Adapting to the Changing Battlefield
The combination of operational restrictions and restrictions arising from the geopolitical circumstances have compelled the IDF to develop methods of operation and capabilities that would enable it to adapt to the current reality. One such capability is hybrid warfare
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 12/10/2018
Photo: IDF
The last year has not been a trivial period for the IDF, security wise. On the one hand, the asymmetrical threats imposed by terrorist organizations and proxy groups of such states as Iran along the borders have intensified. On the other hand, the confrontation takes place in areas with massive civilian population concentrations, a fact that makes it difficult to employ substantial military strength owing to concerns of considerable collateral damage. Along with the operational restrictions, the IDF operates in a multinational geopolitical environment, owing to the on-going confrontation with ISIS in Syria, Sinai, and Iraq. Consequently, the IDF operates under serious restrictions the political echelon imposes.
Quick Adaptation
The combination of operational restrictions and those imposed by the government have compelled the IDF to develop methods of operation and capabilities that would enable it to adapt to the present reality. One such capability is hybrid warfare. Notably, the IDF is already halfway into this mode of warfare with their definition of "War-between-Wars." Continuous fighting and the blurring of the line between emergency and routine situations is one element of hybrid warfare.
One of the countries identified with this mode of warfare is Russia, which implemented this method in the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and subsequently followed this method in the fighting in Ukraine, well into the present time. The Rand Corporation of the USA explains: "Experts use the term 'hybrid warfare' in different ways. Several related terms are now in use, including 'gray zone strategies,' 'competition short of conflict,' 'active measures,' and 'new generation warfare.'"
"Despite subtle differences, all these terms point to the same thing: Russia is using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its borders – often at the expense of US interests and those of US allies," wrote Christopher S. Chivvis of the Rand Corporation.
The same article outlines several principles of hybrid warfare, such as the use of instruments of reduced economic and political cost like cyber, specialist units and intelligence services and on-going, uninterrupted fighting at varying intensity levels (similar to the IDF's War-between-Wars definition). Another major element of hybrid warfare is influencing the local population, including the use of that population as a proxy.
One of the persons identified with this concept in the IDF is Brig. Gen. (res.) Gal Hirsch, who is also involved in the build-up of the IDF Depth Corps – a confidential IDF organ that demonstrates innovation by building a force to fight along external, rather than internal lines, as the IDF normally does. In the past, Israel Defense published an article Hirsch had written titled "The Sixth C has taken off," which focuses on the importance of the operations of commando units in the context of the new mode of warfare. In that article, Hirsch argues that on the future battlefield, complete operational moves executed mainly by commando elements will be required.
Along with specialist units, hybrid warfare also involves intelligence services. Israel has the Mossad, the ISA (aka Shin Bet), IDF (through Unit 504), all of which initiate activities outside the State of Israel. Intelligence services, by definition, operate clandestinely, and recruit and employ individuals and groups within the local population. The intelligence and its various branches are thus responsible for influencing the social, cultural, and political circles of the target country. Anyone following the affair associated with the election of Donald Trump to President of the USA has become aware of the recent allegations by the US Justice Department against 12 members of the Russian GRU – Russia's 'external' military intelligence service. Such allegations are not rare in the intelligence world. A Google search will yield numerous reports from various countries where the authorities accused intelligence operatives for attempting to undermine the local regime.
Middle East Carousel Scenarios
One of the scenarios may be similar to the Matryoshka doll concept – the Russian hollow dolls that nest one inside the other. In such a scenario, pockets of non-sovereignty might develop within the sovereign territory of a neighboring country. In this situation, the sovereign power is unable to apply its sovereignty on these local pockets, as in fact terrorist organizations control them and operate out of them against Israel or against Israeli interests. If the response by the IDF violates the sovereignty of the neighboring country, it will constitute a declaration of war, which would lead to an actual war.
Such a scenario could develop soon along the border with Syria. It will develop if the Syrian military should dominate the entire territory of Syria and if such pockets of non-sovereignty should emerge near the border with Israel, either by chance or with the intention of enabling Iranian militia forces to operate against Israel while taking advantage of the Israeli reluctance to enter a war against the Syrian military. A similar situation could also develop along the Jordanian border if internal or external pressures from the direction of Iraq or Iran should undermine the King's regime. Facing such challenges, the IDF will have to come up with hybrid warfare methods that would enable them to operate without leaving traces: to be there without actually being there.
