Between Military Victory and Political Achievement
The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War had led to a major rift between the warring parties, to the point where peace was unachievable. Accordingly, Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivry maintains that military deterrence should not be an objective in itself, but a part of the political achievements. Opinion
David Ivry
| 06/06/2017
Photo: IDF
Some authorities maintain that the political echelon should simply order the IDF to win the war and settle for that. This may sound understandable and perfectly acceptable at first glance, but when you present the question of what it actually means to win a low-intensity conflict or the 'War between Wars', you will hear more than one version of what counts as victory. Consequently, the above is no more than a populistic slogan that allows the political echelon to evade its responsibility.
The political echelon cannot evade its duty of specifying the substance of military victory, and by doing so it will actually dictate the manner in which military power should be employed.
Carl von Clausewitz said that "War… is the continuation of politics by different means". Military action is not an independent, isolated phenomenon. It is intended to improve the political situation. If a major, highly successful military victory had an adverse effect on the winning country's political interests, then that military victory would have failed to accomplish its objective.
The ultimate objective of the State of Israel is to achieve stable peace and security for the citizens of Israel. If the military activity failed to propel us toward that objective, then it would not be justified. Sometimes military action is necessary because it had been forced on us, but even forced military action must yield political achievements, or at least avoid damaging the state's political interests.
The various confrontations in which Israel has been involved since 2000 may be examined from this perspective. Most of these confrontations developed from a situation where Israel's political circumstances were relatively comfortable and in some cases even favorable. This refers primarily to the aspect of international understanding and support for Israel's need to resort to military action. However, during the actual fighting, international support was gradually lost and when Israel emerged from the conflict, most of the countries that had supported it at the outset changed their view to the point of criticizing the manner in which the Israeli military was employed. In other words, even though from a military point of view we had the upper hand (with some commentators claiming that we had achieved a military victory while others disagree), we definitely lost points on the diplomatic playground.
If the political echelon issues clear directives as to the political achievement expected from the employment of military power, the military will be able to employ its power based on an understanding of what is expected of it.
The Israeli victory in the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, the bitter criticism notwithstanding, led to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The same cannot be said about the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War had led to a major rift between the warring parties, to the point of making any attempt to promote a peace process impossible.
Following the Second Lebanon War of 2006, we were blessed with a state of tranquility along our border with Lebanon. Was it due to the military victory? In my estimate – on the contrary. The last day of that war ended with Hezbollah having launched more rockets into Israel during that particular day than during any other day of the war. Accordingly, I cannot accept the claim that we had achieved a state of deterrence. Indeed, we were blessed with 11 years of tranquility. Hezbollah, reasoning that they won, had accomplished their military objectives of launching rockets into central Israel and not being forced to stop those launches despite the massive entrance of Israeli forces into Lebanon. This is how Hezbollah became the dominating political force in Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah dictates every appointment of senior officials within the Lebanese government, and they will not want to lose that dominating position. Understandably, the leaders of Hezbollah understand that any major confrontation with Israel will lead the Lebanese public to oppose their dominating position. In this respect, political deterrence was, indeed, achieved – but not owing to the military victory.
The other reason for the relative calm along the border between Israel and Lebanon is, naturally, Hezbollah's involvement in the civil war in Syria, which makes it extremely difficult for them to open a second front against Israel. In other words, the Second Lebanon War – the doubts regarding the Israeli military victory in that war notwithstanding – created, both directly and indirectly, a state of calm. Admittedly, it is a tense calm that still possesses the potential for a severe future confrontation – possibly more severe than the Second Lebanon War.
My conclusion is that military deterrence is not an objective in itself. It must be a part of the political achievements. Normally, political deterrence is more powerful than military deterrence. For example, the Yom-Kippur War of 1973 broke out despite the Israeli deterrence. President Sadat of Egypt had realized that he would not win, but he was willing to sacrifice one million Egyptian troopers in order to set in motion a diplomatic process which, for him, was the objective of that war, and he accomplished the political objective despite the military defeat. It is difficult for me to imagine an Israeli leader setting a similar goal.
It is the duty of the political echelon to determine and define the political objective of the military confrontation. This is a highly complex definition under the political-strategic circumstances, and it is normally derived from the national security concept of the political echelon. We can no longer afford the process that evolved during the wars of the previous century – when military commanders on the ground initiated the achievements of the war. In the previous century, a military victory was normally synonymous with the political achievement. These days, such an initiative might prove to be a diplomatic catastrophe.
