Analysis | For the Americans, Israel’s Ground Maneuver in Gaza Has Entered its Diminishing Marginal Returns Phase
The US believes that the policy goals of the military maneuver have been achieved and that it is possible to assemble an alternative government to Hamas in Gaza through diplomatic negotiations. Continuing with the current force - an unnecessary move
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 10/01/2024
Photo credit: Kobi Gideon, GPO
While Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to market his “keeping on until the victory” stance to the public, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has aligned with the Pentagon and the White House, claiming that the IDF is transitioning from the massive maneuver phase to carrying out special operations. Gallant cannot explicitly state that the maneuver has exhausted itself, so in translation for the Israeli public, he is signaling that the military operation has achieved its strategic objective.
Diminishing Marginal Returns
Regarding the effectiveness of the IDF's activity in Gaza, the Americans believe that it has reached a diminishing marginal return. In other words, each additional “kilogram” of maneuvering will yield fewer results compared to the maneuvering “kilogram” preceding it. The reason for this is that the Americans think it is already possible today to implement, through diplomatic negotiations, an alternative leadership to Hamas in Gaza. From their perspective, this is the political goal of the diplomatic move.
The Americans believe that Hamas has lost its governing ability in Gaza, and therefore, the ground maneuver has exhausted itself. In such a situation, targeted assassinations and precise operations are considered more effective. Targeted operations for the destruction of tunnels, workshops, and large arms caches are seen as a cost-effective equation. They can also be carried out in parallel with the reconstruction and redevelopment of residential neighborhoods and civilian infrastructure in Gaza.
Gallant’s statements align with the American perspective - less maneuvering, more reconstruction of Gaza, along with continued surgical measures against Hamas and Hezbollah. Between the lines, Gallant’s words indicate that the Israeli military effort will focus on targeted assassinations and precise operations. Such a defense policy is expected to result in fewer casualties in both Israel and Gaza, reducing regional tensions. This could enable the U.S., along with its allies in the region, to formulate an immediate solution for Gaza and potentially a longer-term resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Don’t repeat the American mistakes
In the days following the October 7th massacre, when Joe Biden visited Israel, he openly stated that Israel should avoid repeating the mistakes of the United States. He was likely referring to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both wars cost the United States a significant loss of human lives and resources, with little tangible change in the end. Despite the U.S. achieving military victories and security control, the post-war strategy ultimately failed, and the situation returned to its initial state.
The Americans are analyzing the Gaza war from a professional perspective. It aims to topple Hamas' rule until a point where a new leadership can be established. They do not see the occupation of all of Gaza as a necessary step to achieve this goal. The U.S. military has also shifted to emphasizing security control through targeted assassinations, precise operations, and police deterrence. In Iraq, a similar approach has been ongoing with the use of local security forces.
The recent assassinations attributed to Israel in Syria and Lebanon likely represent the practical implementation of the policy shift indicated by Gallant. It involves a concentrated effort by the Mossad and Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate to personally target decision-makers or functional nodes within organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Jihad.
Gaza’s security control issue
Another point in the American perspective, differing from the Israeli viewpoint, is the consideration of the day after. Americans, learning from mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq, understand that the governance issue in Gaza is more crucial than security discussions in the context of the continued ground maneuver. If the maneuver achieves success until its end, but the future governance in Gaza returns to terrorism, what benefit is there?
The Americans are looking at the situation from a distance and want quiet, whether out of love for Israel or American interests—it doesn't matter. In the corridors of power in Washington, they are fed up with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It leads nowhere and only serves as an economic burden, diverting resources and managerial attention from the real adversaries of the Western world—China and Russia.
In this context, from the U.S. perspective, two million people in Gaza living in poverty, without water, food, housing, employment, and basic living conditions, are a security powder keg. If, at the end of the current conflict, this becomes the situation in Gaza, the next war in the Middle East will go beyond the corner. If, within 4-5 years, terrorism returns to Gaza in the form of rockets or anti-tank missile fire toward transportation arteries in the periphery, all the efforts of the current war strategy will be in vain. This is a scenario that the United States wants to avoid, as does the Israeli government.
In the day-after scenario, a crucial hidden question revolves around security control in Gaza. The leading idea is that if Israel does not have security control in Gaza, there will be no entity to supervise and enforce to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist infrastructure.
Regarding the terror infrastructures, it is relatively easy to rebuild. This includes importing rockets, explosives, or raw materials into Gaza, whether through the sea, tunnels, or crossings under Egyptian control. While rebuilding tunnels does take time and incurs significant costs, the equation remains the same with or without new tunnels in Gaza—contributing little to Israel's future security.
The division between the security control that Israel desires and the civil control that Israel does not want is at the heart of the governmental plan that aims to replace Hamas in Gaza. In this regard, the Americans want Jerusalem to focus on this issue, which won't happen as long as the Prime Minister sees military force as a way to avoid it.
Again, from the American perspective, the IDF has reached a military point in Gaza where its contribution to the political process diminishes over time. Using the military to avoid dealing with diplomatic matters is seen as an unprofessional move.
There is no doubt that there is a gap between the image presented to the Israeli public at the beginning of the war and the actual situation on the ground three months later. This gap creates tension between Jerusalem and Washington. Despite the clear military advantage of the IDF over Hamas, the progress of the IDF is slow, as expected during urban warfare. In such a situation, Jerusalem cannot market a clear victory, and Washington has pushed for the military move to be concluded, aiming to advance the diplomatic process.
