The Next War

The events and developments of the last few days indicate that the next war in Gaza will not necessarily be similar to the last rounds of fighting against Hamas. Amir Rapaport's column discusses the possible characteristics of the next confrontation in the south

The Next War

Photo: IDF

The next war in Gaza, whenever it might come, will not necessarily be similar to the last rounds against Hamas – Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense and Operation Protective Edge.

Duration. One of the lessons learned from the previous rounds is that an extended operation does not play in Israel's favor. From one round to the next, the operations grew longer, to the point that Operation Protective Edge lasted nearly two months. Admittedly, the Iron Dome system made the extended duration of the operation possible as far as Israel's rear was concerned, while making things difficult for Hamas primarily, but the lengthy operation was problematic for Israel as well. A lengthy operation consumes a massive amount of Iron Dome interceptors and eventually wears down the home front on our side as well.

A different way to conduct the next operation would be to initiate a powerful opening move, rather than an "ascending scale" where the level of strength employed is determined according to the responses of Hamas. The next round should allow no respites for mediation efforts (mainly by Egypt).

Objective. That could be the most substantial change. In the past, the prevailing view throughout the Israeli defense establishment and political echelon was that the best situation for Israel would be to keep Hamas in power while deterring it from firing into Israel for a long time (according to this approach, Palestinian unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is not necessarily in Israel's best interest). If the situation in the south does deteriorate rapidly, the objective this time may very well turn out to be the total annihilation of the rule of Hamas, which would lead to a new situation, under the auspices of Egypt.

According to the longstanding directives of the Minister of Defense and contrary to previous operations, the IDF will enter the next war with effective operational plans to eliminate the rule of Hamas – which the military has actually practiced. Eliminating the rule of Hamas is not a simple military mission. It could involve a massive-scale ground maneuver into the Gaza Strip. Dominating the Gaza Strip is a process that might take months to complete, during which time (and possibly even subsequently) the Palestinians will launch missiles into the Israeli rear.

In any case, the IDF and the ISA (Israel Security Agency, aka Shin Bet) are expected to mark the leaders of Hamas as top priority objectives for targeted killing.

Surprise. In any war, the enemy prepares surprises of their own. During Operation Protective Edge, for example, the IDF was not effectively prepared to deal with the underground tunnel threat (despite the fact that they had known about the tunnels). Following the massive activity against the tunnels, mainly during the past year, that threat has subsided – but it still exists.

What will the next surprise be? Hamas has invested a massive effort in the establishment of a setup of unmanned aerial vehicles and armed drones, which would constitute a serious challenge, along with upgraded rockets (superior even to the heavy rocket carrying 20 kilograms of explosives that landed on a house in Be’er-Sheva last Monday morning).

Hamas will fire massive amounts of mortar bombs, for which the IDF is still hard-pressed to find a full-proof solution (the upgraded version of the Iron Dome system is already capable of intercepting mortar bombs, but does not offer a reasonable solution against massive mortar fire, as the Iron Dome's primary function is to provide protection against rockets and missiles).

Evacuation. Mainly owing to the mortar fire threat, one of the definite lessons derived from Operation Protective Edge is that there is no reason to persuade the civilian inhabitants of the 'Gaza Envelope' to remain in their homes under heavy fire. In the event of a war, the authorities will promptly evacuate the inhabitants residing within a distance of up to seven kilometers from the border fence. The Ministry of Defense is ready for this undertaking.

Will Ben-Gurion Airport Close Down? No one should take for granted the fact that Ben-Gurion international airport continued to operate almost fully throughout the extended duration of Operation Protective Edge. During the next operation, Ben-Gurion airport may close down, at least during the peak days of the operation. This is the main reason why the State of Israel has prepared Ramon airport, near Ouvda, to serve as an alternate international airport capable of operating and maintaining uninterrupted air transport to and from Israel.

Two Fronts

Over a few long weeks in the summer of 2018, Israel was on the verge of a war on two fronts – opposite the Gaza Strip in the south and opposite Iran and the armed forces of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The firing of a rocket followed the shooting down of an aircraft or a UAV, a heavy Israeli air strike or "ordinary" border and arson incidents.

The basic volatile situation in the north has not changed. In that sector, both Iran and Israel are still committed to their mutually exclusive policies, and it is reasonable to assume that the last word on this subject has not been uttered yet, the delivery of the S-300 surface to air missile batteries to Syria notwithstanding.

A war on two fronts is a highly undesirable scenario for Israel (among other things, because in such a scenario, the Iron Dome batteries will be hard-pressed to provide a full protective solution to all population centers and strategic installations throughout Israel).

A war opposite Hamas in the Gaza Strip might spur Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran to escalate the situation in the north while using such strategic weapons as missiles carrying hundreds of kilograms of explosives and fitted with precise navigation mechanisms or Yakhont shore-to-sea missiles that would stop maritime traffic.

The IDF is prepared to fight on two fronts, if necessary. It is the worst-case scenario, but it is no longer a delusional fantasy, as far as the next war is concerned.

Finally, it is still possible that the next round will be the same as the previous ones – an exchange of blows and empty threats, or an operation intended, once again, to deter Hamas for a limited time only.