The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War had led to a major rift between the warring parties, to the point where peace was unachievable. Accordingly, Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivry maintains that military deterrence should not be an objective in itself, but a part of the political achievements. Opinion
Photo: IDF
Some authorities maintain that the political echelon should simply order the IDF to win the war and settle for that. This may sound understandable and perfectly acceptable at first glance, but when you present the question of what it actually means to win a low-intensity conflict or the 'War between Wars', you will hear more than one version of what counts as victory. Consequently, the above is no more than a populistic slogan that allows the political echelon to evade its responsibility.
The political echelon cannot evade its duty of specifying the substance of military victory, and by doing so it will actually dictate the manner in which military power should be employed.
Carl von Clausewitz said that "War… is the continuation of politics by different means". Military action is not an independent, isolated phenomenon. It is intended to improve the political situation. If a major, highly successful military victory had an adverse effect on the winning country's political interests, then that military victory would have failed to accomplish its objective.
The ultimate objective of the State of Israel is to achieve stable peace and security for the citizens of Israel. If the military activity failed to propel us toward that objective, then it would not be justified. Sometimes military action is necessary because it had been forced on us, but even forced military action must yield political achievements, or at least avoid damaging the state's political interests.
The various confrontations in which Israel has been involved since 2000 may be examined from this perspective. Most of these confrontations developed from a situation where Israel's political circumstances were relatively comfortable and in some cases even favorable. This refers primarily to the aspect of international understanding and support for Israel's need to resort to military action. However, during the actual fighting, international support was gradually lost and when Israel emerged from the conflict, most of the countries that had supported it at the outset changed their view to the point of criticizing the manner in which the Israeli military was employed. In other words, even though from a military point of view we had the upper hand (with some commentators claiming that we had achieved a military victory while others disagree), we definitely lost points on the diplomatic playground.
If the political echelon issues clear directives as to the political achievement expected from the employment of military power, the military will be able to employ its power based on an understanding of what is expected of it.
The Israeli victory in the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, the bitter criticism notwithstanding, led to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The same cannot be said about the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War had led to a major rift between the warring parties, to the point of making any attempt to promote a peace process impossible.
Following the Second Lebanon War of 2006, we were blessed with a state of tranquility along our border with Lebanon. Was it due to the military victory? In my estimate – on the contrary. The last day of that war ended with Hezbollah having launched more rockets into Israel during that particular day than during any other day of the war. Accordingly, I cannot accept the claim that we had achieved a state of deterrence. Indeed, we were blessed with 11 years of tranquility. Hezbollah, reasoning that they won, had accomplished their military objectives of launching rockets into central Israel and not being forced to stop those launches despite the massive entrance of Israeli forces into Lebanon. This is how Hezbollah became the dominating political force in Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah dictates every appointment of senior officials within the Lebanese government, and they will not want to lose that dominating position. Understandably, the leaders of Hezbollah understand that any major confrontation with Israel will lead the Lebanese public to oppose their dominating position. In this respect, political deterrence was, indeed, achieved – but not owing to the military victory.
The other reason for the relative calm along the border between Israel and Lebanon is, naturally, Hezbollah's involvement in the civil war in Syria, which makes it extremely difficult for them to open a second front against Israel. In other words, the Second Lebanon War – the doubts regarding the Israeli military victory in that war notwithstanding – created, both directly and indirectly, a state of calm. Admittedly, it is a tense calm that still possesses the potential for a severe future confrontation – possibly more severe than the Second Lebanon War.
My conclusion is that military deterrence is not an objective in itself. It must be a part of the political achievements. Normally, political deterrence is more powerful than military deterrence. For example, the Yom-Kippur War of 1973 broke out despite the Israeli deterrence. President Sadat of Egypt had realized that he would not win, but he was willing to sacrifice one million Egyptian troopers in order to set in motion a diplomatic process which, for him, was the objective of that war, and he accomplished the political objective despite the military defeat. It is difficult for me to imagine an Israeli leader setting a similar goal.
It is the duty of the political echelon to determine and define the political objective of the military confrontation. This is a highly complex definition under the political-strategic circumstances, and it is normally derived from the national security concept of the political echelon. We can no longer afford the process that evolved during the wars of the previous century – when military commanders on the ground initiated the achievements of the war. In the previous century, a military victory was normally synonymous with the political achievement. These days, such an initiative might prove to be a diplomatic catastrophe.
