in the Middle East every minute. Voice information should be digitized and converted into digital media. This will enable us to use the bits of information to produce real-time intelligence. One of the major difficulties is how to deal with the verbal media.”
Haim Tomer, formerly a department head in the Mossad, said in the panel: “Dagan and Pardo [former Mossad chiefs] objected, initially, to devoting resources to collection efforts associated with the Syrian reactor. At the Mossad, (the element in charge of) collecting non-tactical counterterrorism intelligence was established in 1974. That move required that the operations people adapt themselves to the (presence of the) intelligence division, and vice versa. This is also associated with the attack against the Syrian reactor in 2007. In those days, I was Deputy Head of Intelligence & Operations. In 2002, the Mossad decided to change its courses of action and focus on Iran and Islamist terrorism. Dagan made that decision. He decided that Syria was no longer a threat.
“A handful of intelligence professionals at the Mossad and the IDF Intelligence Directorate took the information regarding a reactor in Syria seriously. Other people, at both agencies, thought differently – mainly operations people who did not believe that Syria would establish a nuclear reactor. It was a story of the ability to conduct a dialog that would be comprehensible to the organization within which you operate. You, as an intelligence officer, must convince the operational echelon within your own organization, in order to bring about a change in its operations.
“Dagan and Pardo objected to devoting resources to the Syrian reactor. They were eventually convinced, as the discourse around the subject was conducted in a language they could understand. Amnon Sofrin, who led the effort, conducted that dialog, along with me and other people at the Mossad analysis division. There were other failures involving intelligence capabilities that had not been realized over the years. One should bear in mind the fact that the amount of information is of no consequence if the intelligence officer fails to derive practical action from it. In the Syrian case, we asked detachments that went to Europe to search for proof for the existence of the project, and that was how it happened.
“Another issue that we need to pay attention to is the Prime Minister's presentation of the materials brought from Iran. That presentation signifies a change of concept in the Israeli intelligence world. In the past, operational units flatly refused to present such strategic materials, for fear of exposing their methods and sources. That was taboo. The Prime Minister revealed the fact that the Mossad had extracted those materials, and it is clear to everyone that (in response,) the Iranians launched an investigation as to how their archive had been stolen. This (revelation) carries an operational price tag.
“The Prime Minister wanted President Trump to withdraw from the agreement, and it happened. I do not know whether this was the decisive factor, but it happened. It is a process that started back in 2005 when an operational Mossad unit obtained and delivered materials about the Iranian nuclear program – what happens inside an Iranian nuclear plant. Dagan looked at us and asked what we should do with that, and then someone at the Mossad, from one of the operational units, said that we should present the information to all of the countries that are friendly to Israel.
“Dagan responded favorably to that suggestion, and since then, a new mechanism evolved, designated ‘diplomatic counterintelligence.’ Many Israeli organizations took part in that effort, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and others. Pursuant to that process, the operational units released more and more information over time, as they realized that pressure exerted on Iran was an objective. The intelligence community currently understands that operational intelligence may be used to accomplish a strategic goal – like the Iranian nuclear program.
“This is a critical question – how do you take strategic intelligence, intended to convince relevant elements and individuals around the world of the (validity of the) cause, for the benefit of the State of Israel. In many instances, Israel does not know how to do that. One example is the Palestinian theater. In 2008, we obtained the ‘golden nugget’ that indicated that the Iranians had a nuclear installation and the materials presented by Israeli intelligence managed to influence the decision to impose sanctions on Iran and subsequently the nuclear agreement of 2015, which has since then been revoked. Without a doubt, the conclusion from the Iranian affair is that sometimes, it is worthwhile to unveil operational intelligence information for diplomatic purposes.”
Sima Shine, a senior research fellow at INSS and a former senior officer of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the Mossad, addressed the Iranian nuclear issue during the Israel Defense annual conference. “Israel's intelligence potential is well known in Iran and is a cause for concern for the Iranians”
Photo credit: Gilad Kavalerchik
“It is my estimate that within a few months, the Iranians will announce their withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and return to their original nuclear program,” says Sima Shine, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and a former senior officer of the Mossad and the IDF Intelligence Directorate.
In Shine's estimate, “The Iranians will not pull out of Syria easily and promptly. Consequently, if we spot, for example, the transfer of weapon systems risking Israel's security, we should attack. At the same time, diplomatic efforts should be made through a third party, in an attempt to reach a settlement that would guarantee that Israel's Red Lines, which are essential to Israel's national security, are maintained.” Ms. Shine spoke during the Israel Defense annual Fire, Maneuvering & Intelligence Conference.
Possessing extensive experience gained over many years of service with the Israeli intelligence community, Shine argued: “Israel's intelligence potential is well known in Iran and is a cause for concern for the Iranians. It was proven that the various branches of Israeli intelligence possess the ability to penetrate certain necessary objectives in Iran.” With regard to the Iranian presence in Syria, Shine reasoned that Israel should not keep announcing that it would not tolerate the presence of even a single Iranian in Syria, as there is no military way to get all of the Iranians out of Syria. According to current estimates, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 Iranian servicemen in Syria. They had shed blood there, as had Hezbollah, but the Iranians do not intend to leave Syria any time soon.