Another scenario may involve an unexpected change of regime, from a sympathetic one to a less sympathetic or even hostile regime. The events of the Arab Spring are a good example of such a process. Those events led to regime changes in various Arab countries in the Middle East, all within a timeframe of just weeks or days. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power and assumed command over the Egyptian military. In a scenario of this type, the State of Israel may once again find itself facing terrorism sponsored by the regime, with no real desire to engage in an all-out war.
Such a reality – the sudden change of government in a neighboring country – will cause the IDF to change its approach accordingly. While the situation vis-à-vis that country had consisted of a quiet border, security cooperation, and warm diplomatic relations, following the change the military must reorganize very quickly. In the new situation, the task of dealing with threats emanating from the sovereign territory of that country will be subject to a practical restriction on the option of responding freely. In this case, too, hybrid warfare can provide a solution as part of the IDF toolbox.
Yet another scenario involves the possibility that the Government of Israel would want to undermine the regime in a hostile country. An example that comes to mind is Iran, in recent years. In the context of Jerusalem's decision to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, one of the ideas the decision makers had discussed was a change of regime in Iran. In 2009, Iranian citizens initiated the Green Revolution – attributed, according to foreign sources, to the Israeli and American intelligence services. This year, after the USA withdrew from the JCPOA, the White House announced the Americans' desire to replace the regime in Tehran. Admittedly, this is an ambitious, difficult to execute undertaking with a high probability of failure, but if the government makes that decision, a military force trained in hybrid warfare may be the element charged with executing the government's directive.
In addition to the scenarios outlined above, there is the all-out war scenario. In the event that Israel engages in an all-out war against a hostile country, hybrid warfare may help the IDF to undermine the hostile regime's hold on populated areas, thereby challenging the military forces of that country. Supporting elements that oppose the hostile regime so that they may operate against that regime during the war, influencing public opinion in the enemy country and disrupting the infrastructures and preparatory moves of the enemy without leaving a trace associating these activities with Jerusalem are some of the advantages of hybrid warfare during wartime.
A Change of World Order?
The IDF has undoubtedly reorganized in recent years in view of the realization that the present and future confrontations will take place opposite terrorist organizations in densely populated areas. The reorganization process included the consolidation of the War-between-Wars concept and steering the force build-up and employment trends accordingly; the establishment of the IDF commando brigade; the development of the IDF Depth Corps; investment in combined-arms capabilities; the enhancement of cooperation with other intelligence services; and various other activities. At the same time, the IDF does not currently possess a complete, independent hybrid warfare concept with its foundation made up of the development of suitable operational doctrines and the build-up and employment of the force in accordance with those doctrines. The elements outlined above are an improvement of the existing capabilities of dealing with terrorist organizations.
Establishing a hybrid warfare activity within the IDF will require a substantial change in the division of responsibility among Israel's intelligence services. The traditional assignment of responsibilities to the Mossad, ISA, and IDF should be broken and reassembled in line with the idea that the military is the element in charge of hybrid warfare. The combination of Mossad operatives, ISA case officers and IDF commandos under a single, military command can provide numerous advantages in hybrid warfare that the existing organizational division cannot provide. Alternately, the State of Israel may decide to assign the responsibility for hybrid warfare to another organ, like the Mossad, which would employ IDF resources under its command.
The advantage of developing such capabilities in the military, as opposed to the intelligence organizations, is in the ability to establish within the military a diversified range of operational doctrines, extending from routine security operations through War-between-Wars operations, to hybrid warfare operations and to all-out war. The same organization, employing the same personnel and platforms, can change and adapt to the different situations in the Middle East "at the push of a button." A military organization trained in different operational concepts can provide a better solution to the government in its efforts to accomplish political goals. This ability of a security organization to operate along the entire intensity scale – from low intensity in peacetime to full intensity in wartime, regardless of geopolitical restrictions, can only develop in a military organization. Intelligence organizations are not up to this task, and handing over the baton between security organizations in an emergency might result in the loss of the advantage over the enemy.
