The Bit & Frequency War
In order to prepare for the bit & frequency war, the IDF C4I Directorate initiated a substantial revision of its peacetime and wartime operation. The objective – to provide the IDF, where most of the strike systems are based on computer systems, with operational latitude
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 14/12/2017
Illustration: Bigstock
In the next war, the enemy's spectrum and cyber activity is expected to affect combined-arms operations and processes by the IDF. That, at least, is the basic assumption of the IDF C4I Directorate. Over the last eighteen months, in order to prepare for the bit and frequency war, the IDF C4I Directorate initiated a substantial revision of the manner in which it will operate during peacetime and war. The primary objective of this revision is to provide the IDF, where most of the strike systems are based on computer systems, with operational latitude.
The new organizational structure of the IDF C4I Directorate consists of three divisions that make up a complete C4I circle – the Command, Control, Communications and Network-Centric Warfare (C3/NCW) Division, the Cybersecurity Division and the Digital Dimension Division.
The C3/NCW Division is responsible for the networks of the IDF Ground Arm and provides the IDF regional commands with the services they require while preparing for war and during wartime. This is one of the lessons drawn from the Second Lebanon War (2006), during which the regional commands were not provided with the support they needed from the C4I Directorate according to their desired SLAs.
The Cybersecurity Division is responsible, at the GHQ (General Staff) level, for overseeing all of the networks of the IDF, and that includes the responsibility for cooperation with the Cyber Authority, the ISA and all the other elements that are responsible for critical civilian infrastructures.
The Digital Dimension Division is a new element that serves as the operations center of the Head of the C4I Directorate and is actually managed by the Head of the Security Division. Its function is to synchronize the requirements of the IDF Operations Division with the C4I Directorate's services, whether this applies to multiple-branch infrastructure or to the infrastructure of the Ground Arm. It should be noted that the C4I Directorate is the IDF regulator in charge of all C4I matters. During wartime, it makes decisions in the context of the planning process of the IDF Operations Division.
The Objective: C4I Chain of Supply Continuity
The C3/NCW Division has under it the Staff Department, which is a part of the Directorate's staff and is responsible for the employment of C3 elements within the IDF Ground Arm during wartime. The Staff Departments includes two other departments – the Planning Department, in charge of force build-up, and the Human Resources Department. The Operations Department consists of four branches – Operations, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), Doctrine & Training and the Field Branch (C3 logistics).
As far as the logistics aspect is concerned, each regional C3 element has a regional command equipment base subordinated to a regional command communication office. Today, these bases are involved less in maintenance and more in network operation and logistics. One of their functions is to improve the efficiency of the chain of supply of the communication services provided to the regional command. A substantial portion of the maintenance of communication components was outsourced in 2011 to Elbit Systems, as part of Project 'Meshek HaTagam' (= VHF Economy) which took the intermediate and depot maintenance levels out of the organizational structure of the IDF. In the context of this project, Elbit Systems deployed laboratories at the regional command equipment bases and the IDF were assured of a higher level of availability along with new hardware.
"The story of the C3 logistics must be linked to the logistic command at IDF GHQ/General Staff," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "The IDF logistics chain is run through the Operations Division, to the logistic centers, emergency supply convoys, and other elements. If you want to provide the regional command with a high service standard during wartime, you cannot detach C3 logistics from the logistic management taking place at IDF GHQ. The GHQ-level logistics are managed by the Yahalom (= Diamond) system developed by the C4I Directorate. This system is synchronized with the Masu'ah (= Beacon) system, used by echelons from the Army Corps/Division level down."
The logistics system is also synchronized with the 'Kelim Shluvim' (= Communicating Vessels) system that runs the operational fire loop at IDF GHQ. Within the next few years, the 'Kelim Shluvim' system will be replaced by the Operational Internet system, which would place the entire IDF on a single flat network. In this way, every user will be able to access any database easily and quickly. Today, this process still includes 'bottlenecks.' "In order to view the situation of our own forces using the 'Tirat Ha'Agam' system, you need a working interface using the 'Kelim Shluvim' system. For a GHQ-level fire loop, where you set up a target and want to pull it out of the 'target bank,' this will involve a fairly complex procedure. The Operational Internet system should bridge those bottlenecks," they explain at the IDF C4I Directorate.