Shine analyzed Iran's current state and said that apparently, Iran had some accomplishments: it established itself as a major player in the Middle East and claims that it dominates four Middle Eastern capitals. However, some changes have taken place in recent years, with one of the indicators being the demonstrations initiated in the cities of Iran every day by youngsters born after the Islamist revolution. These youngsters currently demand labor and wages or demonstrate against environmental pollution – but they also chant “Death to the Leader” – which indicates that these are demonstrations against the republic.
Following President Trump's announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, the Iranians are currently checking whether the agreement can be adhered to even without the US. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is traveling around the world in an attempt to buy time and find out what happens if the sanctions are renewed. “It is my estimate that within a few months, the Iranians will announce their withdrawal from the agreement and renewal of their nuclear program,” Shine concluded.
“The Problem of the Intelligence Services is Dealing with Voice Information”
“The IDF Intelligence Directorate faces three billion bits of information per day. Within minutes, you have to derive insights from that mass. It is difficult to describe the significance of this Big Data revolution. A massive data storing and processing capability is required,” said Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, formerly the Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, during a special panel at the Israel Defense annual conference.
“By 2025, the objective is to obtain a video stream of every objective and target in the Middle East every minute. Voice information should be digitized and converted into digital media. This will enable us to use the bits of information to produce real-time intelligence. One of the major difficulties is how to deal with the verbal media.”
Haim Tomer, formerly a department head in the Mossad, said in the panel: “Dagan and Pardo [former Mossad chiefs] objected, initially, to devoting resources to collection efforts associated with the Syrian reactor. At the Mossad, (the element in charge of) collecting non-tactical counterterrorism intelligence was established in 1974. That move required that the operations people adapt themselves to the (presence of the) intelligence division, and vice versa. This is also associated with the attack against the Syrian reactor in 2007. In those days, I was Deputy Head of Intelligence & Operations. In 2002, the Mossad decided to change its courses of action and focus on Iran and Islamist terrorism. Dagan made that decision. He decided that Syria was no longer a threat.
“A handful of intelligence professionals at the Mossad and the IDF Intelligence Directorate took the information regarding a reactor in Syria seriously. Other people, at both agencies, thought differently – mainly operations people who did not believe that Syria would establish a nuclear reactor. It was a story of the ability to conduct a dialog that would be comprehensible to the organization within which you operate. You, as an intelligence officer, must convince the operational echelon within your own organization, in order to bring about a change in its operations.
“Dagan and Pardo objected to devoting resources to the Syrian reactor. They were eventually convinced, as the discourse around the subject was conducted in a language they could understand. Amnon Sofrin, who led the effort, conducted that dialog, along with me and other people at the Mossad analysis division. There were other failures involving intelligence capabilities that had not been realized over the years. One should bear in mind the fact that the amount of information is of no consequence if the intelligence officer fails to derive practical action from it. In the Syrian case, we asked detachments that went to Europe to search for proof for the existence of the project, and that was how it happened.
“Another issue that we need to pay attention to is the Prime Minister's presentation of the materials brought from Iran. That presentation signifies a change of concept in the Israeli intelligence world. In the past, operational units flatly refused to present such strategic materials, for fear of exposing their methods and sources. That was taboo. The Prime Minister revealed the fact that the Mossad had extracted those materials, and it is clear to everyone that (in response,) the Iranians launched an investigation as to how their archive had been stolen. This (revelation) carries an operational price tag.
“The Prime Minister wanted President Trump to withdraw from the agreement, and it happened. I do not know whether this was the decisive factor, but it happened. It is a process that started back in 2005 when an operational Mossad unit obtained and delivered materials about the Iranian nuclear program – what happens inside an Iranian nuclear plant. Dagan looked at us and asked what we should do with that, and then someone at the Mossad, from one of the operational units, said that we should present the information to all of the countries that are friendly to Israel.
“Dagan responded favorably to that suggestion, and since then, a new mechanism evolved, designated ‘diplomatic counterintelligence.’ Many Israeli organizations took part in that effort, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and others. Pursuant to that process, the operational units released more and more information over time, as they realized that pressure exerted on Iran was an objective. The intelligence community currently understands that operational intelligence may be used to accomplish a strategic goal – like the Iranian nuclear program.
“This is a critical question – how do you take strategic intelligence, intended to convince relevant elements and individuals around the world of the (validity of the) cause, for the benefit of the State of Israel. In many instances, Israel does not know how to do that. One example is the Palestinian theater. In 2008, we obtained the ‘golden nugget’ that indicated that the Iranians had a nuclear installation and the materials presented by Israeli intelligence managed to influence the decision to impose sanctions on Iran and subsequently the nuclear agreement of 2015, which has since then been revoked. Without a doubt, the conclusion from the Iranian affair is that sometimes, it is worthwhile to unveil operational intelligence information for diplomatic purposes.”