The combination of operational restrictions and restrictions arising from the geopolitical circumstances have compelled the IDF to develop methods of operation and capabilities that would enable it to adapt to the current reality. One such capability is hybrid warfare
Photo: IDF
The last year has not been a trivial period for the IDF, security wise. On the one hand, the asymmetrical threats imposed by terrorist organizations and proxy groups of such states as Iran along the borders have intensified. On the other hand, the confrontation takes place in areas with massive civilian population concentrations, a fact that makes it difficult to employ substantial military strength owing to concerns of considerable collateral damage. Along with the operational restrictions, the IDF operates in a multinational geopolitical environment, owing to the on-going confrontation with ISIS in Syria, Sinai, and Iraq. Consequently, the IDF operates under serious restrictions the political echelon imposes.
Quick Adaptation
The combination of operational restrictions and those imposed by the government have compelled the IDF to develop methods of operation and capabilities that would enable it to adapt to the present reality. One such capability is hybrid warfare. Notably, the IDF is already halfway into this mode of warfare with their definition of "War-between-Wars." Continuous fighting and the blurring of the line between emergency and routine situations is one element of hybrid warfare.
One of the countries identified with this mode of warfare is Russia, which implemented this method in the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and subsequently followed this method in the fighting in Ukraine, well into the present time. The Rand Corporation of the USA explains: "Experts use the term 'hybrid warfare' in different ways. Several related terms are now in use, including 'gray zone strategies,' 'competition short of conflict,' 'active measures,' and 'new generation warfare.'"
"Despite subtle differences, all these terms point to the same thing: Russia is using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its borders – often at the expense of US interests and those of US allies," wrote Christopher S. Chivvis of the Rand Corporation.
The same article outlines several principles of hybrid warfare, such as the use of instruments of reduced economic and political cost like cyber, specialist units and intelligence services and on-going, uninterrupted fighting at varying intensity levels (similar to the IDF's War-between-Wars definition). Another major element of hybrid warfare is influencing the local population, including the use of that population as a proxy.
One of the persons identified with this concept in the IDF is Brig. Gen. (res.) Gal Hirsch, who is also involved in the build-up of the IDF Depth Corps – a confidential IDF organ that demonstrates innovation by building a force to fight along external, rather than internal lines, as the IDF normally does. In the past, Israel Defense published an article Hirsch had written titled "The Sixth C has taken off," which focuses on the importance of the operations of commando units in the context of the new mode of warfare. In that article, Hirsch argues that on the future battlefield, complete operational moves executed mainly by commando elements will be required.
Along with specialist units, hybrid warfare also involves intelligence services. Israel has the Mossad, the ISA (aka Shin Bet), IDF (through Unit 504), all of which initiate activities outside the State of Israel. Intelligence services, by definition, operate clandestinely, and recruit and employ individuals and groups within the local population. The intelligence and its various branches are thus responsible for influencing the social, cultural, and political circles of the target country. Anyone following the affair associated with the election of Donald Trump to President of the USA has become aware of the recent allegations by the US Justice Department against 12 members of the Russian GRU – Russia's 'external' military intelligence service. Such allegations are not rare in the intelligence world. A Google search will yield numerous reports from various countries where the authorities accused intelligence operatives for attempting to undermine the local regime.
Middle East Carousel Scenarios
One of the scenarios may be similar to the Matryoshka doll concept – the Russian hollow dolls that nest one inside the other. In such a scenario, pockets of non-sovereignty might develop within the sovereign territory of a neighboring country. In this situation, the sovereign power is unable to apply its sovereignty on these local pockets, as in fact terrorist organizations control them and operate out of them against Israel or against Israeli interests. If the response by the IDF violates the sovereignty of the neighboring country, it will constitute a declaration of war, which would lead to an actual war.
Such a scenario could develop soon along the border with Syria. It will develop if the Syrian military should dominate the entire territory of Syria and if such pockets of non-sovereignty should emerge near the border with Israel, either by chance or with the intention of enabling Iranian militia forces to operate against Israel while taking advantage of the Israeli reluctance to enter a war against the Syrian military. A similar situation could also develop along the Jordanian border if internal or external pressures from the direction of Iraq or Iran should undermine the King's regime. Facing such challenges, the IDF will have to come up with hybrid warfare methods that would enable them to operate without leaving traces: to be there without actually being there.
