Management of Military Operations – Authority & Responsibility Assignment
"The employment of military power is a part of the on-going process of administering and implementing the overall national policy. It is intended to accomplish diplomatic/political objectives, rather than military goals." Special column by Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivry
David Ivry
| 20/04/2018
IDF troops operating in Gaza during Operation Protective Edge (Photo: IDF)
As I join numerous commentators who have already addressed this issue and voice my personal opinion, it is essential, in my view, to clearly define the position and functions of the National Security Council of Israel, which has undergone many upheavals since its inception.
The employment of military power is a part of the on-going process of administering and implementing the overall national policy. Military measures are normally used as a last and necessary resort after all of the other diplomatic and political measures have been exhausted. The employment of military power is intended to accomplish diplomatic/political objectives, rather than military goals (in some cases these goals may overlap, but that is not always the case).
Consequently, the political echelon is responsible for setting forth the goals and objectives of the military operation for the military echelon. As a derivative of the overall national security strategy, the political echelon must also define the restrictions imposed on the employment of military power in line with the national interests, while avoiding any definition of restrictions on the employment of power that stem from operational military considerations. Accordingly, a military victory (an elusive, difficult to define concept) is not a clear-cut, definitive objective. Rather, the diplomatic accomplishment is the actual objective. A military victory of a certain type might undermine the national diplomatic-strategic interest.
The military echelon must provide the political echelon with the best possible plan for the accomplishment of the goals and objectives set forth in advance. The military echelon may also present alternatives while listing and explaining the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. The National Security Council should address the question of whether the plans presented by the military echelon conform to the diplomatic/political objectives and examine the risks the military plans are likely to produce with regard to other fields (economics, tourism, law). Such risks, when properly presented, may oblige the political echelon to reject the military plans or demand revisions/adjustments that would minimize the risks.
The National Security Council must not present its own military plans. If it were to do so, it would have assumed the authority without assuming the responsibility for the outcome. All revisions and adjustments of military plans must be made by the military echelon exclusively, with the implications presented to the political echelon.
The objectives of the military operation may change during the actual operation, and there is nothing wrong about that – on the contrary. As a result of external political developments or unexpected circumstances, it may be appropriate or even obligatory to revise the objectives. This has evolved into a more acute necessity in limited (low intensity) conflicts or in wars-between-wars in the modern technological and media-intensive era.
Consequently, the current objectives must be reviewed in the context of every daily dialog between the political echelon and the military echelon. The initiative for revisions may originate from either echelon. Following every such revision, the military echelon must present the revised plan for the accomplishment of the relevant objectives.
Independent front-line military initiative intended to revise strategic objectives is extremely dangerous. This form of initiative was widely accepted during the first years of Israel's existence and was even praised, but today, owing to the complexity of the processes, it could be catastrophic from a political-diplomatic point of view.
In conclusion, the processes of managing military operations are becoming much more complex than ever before, for the political echelon as well as for the military echelon. The management of military operations calls for full, close coordination, on-going updating and mutual understanding and trust between the two echelons. It would be preferable for each side to be aware of the limitations of the other side, rather than covering itself by making announcements for the benefit of future commissions of inquiry. The management of military operations is a supreme test of leadership for all of the echelons, in the context of which the national interest must always transcend any personal interest.
"The employment of military power is a part of the on-going process of administering and implementing the overall national policy. It is intended to accomplish diplomatic/political objectives, rather than military goals." Special column by Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivry
IDF troops operating in Gaza during Operation Protective Edge (Photo: IDF)
As I join numerous commentators who have already addressed this issue and voice my personal opinion, it is essential, in my view, to clearly define the position and functions of the National Security Council of Israel, which has undergone many upheavals since its inception.
The employment of military power is a part of the on-going process of administering and implementing the overall national policy. Military measures are normally used as a last and necessary resort after all of the other diplomatic and political measures have been exhausted. The employment of military power is intended to accomplish diplomatic/political objectives, rather than military goals (in some cases these goals may overlap, but that is not always the case).
Consequently, the political echelon is responsible for setting forth the goals and objectives of the military operation for the military echelon. As a derivative of the overall national security strategy, the political echelon must also define the restrictions imposed on the employment of military power in line with the national interests, while avoiding any definition of restrictions on the employment of power that stem from operational military considerations. Accordingly, a military victory (an elusive, difficult to define concept) is not a clear-cut, definitive objective. Rather, the diplomatic accomplishment is the actual objective. A military victory of a certain type might undermine the national diplomatic-strategic interest.
The military echelon must provide the political echelon with the best possible plan for the accomplishment of the goals and objectives set forth in advance. The military echelon may also present alternatives while listing and explaining the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. The National Security Council should address the question of whether the plans presented by the military echelon conform to the diplomatic/political objectives and examine the risks the military plans are likely to produce with regard to other fields (economics, tourism, law). Such risks, when properly presented, may oblige the political echelon to reject the military plans or demand revisions/adjustments that would minimize the risks.
The National Security Council must not present its own military plans. If it were to do so, it would have assumed the authority without assuming the responsibility for the outcome. All revisions and adjustments of military plans must be made by the military echelon exclusively, with the implications presented to the political echelon.
The objectives of the military operation may change during the actual operation, and there is nothing wrong about that – on the contrary. As a result of external political developments or unexpected circumstances, it may be appropriate or even obligatory to revise the objectives. This has evolved into a more acute necessity in limited (low intensity) conflicts or in wars-between-wars in the modern technological and media-intensive era.
Consequently, the current objectives must be reviewed in the context of every daily dialog between the political echelon and the military echelon. The initiative for revisions may originate from either echelon. Following every such revision, the military echelon must present the revised plan for the accomplishment of the relevant objectives.
Independent front-line military initiative intended to revise strategic objectives is extremely dangerous. This form of initiative was widely accepted during the first years of Israel's existence and was even praised, but today, owing to the complexity of the processes, it could be catastrophic from a political-diplomatic point of view.
In conclusion, the processes of managing military operations are becoming much more complex than ever before, for the political echelon as well as for the military echelon. The management of military operations calls for full, close coordination, on-going updating and mutual understanding and trust between the two echelons. It would be preferable for each side to be aware of the limitations of the other side, rather than covering itself by making announcements for the benefit of future commissions of inquiry. The management of military operations is a supreme test of leadership for all of the echelons, in the context of which the national interest must always transcend any personal interest.
