A Global Conflict in the Backyard

Russia’s objectives in Syria are derived from Moscow’s global policy: retaining Russia’s strategic foothold in the Middle East and developing a stable position vis-à-vis the USA. Naturally, oil plays a part, too. Exclusive
A Global Conflict in the Backyard
The Russian policy in the Middle East generally and in Syria in particular is derived from Russia’s global policy. The primary characteristic of its global policy is the intensifying confrontation vis-à-vis the USA. This confrontation is not only political, as it attains an increasingly more military character.

The turning point in the Russian evaluations occurred as far back as 2003, when the USA developed the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) doctrine.

The concerns of the Russian defense system increased with the establishment of the PGS HQ in 2009. The plan to deploy a missile defense layout in Eastern Europe, announced by President Obama in that year, only intensified the Russians’ suspicions and concerns. Russia regarded the deployment of that layout in Poland and Romania as a threat to her strategic missile arsenal.

The deployment of the Aegis missile defense layout on board US Navy vessels fit well into the threat Russia had sensed in that combined array. Estimates consolidated in Russia in 2013 maintained that the USA was building a combined offensive layout against Russia which is to be completed by 2020, where the primary elements are Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed on the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (90 missiles) and Ticonderoga-class cruisers (120 missiles).

According to the Russian military doctrine of 2014, PGS was regarded as a threat to Russia. According to Russian evaluations, the number of US Navy vessels in the Mediterranean theater would increase to about 40 by 2020. By the end of 2015, a flotilla will be established within the US Sixth Fleet, on the basis of four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers fitted with Aegis systems and cruise missiles, based in the Mediterranean near Spain. By that time, the cruise missile arsenal of the US armed forces will amount to about 5,000 missiles, of which about 3,000 will be carried by naval platforms (about 1,150 on 39 submarines). Some of those missiles will be fitted with nuclear warheads, and would constitute the primary element of the strategy.

A simultaneous launch of all of those missiles, including the ballistic missiles, could, according to the estimates of the Russian military, destroy up to 90% of Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities. 

According to the Russian naval doctrine of July 2015, the Russian Navy should maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. By 2020, the Russians aspire to establish their Navy as a factor no one would be able to ignore anywhere in the world. According to this concept, the Russian Navy presence in the Mediterranean should be capable of coping with the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet.

It is important to note that the considerations of coping with the threats imposed by the US missile layouts in Eastern Europe and the Sixth Fleet are among the primary elements that shaped the Russian policy regarding the crisis in the Ukraine and the issue of regaining Russian control over the Crimea and the port of Sebastopol. Today, the Russians believe that within 15 minutes they would be able to destroy the entire NATO presence in the Black Sea, along with the missile centers in Romania and Poland.

In the Mediterranean, the Russian Navy needs a home port and a primary base of operations. The only option at the moment is converting the Syrian port of Tartus into a permanent base for the Russian Navy. Thus far, the Russian Navy could only receive refueling and resupply services in Tartus. Keeping the base in Tartus will depend on whether Syria remains a unified country governed by the present regime, which is not pro-American. It is quite possible that there are plans to provide services at the Port of Tartus to surface vessels and submarines of the Chinese Navy, which could dispatch its vessels to the Mediterranean for long periods of time.

This fits in with the overall-strategic view of Russia regarding the Middle East. According to Russian evaluations, world oil consumption in 2040 will increase by 56%. This leaves the Middle East as the chief supplier of oil to the world, with all that entails. Russia, as well as China, have consistently opposed the attempts to bring about the removal of Bashar al-Assad by forceful measures. Recently, pursuant to the signing of the agreement with Iran, Assad’s chances of survival have improved even more. The ISIS phenomenon and the stream of refugees out of the Middle East will create convenient conditions for the efforts to impose order on the Middle East. All of the above led Russia to decide that it can intervene in the crisis and help Assad gain an overbalance and emerge victorious from the civil war in Syria.

The Russian General Staff prepared a structured, combined-arms plan for military intervention in Syria. The Russian intervention was based on the employment of the Air Force and partial employment of the Navy, without employing any Russian ground forces. From a Russian point of view, an overwhelming majority of the opposition forces in Syria belong to ISIS, al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups, and the Russians do not bother to distinguish between them as objectives for attack.

The forces of ISIS and al-Qaeda include as combatants about 4,000 former citizens of the USSR, including up to 2,000 former citizens of Russia. In the event that Assad’s regime collapsed and Islamist organizations dominated Syria, Russia believes that many of those former citizens would have attempted to infiltrate Russia and the neighboring countries. Consequently, the elimination of these elements is also one of the considerations for the Russian intervention in Syria.