Another scenario may involve an unexpected change of regime, from a sympathetic one to a less sympathetic or even hostile regime. The events of the Arab Spring are a good example of such a process. Those events led to regime changes in various Arab countries in the Middle East, all within a timeframe of just weeks or days. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power and assumed command over the Egyptian military. In a scenario of this type, the State of Israel may once again find itself facing terrorism sponsored by the regime, with no real desire to engage in an all-out war.
Such a reality – the sudden change of government in a neighboring country – will cause the IDF to change its approach accordingly. While the situation vis-à-vis that country had consisted of a quiet border, security cooperation, and warm diplomatic relations, following the change the military must reorganize very quickly. In the new situation, the task of dealing with threats emanating from the sovereign territory of that country will be subject to a practical restriction on the option of responding freely. In this case, too, hybrid warfare can provide a solution as part of the IDF toolbox.
Yet another scenario involves the possibility that the Government of Israel would want to undermine the regime in a hostile country. An example that comes to mind is Iran, in recent years. In the context of Jerusalem's decision to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, one of the ideas the decision makers had discussed was a change of regime in Iran. In 2009, Iranian citizens initiated the Green Revolution – attributed, according to foreign sources, to the Israeli and American intelligence services. This year, after the USA withdrew from the JCPOA, the White House announced the Americans' desire to replace the regime in Tehran. Admittedly, this is an ambitious, difficult to execute undertaking with a high probability of failure, but if the government makes that decision, a military force trained in hybrid warfare may be the element charged with executing the government's directive.
In addition to the scenarios outlined above, there is the all-out war scenario. In the event that Israel engages in an all-out war against a hostile country, hybrid warfare may help the IDF to undermine the hostile regime's hold on populated areas, thereby challenging the military forces of that country. Supporting elements that oppose the hostile regime so that they may operate against that regime during the war, influencing public opinion in the enemy country and disrupting the infrastructures and preparatory moves of the enemy without leaving a trace associating these activities with Jerusalem are some of the advantages of hybrid warfare during wartime.
A Change of World Order?
The IDF has undoubtedly reorganized in recent years in view of the realization that the present and future confrontations will take place opposite terrorist organizations in densely populated areas. The reorganization process included the consolidation of the War-between-Wars concept and steering the force build-up and employment trends accordingly; the establishment of the IDF commando brigade; the development of the IDF Depth Corps; investment in combined-arms capabilities; the enhancement of cooperation with other intelligence services; and various other activities. At the same time, the IDF does not currently possess a complete, independent hybrid warfare concept with its foundation made up of the development of suitable operational doctrines and the build-up and employment of the force in accordance with those doctrines. The elements outlined above are an improvement of the existing capabilities of dealing with terrorist organizations.
Establishing a hybrid warfare activity within the IDF will require a substantial change in the division of responsibility among Israel's intelligence services. The traditional assignment of responsibilities to the Mossad, ISA, and IDF should be broken and reassembled in line with the idea that the military is the element in charge of hybrid warfare. The combination of Mossad operatives, ISA case officers and IDF commandos under a single, military command can provide numerous advantages in hybrid warfare that the existing organizational division cannot provide. Alternately, the State of Israel may decide to assign the responsibility for hybrid warfare to another organ, like the Mossad, which would employ IDF resources under its command.
The advantage of developing such capabilities in the military, as opposed to the intelligence organizations, is in the ability to establish within the military a diversified range of operational doctrines, extending from routine security operations through War-between-Wars operations, to hybrid warfare operations and to all-out war. The same organization, employing the same personnel and platforms, can change and adapt to the different situations in the Middle East "at the push of a button." A military organization trained in different operational concepts can provide a better solution to the government in its efforts to accomplish political goals. This ability of a security organization to operate along the entire intensity scale – from low intensity in peacetime to full intensity in wartime, regardless of geopolitical restrictions, can only develop in a military organization. Intelligence organizations are not up to this task, and handing over the baton between security organizations in an emergency might result in the loss of the advantage over the enemy.
