Israel's Home Front: Worsening Threat, Lukewarm Interest

 Is Israel’s response for the civilian home front sufficiently effective considering the emerging security threat posed to Israeli population by its adversaries? A special review of the emerging security challenges of the Israeli home front at Israel's 70th anniversary

Israel's Home Front: Worsening Threat, Lukewarm Interest

Iron Dome battery deployed near the northern Israeli city of Haifa (Photo: AP)

Israel’s national security picture at its 70th anniversary of its independence shows its definite military superiority over the neighboring adversaries. At the same time, as far as the Israeli civilian home front is concerned, the picture that emerges is quite problematic and seriously challenging.

The severity and complexity of the external threats posed to the Israeli home front increase gradually and continuously. In the southern front Hamas continues to strengthen its military capacities, while the Gaza Strip is steadily sinking toward a dangerous economic collapse. In the north, Hezbollah is perceived as the most serious military opponent, operating both in Lebanon and in torn Syria. Lebanon is under the effective control of Hezbollah, which relies on the Iranians and continues to strengthen its military posture by building a substantial offensive and deterrent capability vis-à-vis Israel.

From a distance, it may appear that Bashar al-Assad succeeds in consolidating his political control while, in fact, his command of what was the Syrian state is far from complete, and the regime is still struggling with the long bloody civil war, thereby creating a fragile, dangerous and highly explosive challenge to Israel. Under these circumstances, three foreign parties, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, are positioning themselves on the ground. All three are expanding their military presence, allegedly to help consolidate the command of the Syrian ruler but actually and paradoxically contribute to the continued disintegration of Syria and create multiple risks for Israel.

The danger of deteriorating into a large-scale confrontation under this regional instability and in the absence of a "responsible adult" is very serious. Israel might be expected to pay the price of such deterioration not only on the military front, but also on the (civilian) home front. Israel’s foes in bleeding Syria have gained, over the last few years, substantial military capabilities, primarily in the field of high-trajectory weapon systems, aimed purposefully (as they perceive it) at the weakest link of the Israeli setup – the civilian population.

The Reference Scenario for the Home Front

In June 2016 the Israeli National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) presented for the first time the comprehensive reference scenario for the home front to the Israeli Government. The main components of that scenario were as follows: All Israeli population centers and most of the critical infrastructure installations are within range of the high-trajectory weapons of Hezbollah and Hamas; The amount of launchers and munitions available to those organizations is growing steadily’ enabling the enemy to launch hundreds of rockets per day for more than a month; Admittedly, most of the high-trajectory arsenal is still "statistical" in nature, and hence less lethal, but the percentage of precision-guided missiles is growing, which poses a graver risk of extensive damage to select strategic military and civilian targets; The warheads of the enemy's rockets and missiles are becoming larger and more destructive; Unmanned drones are being introduced as an inseparable element of the enemy's arsenals; Cyber capacity is expanding into the adversaries’ offensive effort; An offensive ground capability against Israeli settlements located close to the borders is being developed so as to constitute a threat for invasion or disruptions of some of these through land attack or by penetrating through offensive tunnels.

The expected threat scenario can materialize by a "concentrated blow on urban areas." These attacks might be carried out by a massive high trajectory fire, targeting selected areas, for the purpose of inflicting substantial damage that would result in a high casualty count, system demoralization and wide-scale disruptions of the functional continuity of the civilian sector. The potential realization of this scenario might challenge Israel in an unprecedented manner, significantly more severe than the damage during the previous four rounds of terror attacks (2006, 2008/9, 2012, and 2014).

The question is to what extent Israel is ready for this scenario and what are the responses developed for the civilian home front facing these new threats. The answer to this question is complex – as it involves military and civilian aspects nevertheless, the direction is quite clear: the preparedness of the Israeli home front for the current reference scenario does not close the gap between the threat and the response. In fact, the growing quantitative and qualitative threat expands the gap with the civilian readiness. The primary reason for this unwarranted situation is that the Israeli national security approach for the home front does not provide the necessary answers for the changing threats. Furthermore, Israel does not have a comprehensive doctrine for the civilian home front, contrary to the existing doctrine – albeit not fully formulized – concerning the military front. Consequently, there is neither consensus nor transparency regarding the questions of what should be done in this critical field and how to prioritize the optimal preparedness of the civilian home front in accordance with the emerging threats.