The Combined-Arms Warfare Era
Given the fact that the IDF wishes to advance in the direction of the "Network Surveillance & Strike" (NSS) vision, synchronization between logistics and the closure of the fire loop is mandatory, as is the ability to dynamically manage the spectrum and cybersecurity activity in real time. "When you are engaged in combat in Lebanon, Syria or elsewhere, the spectral range neither belongs to you nor is it under your complete command," they explain at the IDF C4I Directorate.
"A counter operation is underway. This is an era of combined-arms combat operations where nearly all of the operational combat processes are based on computer and spectral systems. If an operational process within the fire loop is interrupted – you will have a problem on the battlefield. If a certain intelligence collection effort is interrupted – you will have a problem. Achieving operational latitude in the context of such a scenario becomes a challenge. The Operations Department of the C4I Directorate bears a major share of the responsibility for providing solutions to this challenge."
This latitude might be adversely affected in the spectrum-cyber worlds, or it might be a malfunction. How do you characterize a blue screen in the context of an operating system? Owing to the technical complexity, the people at the C4I Directorate have, over the past eighteen months, formulated a troubleshooting doctrine. "We are trying to produce a system that will be as interruption-proof as possible, but you can never know what the enemy has in store for you," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "The challenge is to manage the combined-arms interoperability in an operational manner. If you identify an overload in one of the systems, you will have the option of regulating the loads. You may decide to cut off divisions that do not take part in the maneuver. This is the function of the Digital Dimension Division under the Head of the C4I Directorate: to view the holistic picture of the IDF and decide what to do."
Between Independence in the Field and a Supporting Space
One of the questions that arise in the context of operating the C3 services in wartime concerns the ability to "extend" these services into the enemy's territory. While in the civilian world, the client is used to being provided with C3 services almost anywhere in the country, in a military scenario a clear distinction should be made between the territory of the State of Israel and enemy territory. Within the territory of the State of Israel, the IDF C4I Directorate can provide wide bandwidth C3 services through the use of cables, fibers or wireless communication channels to any point in the country.
However, when the IDF embarks on a deep-penetration maneuver for the purpose of having the fighting transferred to the enemy's territory (a maneuver extending to more than a few kilometers), the question that arises is how to stretch the C3 capabilities that are available inside the country into the enemy's territory. Why is this so important? Because the maneuvering forces – the users of the C3 services – are used to operating in a certain way that relies on a given bandwidth.
"We need a balance between spatial firepower capabilities and autonomous capabilities," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "What is a tank? It is not dependent on any other element. It is impossible to have all of the operational loop closure processes based on a rear-area fire support space. Again, a counter spectrum and cyber operation is underway that might interrupt operational processes, including loop closure processes."
It should be noted that the IDF wishes to operate through a spatial fire configuration that would relieve the front-end force of a considerable load and enable it to be as fast as the enemy. For this purpose, C3 services with a high-standard SLA are required. When you 'pin-prick' a map – an ordnance item is launched from the rear-area (fire support) space. The operational idea presents a cutting-edge concept, but requires computer services capable of extending a wide bandwidth service at the same pace as the maneuver – and that is a complex technical challenge.
The IDF does not have such services yet. The old 'Vered Harim' (= Mountain Rose) system and the military cellular system that replaces it provide a wide, wireless bandwidth only inside Israeli territory, plus a few additional kilometers beyond that. Optical fibers and cables must be laid on the ground. For this purpose, you need a secure route into the enemy's territory, which takes time to achieve. In effect, the IDF currently uses the 'Afik Rahav' (= Wide Channel) system, which is based on the Tzayad (= Digital Land Army) system.
Simplified, this is a satellite communication system for maneuvering vehicles, capable of decentralizing the bandwidth through the Tzayad system. For the next version, the IDF wants to include MANET services as well, capable of providing an ad-hoc network that may be deployed at the same pace as the maneuver. Even if the complex technical challenge is resolved, the bandwidth is question will still be narrow and extremely costly, and will not be able to support all of the services of the domain at the far end of the maneuvering area. This is the reason why the Operations Department keeps considering an operational doctrine that would instruct the maneuvering echelon on how to deal with a drop in the bandwidth available in enemy territory.
