“Iran was Mistaken in Deploying Forces within Range of IDF's Precision-Guided Munitions”

Four former IDF generals took part in a special panel in the context of the first day of the Israel Defense annual conference and discussed Israel's defense situation and the challenges of the modern battlefield

“Iran was Mistaken in Deploying Forces within Range of IDF's Precision-Guided Munitions”

From the Generals panel (Gilad Kavalerchik)

In the context of the 2018 Israel Defense Fire, Maneuvering & Intelligence Conference, four former IDF generals took part in a discussion of Israel's defense situation and the challenges it faces.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Avi Mizrachi argued that in the future, the ground force entering an enemy town or village will only enter after much of the work had already been done by a combination of robotics and technology – not by humans. "The robotic systems will collect intelligence and deal with some of the threats before the troopers enter," said Mizrachi.

"The challenge is to identify the enemy operatives – whether they wear civilian clothes or uniforms, and then you can employ ordnance against them. In order to accomplish that, the military must undergo a conceptual revision. This swarm-like force can mop-up buildings, plant sensors and establish its own grid in that village or town. We need the ability to strike within a closed, fast-acting network, with no need for external support from the air force or the navy.

"In other words, the ground forces should obtain an independent capability, based on platforms. Unless you plan the battle correctly, especially with regard to such scenarios as the ones we experienced in Gaza, the cost of victory will be higher. Technology does not exempt you from the need to think and plan.

"The IDF is an executive organization and should build up its capabilities regardless of any government program," said Mizrachi. "Another subject not being addressed at the conference is electronic warfare. The IAF excels at this, while the ground forces do not. We need to look at the Russians in this context. The Iranians are also good at it and Hezbollah learn from them. Protection for the forces is another issue: the IDF wants a 'curtain' for the force, and we are not there yet. If we manage to obtain effective protection, we will be able to provide the government with more air to continue fighting."

Vice Admiral (res.) Ram Rutenberg argued that the military, as an organization, changes slowly compared to the enemy. Only a complete combined-arms concept will enable the military to adapt promptly. If an aircraft regards a naval vessel as another aircraft within the span of its C2 system, you will expand the national territory by dozens of kilometers. If the platforms are fitted with surveillance and strike resources, along with combat interoperability – we will be able to obtain a substantial advantage.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Guy Tzur argued that we lost the ability to transfer the battle into the enemy's territory, as it takes place in the rear area. In order to transfer the battle to the enemy's theater, we need to destroy their steep-trajectory weapons before they reach the civilian space. Another challenge involves the need to minimize the time interval between the moment a target is identified and the moment it is destroyed. The solution to this challenge includes an IoT element – a system providing protection to heavy and light platforms and full cooperation between the arms through a real-time connection.

Tzur argued further that a long-term plan is required in order to enable the IDF to implement the various changes. "We need consistency. The leadership may change, but the military should develop and build up their capabilities in a consistent and independent manner," said Tzur.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Ben-Eliyahu argued that the interface between the military and the political leadership is the main issue. Ben-Eliyahu argued further that the military should be told explicitly what it is required to achieve.

"If you manage, through political wisdom, to create a form of battlefield that suits your relative advantage, then your chances of winning will be higher – without getting into a technological discourse. We initiated an aerial operation during the First Lebanon War against Syrian surface-to-air missiles that had been deployed in the Beqaa Valley of Lebanon. The war had to be fought in Lebanon. Back then we had precision-guided munitions for ranges of 30-40 kilometers and we managed to destroy the Syrians' surface-to-air missile layout. They had deployed their weapon systems within range of our precision-guided munitions.

"You say strategic depth is an asset? What happened in 1973? We had strategic depth. Did it do us any good? Let's take another example. In the Six-Day War, Nasser made the mistake of deploying his aircraft in the Sinai, within flight range of the Israeli aircraft. Did the strategic depth do him any good? The Iranians made the same mistake in Syria. They deployed their forces within our range. The principle we are talking about is turning the advantage of the other side into their disadvantage."

“There is no longer a distinction between terrorism, guerilla warfare and conventional warfare"

"The rate of change in recent years has been very fast, and we are always behind trying to keep pace with the change," said Maj. Gen. (res.) Tal Russo in his address at the Israel Defense annual conference.

Russo argued that the nature of wars has changed. "After Vietnam, the Americans realized that their concepts were no longer valid. This led them to divide war into high-intensity conflicts and low-intensity conflicts. That was more or less the stage where we started following the Americans' example. The process progressed and over the last two decades there has been a dramatic change in the nature of wars worldwide, with regard to the compound battle aspect. There are dozens of confrontations around the globe every day. There is no longer a distinction between terrorism, guerilla warfare and conventional warfare," explained Russo.

"Looking at Israel, in the first decades (of the State's existence) we faced invading armies. In the last two decades there has been a dramatic change. From a situation where the Arab armed forces wanted to dominate Israel, they changed their strategy into one of attrition. Until 15 years ago we faced deadly terrorism within the boundaries of the State of Israel, which exacted a toll of dozens of deaths each month. That attrition proved to be effective.

"The current war is taking place in a state of relative chaos, and we should take advantage of the chaos that exists on the battlefield. The moves Israel is making are moves in the right direction, with the emphasis on connectivity. That is the primary challenge. To connect everyone together so as to improve the (over-all) effectiveness. Owing to the expansive spaces where we have to conduct our operations. Maneuvering in the enemy's depth, maneuvering into the enemy's depth, extensive fire support, high strike yields, precision-guided munitions (including prevention of collateral damage), and connecting all of those elements together – these are the challenges.

"The State of Israel is an excellent learning platform. In Lebanon and the Gaza Strip we need all of our efforts. In Syria we need mainly fire and special forces. In the Sinai we need fire and special forces. In the Judea and Samaria district we do not need fire – mainly special forces. The battlefield is highly diversified. Our challenges involve protecting our own forces, defending the home front and maintaining our lethality vis-à-vis the enemy. Robotics, connectivity and interconnecting technologies are all parts of the solution.

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