Once Again, Iranian Intelligence Dupes Israelis Using Online Photos of Beautiful Women
The Shin Bet exposed and thwarted Iranian security efforts to recruit Israeli citizens through the Internet for terror activities
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 24/12/2023
In recent months, Iranian security operatives have been working to recruit and activate Israeli citizens in order to carry out security missions. They present a false facade, portraying their approach as innocent. In this activity, the Shin Bet thwarted an intention to carry out an attack, during which an Israeli individual was approached under criminal cover.
The initial contact with Israeli citizens is carried out through social media platforms as well as websites offering paid job opportunities, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (X), using various languages including Hebrew, Arabic, and English.
While using various deceptive presentations, the threat actors engaged with the Israelis to establish initial contact. They pose as apartment brokers, individuals interested in marketing and selling drones, courier services, requests for photography, online acquaintances, contact with private investigators, and more.
The Israeli civilians contacted were asked to perform different "tasks" in exchange for financial compensation, which ostensibly appeared unrelated to security aspects – however, which can certainly serve the Iranians and enrich their intelligence. This included photographing, locating addresses, and more. Some of the civilians contacted refrained from replying and even informed Israel’s defense bodies.
This is a well-known modus operandi of Iranian security entities, using a platform to recruit seemingly innocent Israeli citizens for the execution of ostensibly benign tasks. These tasks, based on misleading motives, could potentially be exploited to advance plans targeting Israeli citizens.
Since the beginning of the war, the efforts of Iranian security entities have significantly intensified, with a notable increase in the widespread use of digital space for purposes of intimidation, conveying messages, or promoting terrorist activities under the guise of other motives. Its goal is to assist Hamas and undermine Israel's national resilience and military efforts, spreading demoralization and deepening social divisions.
Some of the platforms pretending to be Israeli also employ a cynical and manipulative approach to the issue of hostages. They even attempt to operate against their families and bereaved families.
The Shin Bet identified and monitored numerous fictitious profiles on social networks that were used by Iranian security entities. A wealth of information about the identities of the individuals behind these profiles has been gathered, and actions have been taken accordingly.
The Shin Bet exposed and thwarted Iranian security efforts to recruit Israeli citizens through the Internet for terror activities
In recent months, Iranian security operatives have been working to recruit and activate Israeli citizens in order to carry out security missions. They present a false facade, portraying their approach as innocent. In this activity, the Shin Bet thwarted an intention to carry out an attack, during which an Israeli individual was approached under criminal cover.
The initial contact with Israeli citizens is carried out through social media platforms as well as websites offering paid job opportunities, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (X), using various languages including Hebrew, Arabic, and English.
While using various deceptive presentations, the threat actors engaged with the Israelis to establish initial contact. They pose as apartment brokers, individuals interested in marketing and selling drones, courier services, requests for photography, online acquaintances, contact with private investigators, and more.
The Israeli civilians contacted were asked to perform different "tasks" in exchange for financial compensation, which ostensibly appeared unrelated to security aspects – however, which can certainly serve the Iranians and enrich their intelligence. This included photographing, locating addresses, and more. Some of the civilians contacted refrained from replying and even informed Israel’s defense bodies.
This is a well-known modus operandi of Iranian security entities, using a platform to recruit seemingly innocent Israeli citizens for the execution of ostensibly benign tasks. These tasks, based on misleading motives, could potentially be exploited to advance plans targeting Israeli citizens.
Since the beginning of the war, the efforts of Iranian security entities have significantly intensified, with a notable increase in the widespread use of digital space for purposes of intimidation, conveying messages, or promoting terrorist activities under the guise of other motives. Its goal is to assist Hamas and undermine Israel's national resilience and military efforts, spreading demoralization and deepening social divisions.
Some of the platforms pretending to be Israeli also employ a cynical and manipulative approach to the issue of hostages. They even attempt to operate against their families and bereaved families.
The Shin Bet identified and monitored numerous fictitious profiles on social networks that were used by Iranian security entities. A wealth of information about the identities of the individuals behind these profiles has been gathered, and actions have been taken accordingly.