The Enemy's C3 becomes a Kinetic Target
The data fusion associated with the wartime activity of the IDF C4I Directorate takes place at the Digital Dimension Division. As stated earlier in this article, this is a new and very lean command tier charged with the task of providing the operations center of the Head of the C4I Directorate. Let's assume a scenario where the Commandant of the IAF reports he is unable to launch a strike mission for the benefit of IDF Northern Command owing to a C3 problem. The IDF Chief Communications Officer, in charge of the C3/NCW Division, will order MAMRAM (the IDF's Computer & Information System Center) to deal with the problem. However, the Digital Dimension Division may intervene and decide that from a GHQ/General Staff perspective, MAMRAM should be assigned another task that is more important to the preparatory process of the IDF.
The Digital Dimension Division is linked to and involved in the planning process of the Head of the IDF Operations Department during wartime, and has a clear view of the entire IDF in the next 72 hours. The Digital Dimension Division should reflect the C3 status on the ground to the Head of the Operations Department. The final decisions of the Head of the C4I Directorate are enforced by the Digital Dimension Division through dedicated teams that also provide feedback from the C3/NCW and Cybersecurity Divisions.
In order to relieve some of the tensions that could develop between the C3/NCW Division and the Cybersecurity Division, a permanent representative of the C3/NCW Division is attached to the Cybersecurity Division. Such tensions can stem from a situation where the C3/NCW Division has identified an enemy element that interferes with a certain operational process. The instinct of this Division is to cut off the detachment being attacked so as not to contaminate and interrupt the entire process. On the other hand, the Cybersecurity Division would want to leave everything connected so as to keep track of the source of the attack. Such tensions, at the moment of truth, could be resolved by the Digital Dimension Division which is responsible for multiple-service/arm connectivity, among other things.
"In the past, the C4I Directorate was not a part of the planning process at the Operations Department," they explain at the C4I Directorate, "But a reality where operational processes are based on computer systems is what shifted cyber and the spectrum to center stage. Today, the C4I Directorate is definitely a part of the planning process of the Operations Department, and it also produces targets for the IDF regional commands or for the IAF. If a C3 center of Hezbollah or Iran produces attacks against the IDF and interrupts offensive processes during wartime, it will become a target in the target bank. When was there ever a process where the C4I Directorate produces targets for attack? The new organizational structure of the C4I Directorate has already been included in the future training exercises of the IDF and is to become fully operational by mid-2018."
In order to prepare for the bit & frequency war, the IDF C4I Directorate initiated a substantial revision of its peacetime and wartime operation. The objective – to provide the IDF, where most of the strike systems are based on computer systems, with operational latitude
Illustration: Bigstock
In the next war, the enemy's spectrum and cyber activity is expected to affect combined-arms operations and processes by the IDF. That, at least, is the basic assumption of the IDF C4I Directorate. Over the last eighteen months, in order to prepare for the bit and frequency war, the IDF C4I Directorate initiated a substantial revision of the manner in which it will operate during peacetime and war. The primary objective of this revision is to provide the IDF, where most of the strike systems are based on computer systems, with operational latitude.
The new organizational structure of the IDF C4I Directorate consists of three divisions that make up a complete C4I circle – the Command, Control, Communications and Network-Centric Warfare (C3/NCW) Division, the Cybersecurity Division and the Digital Dimension Division.
The C3/NCW Division is responsible for the networks of the IDF Ground Arm and provides the IDF regional commands with the services they require while preparing for war and during wartime. This is one of the lessons drawn from the Second Lebanon War (2006), during which the regional commands were not provided with the support they needed from the C4I Directorate according to their desired SLAs.
The Cybersecurity Division is responsible, at the GHQ (General Staff) level, for overseeing all of the networks of the IDF, and that includes the responsibility for cooperation with the Cyber Authority, the ISA and all the other elements that are responsible for critical civilian infrastructures.
The Digital Dimension Division is a new element that serves as the operations center of the Head of the C4I Directorate and is actually managed by the Head of the Security Division. Its function is to synchronize the requirements of the IDF Operations Division with the C4I Directorate's services, whether this applies to multiple-branch infrastructure or to the infrastructure of the Ground Arm. It should be noted that the C4I Directorate is the IDF regulator in charge of all C4I matters. During wartime, it makes decisions in the context of the planning process of the IDF Operations Division.
The Objective: C4I Chain of Supply Continuity
The C3/NCW Division has under it the Staff Department, which is a part of the Directorate's staff and is responsible for the employment of C3 elements within the IDF Ground Arm during wartime. The Staff Departments includes two other departments – the Planning Department, in charge of force build-up, and the Human Resources Department. The Operations Department consists of four branches – Operations, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), Doctrine & Training and the Field Branch (C3 logistics).