Not Just Deterrence

The basic working assumption that has been guiding the Israeli Government is that the next confrontation may be put off through maintaining a high state of deterrence vis-à-vis Hezbollah and Hamas. In fact, in the last twelve years, since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah was careful not to provoke Israel, primarily because of its concerns about Israel's unrestrained response. The same goes for Hamas: almost four years have passed since Operation Protective Edge of 2014, and the organization so far seems to be cautious not to grant Israel an excuse to attack Gaza.

While the deterrence strategy might be a solid one, it is understood to be temporary and can only partially serve as a barrier against uncontrolled deterioration, which is a prevailing scenario in this region. Hence, deterrence alone cannot serve as a sufficient strategy to guarantee the prevention of a future attack against the home front, and thereby cannot serve as an explanation or justification for the less than adequate preparation of the civilian front for an emergency, based on the severe forecasted scenario.

Presently, Israel is primarily preparing itself in advance for a possible military deterioration that would necessitate defending the home front mostly by staging a major ground and air attack against Hezbollah and or Hamas, which is designed to punish the enemy and to resume deterrence, but also to shorten the duration of the war, so as to rid the civilian home front from the expected threat as soon as possible. Regrettably, the last four rounds do not serve to bolster this expected goal. On the contrary – for different reasons, the Second Lebanon War (2006) lasted 33 days and Operation "Protective Edge" lasted 51 days of continuous harassment on the civilian home front. This happened despite the clear military advantage of the IDF.

For this reason, the IDF has also been developing extensive and diversified defensive capabilities in recent years. The defensive build-up has centered primarily on the active defense systems (the "Iron Dome" and "David's Sling"), designed to engage with the enemy's rockets and missiles, along with the construction of the renewed barriers, and particularly the obstacle currently under construction along the border of the Gaza Strip at a cost of one billion Dollars. These without a doubt represent a substantial, unprecedented investment in defense. However, it is still uncertain whether these measures will provide the needed protection so as to significantly reduce the expected severe damage to the home front.

A Problematic Vicious Circle

Indeed, it is a new level of risk for the civilian home front that is foreseen to characterize the next expected confrontation. The assumption – or rather the hope – is that the IDF will accomplish what it plans to achieve on the military front, and will succeed in lessening the hardship on the civilian front, with the active engagement of the IDF Home Front Command and other first responders. However, what will be the contribution of the civilian sector is not really clear and is far from being defined. This vagueness concerning the role of the civilians in the home front stems mainly from the relative systemic weakness and confusion that characterize the civilian machinery in the complex context of its preparing for emergency situations in general, and for the current scenario of neo-terrorist high trajectory massive assault in particular. This weakness, especially when compared to the capabilities of the well organized and competent military front, stems from several reasons, all related to the national set of priorities, which traditionally gives clear preference to the military front, on the expense of the civilian home front.

But this is not only a problem of resource allocation. Israel is still lacking an agreed concept and constitutional framework for the home front, which is consequently far from being structured and regulated. Fundamental issues are not resolved, and primarily who is the state organ that has the authority and responsibility for the civilian home front. Unlike the agreed construct of the military front, which is governed and directed by clearly-defined hierarchical mechanisms, the situation on the civilian home front is fragmented with loose connecting threads and lack of a recognized organizational framework to clarify who is in charge to make the strategic and the operational decisions before, during and after the emergency.

