The Frail Israeli-Egyptian Defense Relations
With a history of animosity and conflicts in the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptians now maintain close defense ties with Israel, as both sides share two common enemies: Hamas and ISIS
Israeli PM Netanyahu with Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry (Photo: AP)
No other Arab country has caused Israel more casualties and posed a greater threat to the Jewish state than Egypt from the 1950s to the late 1970s. Following the 1973 war, Egypt understood that Israel could not be defeated in the battlefield, or that achieving this goal would be too costly. As a result, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. While this peace turned cold, it did at least prevent war.
One of the stipulations of the 1979 peace treaty was Egypt's obligation to demilitarize most of Sinai, which made the defense of the peninsula much more complicated in the case of an Israeli invasion. In order to compensate for this weakness, Egypt felt obliged to strengthen its military, though Israel had no intention of attacking Egypt. The price for Israel's demand to demilitarize the Sinai was therefore the creation of a stronger Egyptian military.
More than three decades later, in 2015, Egypt’s strategic thinking is still influenced by past wars against Israel, and the Egyptian military continues to train for a potential confrontation with the Jewish state. For example, between October 11 and November 6, 2014, in their biggest drill since 1996, Egyptian troops carried out the Bader-2014 exercise, which examined several scenarios, including a war against the IDF. In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale jets from France, claiming they were needed because of skirmishes with outfits such as the Islamic State located in Libya, Egypt’s western neighbor. Yet Egypt’s F-16 – though quite old models – should be more than enough against those armed groups, which don’t have an air force. Rather, Egypt seeks to upgrade its air force by assimilating the Rafale as part of its preparations for a possible clash with the IAF.
In spite of the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt has poured funds into its military instead of investing in solving its enormous economic and social problems. The social and political upheaval since the start of the Arab turmoil was the result of these policies. Mubarak believed that allocating huge budgets to his military, at the expense of the population, would secure his regime. He was proven wrong in 2011, when the Egyptian people, supported by the military, toppled Mubarak. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is well aware of his country’s dire economic situation, should not repeat this mistake. To this end, al-Sisi has sought the help of other states, including the Arab Gulf states.
Al-Sisi and Israel have a common enemy, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as was evident in the 2014 war. Another conflict in the Gaza Strip could mean Egypt and Israel would have to face Hamas again. The two countries have also been collaborating against ISIS in Sinai, but if ISIS manages to carry out a deadly assault inside Israel, this could create tensions and even lead to a clash between Israel and Egypt.
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This article is based on Ehud Eilam’s article: “Israel in the Face of Evolving Security Challenges,” the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2015
With a history of animosity and conflicts in the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptians now maintain close defense ties with Israel, as both sides share two common enemies: Hamas and ISIS
No other Arab country has caused Israel more casualties and posed a greater threat to the Jewish state than Egypt from the 1950s to the late 1970s. Following the 1973 war, Egypt understood that Israel could not be defeated in the battlefield, or that achieving this goal would be too costly. As a result, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. While this peace turned cold, it did at least prevent war.
One of the stipulations of the 1979 peace treaty was Egypt's obligation to demilitarize most of Sinai, which made the defense of the peninsula much more complicated in the case of an Israeli invasion. In order to compensate for this weakness, Egypt felt obliged to strengthen its military, though Israel had no intention of attacking Egypt. The price for Israel's demand to demilitarize the Sinai was therefore the creation of a stronger Egyptian military.
More than three decades later, in 2015, Egypt’s strategic thinking is still influenced by past wars against Israel, and the Egyptian military continues to train for a potential confrontation with the Jewish state. For example, between October 11 and November 6, 2014, in their biggest drill since 1996, Egyptian troops carried out the Bader-2014 exercise, which examined several scenarios, including a war against the IDF. In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale jets from France, claiming they were needed because of skirmishes with outfits such as the Islamic State located in Libya, Egypt’s western neighbor. Yet Egypt’s F-16 – though quite old models – should be more than enough against those armed groups, which don’t have an air force. Rather, Egypt seeks to upgrade its air force by assimilating the Rafale as part of its preparations for a possible clash with the IAF.
In spite of the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt has poured funds into its military instead of investing in solving its enormous economic and social problems. The social and political upheaval since the start of the Arab turmoil was the result of these policies. Mubarak believed that allocating huge budgets to his military, at the expense of the population, would secure his regime. He was proven wrong in 2011, when the Egyptian people, supported by the military, toppled Mubarak. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is well aware of his country’s dire economic situation, should not repeat this mistake. To this end, al-Sisi has sought the help of other states, including the Arab Gulf states.
Al-Sisi and Israel have a common enemy, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as was evident in the 2014 war. Another conflict in the Gaza Strip could mean Egypt and Israel would have to face Hamas again. The two countries have also been collaborating against ISIS in Sinai, but if ISIS manages to carry out a deadly assault inside Israel, this could create tensions and even lead to a clash between Israel and Egypt.
***
This article is based on Ehud Eilam’s article: “Israel in the Face of Evolving Security Challenges,” the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2015