As far as the logistics aspect is concerned, each regional C3 element has a regional command equipment base subordinated to a regional command communication office. Today, these bases are involved less in maintenance and more in network operation and logistics. One of their functions is to improve the efficiency of the chain of supply of the communication services provided to the regional command. A substantial portion of the maintenance of communication components was outsourced in 2011 to Elbit Systems, as part of Project 'Meshek HaTagam' (= VHF Economy) which took the intermediate and depot maintenance levels out of the organizational structure of the IDF. In the context of this project, Elbit Systems deployed laboratories at the regional command equipment bases and the IDF were assured of a higher level of availability along with new hardware.
"The story of the C3 logistics must be linked to the logistic command at IDF GHQ/General Staff," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "The IDF logistics chain is run through the Operations Division, to the logistic centers, emergency supply convoys, and other elements. If you want to provide the regional command with a high service standard during wartime, you cannot detach C3 logistics from the logistic management taking place at IDF GHQ. The GHQ-level logistics are managed by the Yahalom (= Diamond) system developed by the C4I Directorate. This system is synchronized with the Masu'ah (= Beacon) system, used by echelons from the Army Corps/Division level down."
The logistics system is also synchronized with the 'Kelim Shluvim' (= Communicating Vessels) system that runs the operational fire loop at IDF GHQ. Within the next few years, the 'Kelim Shluvim' system will be replaced by the Operational Internet system, which would place the entire IDF on a single flat network. In this way, every user will be able to access any database easily and quickly. Today, this process still includes 'bottlenecks.' "In order to view the situation of our own forces using the 'Tirat Ha'Agam' system, you need a working interface using the 'Kelim Shluvim' system. For a GHQ-level fire loop, where you set up a target and want to pull it out of the 'target bank,' this will involve a fairly complex procedure. The Operational Internet system should bridge those bottlenecks," they explain at the IDF C4I Directorate.
The Combined-Arms Warfare Era
Given the fact that the IDF wishes to advance in the direction of the "Network Surveillance & Strike" (NSS) vision, synchronization between logistics and the closure of the fire loop is mandatory, as is the ability to dynamically manage the spectrum and cybersecurity activity in real time. "When you are engaged in combat in Lebanon, Syria or elsewhere, the spectral range neither belongs to you nor is it under your complete command," they explain at the IDF C4I Directorate.
"A counter operation is underway. This is an era of combined-arms combat operations where nearly all of the operational combat processes are based on computer and spectral systems. If an operational process within the fire loop is interrupted – you will have a problem on the battlefield. If a certain intelligence collection effort is interrupted – you will have a problem. Achieving operational latitude in the context of such a scenario becomes a challenge. The Operations Department of the C4I Directorate bears a major share of the responsibility for providing solutions to this challenge."
This latitude might be adversely affected in the spectrum-cyber worlds, or it might be a malfunction. How do you characterize a blue screen in the context of an operating system? Owing to the technical complexity, the people at the C4I Directorate have, over the past eighteen months, formulated a troubleshooting doctrine. "We are trying to produce a system that will be as interruption-proof as possible, but you can never know what the enemy has in store for you," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "The challenge is to manage the combined-arms interoperability in an operational manner. If you identify an overload in one of the systems, you will have the option of regulating the loads. You may decide to cut off divisions that do not take part in the maneuver. This is the function of the Digital Dimension Division under the Head of the C4I Directorate: to view the holistic picture of the IDF and decide what to do."
Between Independence in the Field and a Supporting Space
One of the questions that arise in the context of operating the C3 services in wartime concerns the ability to "extend" these services into the enemy's territory. While in the civilian world, the client is used to being provided with C3 services almost anywhere in the country, in a military scenario a clear distinction should be made between the territory of the State of Israel and enemy territory. Within the territory of the State of Israel, the IDF C4I Directorate can provide wide bandwidth C3 services through the use of cables, fibers or wireless communication channels to any point in the country.
However, when the IDF embarks on a deep-penetration maneuver for the purpose of having the fighting transferred to the enemy's territory (a maneuver extending to more than a few kilometers), the question that arises is how to stretch the C3 capabilities that are available inside the country into the enemy's territory. Why is this so important? Because the maneuvering forces – the users of the C3 services – are used to operating in a certain way that relies on a given bandwidth.