Three dedicated Russian military task forces were dispatched to Syria. One task force builds infrastructures for the establishment of a Russian naval base in Tartus. A second task force maintains the airbase for the Russian aircraft and helicopters in Lattakia, and the third task force consists of a special forces battalion (paratroopers and marines) assigned to secure the port of Tartus and the Lattakia airbase. These forces may have been reinforced by a company of T-90 tanks. The total OrBat amounts to 2,000 men.

Twelve Sukhoi Su-25SM strike fighters and twelve Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bombers take part in the combat operations. Additionally, six Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers (the equivalent of the American F-15) were incorporated – these are the front-line fighter aircraft of the Russian Air Force, which maintains only about 80 aircraft of this type. Four Sukhoi Su-30SM air superiority fighters were deployed to Syria as well.

All in all, 10 Russian fighter aircraft of the most advanced models available to the Russian Air Force are currently deployed in Syria and are capable of conducting aerial battles. Fighter aircraft normally escort other aircraft and provide them with cover during their operational activity in the event that enemy fighter aircraft attempt to attack them. In this case, such attempts can only be made by aircraft of the US military or the NATO forces.

According to some reports, several incidents of “Radar lock-on” (namely – the option of an assured kill) have already been recorded with regard to US strike drones that flew near the Russian airbase in Lattakia. In their bombing attacks, the Russians use standard bombs as well as guided bombs normally dropped on the targets from an altitude of more than 5,000 meters, to avoid the threat of surface-to-air missiles. A substantial percentage of the bombing attacks are performed during the night, and the number of ground attack sorties has already reached 70 strikes per day. The Russian command may also divert the Russian aircraft cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, with her fleet of 22 Sukhoi-33 aircraft, toward the Syrian shore.

Additionally, the Russian forces in Syria also include a group of transport and rescue helicopters, including Mi-8 helicopters, and a group of Mi-24 attack helicopters. The most significant element is the Russian intelligence layout, which includes UAVs, electronic intelligence and space intelligence resources. Russian aircraft and UAVs perform surveillance flights all the time, day and night. Additionally, the Russian attack helicopters fly in pairs over the airbases as defensive measures against terrorist detachments. 

A substantial anti-aircraft layout has also been deployed in the area. The primary element of this layout is the Russian cruiser Moscow, which has been patrolling the sea opposite Lattakia since September 25, 2015. This cruiser carries anti-aircraft weapon systems that are the naval equivalent of the S-300 system. In this way, Russia provides air-defense for most of the Syrian territory. Additionally, an SA-22 system was deployed in Lattakia to defend the airbase. This is one of the world’s most advanced air-defense systems, which includes guns and missiles capable of engaging aerial targets within a range of up to 20 km and an altitude of up to 10 km. Similar assistance is provided by Russian Navy vessels patrolling opposite Lattakia and Tartus.

According to some reports, SA-17M2 air-defense systems were also deployed in Syria. This system is intended to provide defense from a height of 30 meters to 6,000 meters and to a range of 20 to 30 km. Electronic warfare systems were also deployed, at sea as well as on land.

The make-up of forces outlined above, including the air-defense and electronic warfare elements as well as the fighter aircraft, indicates that the Russian military is preparing for defensive action and aerial battles, as well as against air strikes by the aircraft of the USA and its allies.

3-Stage Operation

The Russian General Staff planned that during first stage of the operation, which began on September 30, the Russian forces will spot and destroy infrastructures, command posts, storage depots, armored vehicles and other vehicles of the opposition forces. During the second stage, which is already under way, Syrian ground forces will stage attacks with Russian air support, initially in the direction of Al-Hamah, Idlib and Aleppo, for the purpose of dominating the entire area, all the way to and including the Turkish border. This will effectively cut off the supply lines of the opposition forces from their logistic bases in Turkey. According to various estimates, the Russians intend to cooperate with Kurdish-Syrian forces that are also threatened by ISIS and Turkey. The second stage is expected to last one month at most.

If these stages prove to be successful, the Syrian Army will stage a ground attack into the Raqqa area, all the way to the border with Iraq, while recapturing the Syrian oil fields. The other opposition forces will remain isolated and cut off from their supply lines and the Syrian Army may achieve overbalance quickly. The third stage may consist of a follow-up attack by the Russian Air Force along with Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian forces with the intention of eliminating ISIS in Iraq.