The US believes that the policy goals of the military maneuver have been achieved and that it is possible to assemble an alternative government to Hamas in Gaza through diplomatic negotiations. Continuing with the current force - an unnecessary move
Photo credit: Kobi Gideon, GPO
While Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to market his “keeping on until the victory” stance to the public, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has aligned with the Pentagon and the White House, claiming that the IDF is transitioning from the massive maneuver phase to carrying out special operations. Gallant cannot explicitly state that the maneuver has exhausted itself, so in translation for the Israeli public, he is signaling that the military operation has achieved its strategic objective.
Diminishing Marginal Returns
Regarding the effectiveness of the IDF's activity in Gaza, the Americans believe that it has reached a diminishing marginal return. In other words, each additional “kilogram” of maneuvering will yield fewer results compared to the maneuvering “kilogram” preceding it. The reason for this is that the Americans think it is already possible today to implement, through diplomatic negotiations, an alternative leadership to Hamas in Gaza. From their perspective, this is the political goal of the diplomatic move.
The Americans believe that Hamas has lost its governing ability in Gaza, and therefore, the ground maneuver has exhausted itself. In such a situation, targeted assassinations and precise operations are considered more effective. Targeted operations for the destruction of tunnels, workshops, and large arms caches are seen as a cost-effective equation. They can also be carried out in parallel with the reconstruction and redevelopment of residential neighborhoods and civilian infrastructure in Gaza.
Gallant’s statements align with the American perspective - less maneuvering, more reconstruction of Gaza, along with continued surgical measures against Hamas and Hezbollah. Between the lines, Gallant’s words indicate that the Israeli military effort will focus on targeted assassinations and precise operations. Such a defense policy is expected to result in fewer casualties in both Israel and Gaza, reducing regional tensions. This could enable the U.S., along with its allies in the region, to formulate an immediate solution for Gaza and potentially a longer-term resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Don’t repeat the American mistakes
In the days following the October 7th massacre, when Joe Biden visited Israel, he openly stated that Israel should avoid repeating the mistakes of the United States. He was likely referring to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both wars cost the United States a significant loss of human lives and resources, with little tangible change in the end. Despite the U.S. achieving military victories and security control, the post-war strategy ultimately failed, and the situation returned to its initial state.
The Americans are analyzing the Gaza war from a professional perspective. It aims to topple Hamas' rule until a point where a new leadership can be established. They do not see the occupation of all of Gaza as a necessary step to achieve this goal. The U.S. military has also shifted to emphasizing security control through targeted assassinations, precise operations, and police deterrence. In Iraq, a similar approach has been ongoing with the use of local security forces.
The recent assassinations attributed to Israel in Syria and Lebanon likely represent the practical implementation of the policy shift indicated by Gallant. It involves a concentrated effort by the Mossad and Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate to personally target decision-makers or functional nodes within organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Jihad.
Gaza’s security control issue
Another point in the American perspective, differing from the Israeli viewpoint, is the consideration of the day after. Americans, learning from mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq, understand that the governance issue in Gaza is more crucial than security discussions in the context of the continued ground maneuver. If the maneuver achieves success until its end, but the future governance in Gaza returns to terrorism, what benefit is there?
The Americans are looking at the situation from a distance and want quiet, whether out of love for Israel or American interests—it doesn't matter. In the corridors of power in Washington, they are fed up with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It leads nowhere and only serves as an economic burden, diverting resources and managerial attention from the real adversaries of the Western world—China and Russia.
In this context, from the U.S. perspective, two million people in Gaza living in poverty, without water, food, housing, employment, and basic living conditions, are a security powder keg. If, at the end of the current conflict, this becomes the situation in Gaza, the next war in the Middle East will go beyond the corner. If, within 4-5 years, terrorism returns to Gaza in the form of rockets or anti-tank missile fire toward transportation arteries in the periphery, all the efforts of the current war strategy will be in vain. This is a scenario that the United States wants to avoid, as does the Israeli government.
In the day-after scenario, a crucial hidden question revolves around security control in Gaza. The leading idea is that if Israel does not have security control in Gaza, there will be no entity to supervise and enforce to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist infrastructure.
Regarding the terror infrastructures, it is relatively easy to rebuild. This includes importing rockets, explosives, or raw materials into Gaza, whether through the sea, tunnels, or crossings under Egyptian control. While rebuilding tunnels does take time and incurs significant costs, the equation remains the same with or without new tunnels in Gaza—contributing little to Israel's future security.
The division between the security control that Israel desires and the civil control that Israel does not want is at the heart of the governmental plan that aims to replace Hamas in Gaza. In this regard, the Americans want Jerusalem to focus on this issue, which won't happen as long as the Prime Minister sees military force as a way to avoid it.
Again, from the American perspective, the IDF has reached a military point in Gaza where its contribution to the political process diminishes over time. Using the military to avoid dealing with diplomatic matters is seen as an unprofessional move.
There is no doubt that there is a gap between the image presented to the Israeli public at the beginning of the war and the actual situation on the ground three months later. This gap creates tension between Jerusalem and Washington. Despite the clear military advantage of the IDF over Hamas, the progress of the IDF is slow, as expected during urban warfare. In such a situation, Jerusalem cannot market a clear victory, and Washington has pushed for the military move to be concluded, aiming to advance the diplomatic process.