"We need a balance between spatial firepower capabilities and autonomous capabilities," they explain at the C4I Directorate. "What is a tank? It is not dependent on any other element. It is impossible to have all of the operational loop closure processes based on a rear-area fire support space. Again, a counter spectrum and cyber operation is underway that might interrupt operational processes, including loop closure processes."
It should be noted that the IDF wishes to operate through a spatial fire configuration that would relieve the front-end force of a considerable load and enable it to be as fast as the enemy. For this purpose, C3 services with a high-standard SLA are required. When you 'pin-prick' a map – an ordnance item is launched from the rear-area (fire support) space. The operational idea presents a cutting-edge concept, but requires computer services capable of extending a wide bandwidth service at the same pace as the maneuver – and that is a complex technical challenge.
The IDF does not have such services yet. The old 'Vered Harim' (= Mountain Rose) system and the military cellular system that replaces it provide a wide, wireless bandwidth only inside Israeli territory, plus a few additional kilometers beyond that. Optical fibers and cables must be laid on the ground. For this purpose, you need a secure route into the enemy's territory, which takes time to achieve. In effect, the IDF currently uses the 'Afik Rahav' (= Wide Channel) system, which is based on the Tzayad (= Digital Land Army) system.
Simplified, this is a satellite communication system for maneuvering vehicles, capable of decentralizing the bandwidth through the Tzayad system. For the next version, the IDF wants to include MANET services as well, capable of providing an ad-hoc network that may be deployed at the same pace as the maneuver. Even if the complex technical challenge is resolved, the bandwidth is question will still be narrow and extremely costly, and will not be able to support all of the services of the domain at the far end of the maneuvering area. This is the reason why the Operations Department keeps considering an operational doctrine that would instruct the maneuvering echelon on how to deal with a drop in the bandwidth available in enemy territory.
The Enemy's C3 becomes a Kinetic Target
The data fusion associated with the wartime activity of the IDF C4I Directorate takes place at the Digital Dimension Division. As stated earlier in this article, this is a new and very lean command tier charged with the task of providing the operations center of the Head of the C4I Directorate. Let's assume a scenario where the Commandant of the IAF reports he is unable to launch a strike mission for the benefit of IDF Northern Command owing to a C3 problem. The IDF Chief Communications Officer, in charge of the C3/NCW Division, will order MAMRAM (the IDF's Computer & Information System Center) to deal with the problem. However, the Digital Dimension Division may intervene and decide that from a GHQ/General Staff perspective, MAMRAM should be assigned another task that is more important to the preparatory process of the IDF.
The Digital Dimension Division is linked to and involved in the planning process of the Head of the IDF Operations Department during wartime, and has a clear view of the entire IDF in the next 72 hours. The Digital Dimension Division should reflect the C3 status on the ground to the Head of the Operations Department. The final decisions of the Head of the C4I Directorate are enforced by the Digital Dimension Division through dedicated teams that also provide feedback from the C3/NCW and Cybersecurity Divisions.
In order to relieve some of the tensions that could develop between the C3/NCW Division and the Cybersecurity Division, a permanent representative of the C3/NCW Division is attached to the Cybersecurity Division. Such tensions can stem from a situation where the C3/NCW Division has identified an enemy element that interferes with a certain operational process. The instinct of this Division is to cut off the detachment being attacked so as not to contaminate and interrupt the entire process. On the other hand, the Cybersecurity Division would want to leave everything connected so as to keep track of the source of the attack. Such tensions, at the moment of truth, could be resolved by the Digital Dimension Division which is responsible for multiple-service/arm connectivity, among other things.
"In the past, the C4I Directorate was not a part of the planning process at the Operations Department," they explain at the C4I Directorate, "But a reality where operational processes are based on computer systems is what shifted cyber and the spectrum to center stage. Today, the C4I Directorate is definitely a part of the planning process of the Operations Department, and it also produces targets for the IDF regional commands or for the IAF. If a C3 center of Hezbollah or Iran produces attacks against the IDF and interrupts offensive processes during wartime, it will become a target in the target bank. When was there ever a process where the C4I Directorate produces targets for attack? The new organizational structure of the C4I Directorate has already been included in the future training exercises of the IDF and is to become fully operational by mid-2018."