At the government level, a coordinating mechanism – the Ministry of Defense’s National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) – has been in operation for the past decade. However, this authority finds it very difficult to enforce a clearly-defined agenda, system-wide planning, and compliance with the practices and standards on the government ministries, the emergency first responders and the public at large. Even the local authorities and municipalities, perceived, allegedly, as the "basic building block" of the civilian home front, maintain different levels of emergency preparedness and themselves are far from taking the holistic responsibilities for their residents. Quite naturally, the stronger authorities are better prepared than the weaker ones, but most of them fail to present a sufficient level of emergency preparedness vis-à-vis the expected challenges.

This inadequate situation stems, also from the absence of updated legislation regarding civilian emergency activities. Over the last decade, several attempts have been made to promote such legislation that would replace the Civil Defense act of 1951, but all turned out to be unsuccessful. In addition, other issues, such as insufficient training and exercises, indifference of the general public, a public information policy that intentionally avoids presenting the full severity of the threat, inadequate cooperation between the emergency first responders and the absence of detailed planning for critical issues (for example, the question of organized and self-initiated mass evacuation), all contribute to the rather gloomy picture of the preparedness of the civilian front. They are all based on the meager interest and feeble attention it receives from the national leadership, from the local authorities, from the media and from the public at large. In many ways, the home front is far from being an issue in between emergencies.

This phenomenon is manifested by a vicious circle that prevents the acknowledgment of the centrality of the Israeli civilian front, as a construct that is by no means less significant for the national security than the military front. Arguably, a high degree of reciprocity is at play here: just as the protection of the civilian population depends on the IDF, so the success of the IDF depends also on whatever takes place on the home front. Even if the military is successful in inflicting the most painful blows on the enemy, a picture of the final stage of the confrontation which presents large-scale civilian casualties, destruction and a major disruption of the civilian fabric and functionality, will have a negative effect on the image of the result of the war. This disturbing situation may be rectified if and when the conceptual vicious circle is broken and when the Israeli government realizes that a meaningful investment in preparing the home front serves not only the civilians, but also the military’s effort and the overall consequences of the future conflict.

It is important to note that a reasonable investment of resources will necessarily promote a higher level of civilian preparedness, far superior to the existing one. The key concept in this context is that of societal resilience: it involves the promoting of social capacities of individuals, families, and communities (meaning, the national system) to flexibly contain severe perturbations, to bounce back swiftly and return to optimal and even improved functionality following the disruption. This is a tested and known approach which has proven itself to be successful in many instances and also in Israel itself.

The "Gaza Envelope" Model

The processes that have been taken place over the last decade in the localities of the "Gaza Envelope," which constantly deal – with impressive success – with severe security disruptions are indicative of the approach that has to be taken nationwide.  Most of these localities have adopted, following their recognition of the need, the social resilience concept in an optimal manner. What has been happening there in the last decade, under three ‘rounds’ of terrorist challenges, is remarkable in terms of implementing the principles of enhancing societal resilience. This happened in the Kibbutzim, in the other communities and also in the town of Sderot, which – with a new inclusive leadership – adopted resilience as its main strategy and succeeded, in a short period of time to transform the entire town from a passive challenged community into an active growing one. The positive results have been clearly manifested during and following the Hamas terrorist attacks from Gaza. But not less meaningful has been the dramatic social and economic growth of these communities then and thereafter. Despite the hardships, the bouncing back and bouncing forward capacities of these localities enabled them, with governmental assistance, to prosper in a rate which is unprecedented in the country.  This model of resilience leading to sustainability and growth should constitute an excellent model that is ameliorated in other communities and towns, primarily in regions that face future expected security (and other) disruptions. Furthermore, since all the Israeli population is under the range of high trajectory weapons threat, it all needs, and is entitled to, a concentered effort and the necessary investment required in order to enhance its societal resilience.

Developing a national security doctrine for the civilian front that includes the consolidation and implementation of a combined military and civilian efforts, aimed at developing social and infrastructure resilience at the local level, is a readily available, inexpensive and a proven strategic solution. Admittedly, it will be a time-consuming process, but it should be initiated at the earliest possible time and the sooner – the better. 

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Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran is a senior research fellow at the Israel Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Dr. Carmit Padan is a research fellow at INSS