IDF 2030: Small, Efficient & Lethal
The IDF is already hard at work preparing the force build-up plan for the next decade, noting the future strategic threats and challenges
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 16/11/2017
Photo: IDF
At the IDF Ground Arm they have started thinking about the force build-up plan for the next decade, titled "Force Build-Up 2030". Several IDF organs are involved in the planning activity: the IDF Operations Directorate, the IDF Planning Directorate, and the IDF Ground Arm HQ. The Planning Directorate is in charge of developing the reference threat scenarios. The Operations Directorate is in charge of breaking the reference scenarios down to operational scenarios. The IDF Ground Arm HQ is in charge of synchronizing the insights of the Operations Directorate and the Planning Directorate with the actual force build-up activities of the Ground Arm.
The Spherical Threat
The process directing the force build-up effort for the IDF ground forces is titled "Yabasha Ba'Ofek" (= "Land on the Horizon" or "Land Ahoy!"). Four secondary processes that constitute the backbone of the force build-up effort for the ground forces are derived from the primary process. These secondary processes include Combat Task Forces, Special Units, the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy and the Borders. Before elaborating on each secondary process, we should dwell on the general concept regarding the ground threat, titled "The Spherical Threat." Understanding the way this threat is conceived will help us understand the force build-up processes.
The Spherical Threat is unique to the ground forces. It includes the subterranean space, the surface space and the high and low airspaces (drones, steep trajectory). Officers of the IDF Ground Arm explained that the threat facing the troopers on the ground "envelopes them like a sphere." The reality where the maneuvering force faces a set of threats that envelope it compels the IDF Ground Arm to develop the force build-up process on two levels: a general level, intended to provide solutions to the threats generally, and a dedicated level, intended to provide a differential solution to each specific threat.
The IDF Ground Arm HQ attempts to accomplish this by combining the linear development of battlefield platforms (tank, APC, artillery gun, etc.) with the development of modules for those platforms. The platform provides the general solution, while the modules provide the dedicated, specialized solutions. The modules to be used may be selected according to the specific threat.
The Spherical Threat concept, with the emphasis on the terrorism threat, is reflected in the employment of the force and not just in the build-up thereof. The State of Israel is surrounded by different theaters: Egypt in the south, Jordan and Iraq in the east and Syria and Hezbollah in the north, in addition to threats not associated with a common border – like the Iranian threat. The employment of the IDF Ground Arm should, in this context, too, match both the general threat and the specific threat. As with the weapon systems, a general and dedicated (modular) concept was developed for the employment of the force as well.
The force employment concept is based on three loops: a general loop, which consists of the GHQ capabilities – forces that are relevant to all of the different sectors (north, south and east) and may be moved between sectors. The second loop consists of the dedicated sectoral capabilities (IDF regional commands). These forces develop dedicated capabilities that are relevant to the sector for which they are responsible. If they are redeployed to other sectors, their effectiveness will be significantly reduced. The third loop consists of sectoral defensive forces. These forces also operate under the regional commands and possess capabilities that are relevant to their sector, but in line with a defensive approach. In other words – they are trained to provide an immediate response for countering enemy attacks a short distance from the border, and are not intended to engage in deep-penetration maneuvers.
These three loops are intended to function as three parts of a whole. The defensive forces loop deals with the task of blocking enemy attacks within a short distance from the border. The second, sectoral loop joins in and launches a deep-penetration maneuver (transferring the fighting into the enemy's territory), while the defensive loop resumes its defensive posture along the border. The third loop – the GHQ forces – shifts between the sectors as required.
The differentiation between the loops enables the IDF to implement a modular budget policy. The different loops are provided with different – not identical – capabilities. Even within each loop, the individual units are provided with different capabilities. The force build-up process is carried out differentially, according to the expectations from each loop. In this way, public funds may be used more intelligently while improving the effectiveness of the IDF for the same amount of money and possibly even less.
Rubik's Cube
Along with the force build-up and employment, the IDF Ground Arm develops four secondary processes derived from the primary "Land Ahoy!" process, which constitute the backbone of the force build-up of the ground forces. These secondary processes include Combat Task Forces, Special Units, the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy and the Borders.
The combat task forces at the various levels (brigade, battalion and company task forces) are evolving into the primary nuclear entity of land warfare. Having realized that the future wars will take place in urban environments and involve an asymmetrical profile opposite terrorist or guerrilla organizations, the IDF concluded that there is no point in just committing forces to the battlefield. Instead, it is necessary to develop forces possessing diversified capabilities – platforms and infantry elements – so as to cope with terrorist opponents in built-up areas.
The IDF aspires to provide the combat task forces with autonomous surveillance-engagement and independent intelligence collection capabilities, which are to include the lower airspace. At the IDF Ground Arm HQ they do not consider an "Army Air Arm" like that of the US military, but capabilities that include drones, UAVs, towed aerostats and more. In addition to the autonomous capabilities, the combat task force is to be provided with the ability to "order" ordnance so as to minimize the load the troopers have to carry with them.
The idea is for the combat task force to be light, agile, fast and dynamic so as to effectively deal with the enemy's speed of response, which is currently measured by dozens of seconds. When the task force has identified an enemy element, it marks it on a common interactive map and an automatic fire support "tender" process running in the background will decide how to neutralize that enemy element. In this way, the IDF Ground Arm HQ will achieve maximum effectiveness in the employment of the task force opposite a dynamic enemy combat profile. Additionally, the dynamic capabilities of the combat task force will allow it to think how to anticipate and preempt the enemy in a "dense" scenario, instead of thinking about ordnance logistics.
The NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy is the concept according to which the IDF is currently developing the "Fire Support Tender" methodology. This is a state-of-the-art technological solution for the needs of the combat task force at the forward line of friction with the enemy. One of the challenges currently faced by battlefield forces is the tension between the need to maintain friction with the enemy and the tendency to "pull back" the fire capabilities and reassign them to elements deployed at the rear. When the fire capabilities are pulled back from the combat task force and reassigned to external, rear-area elements, the IDF might lose the actual friction with the enemy.
At the IDF Ground Arm HQ they explain that this tension is resolved by retaining friction capabilities for very close ranges. As the opponent is a disappearing enemy and the exposure interval of enemy targets is less than 40 seconds on average, the friction of the combat task force is reduced to this range. The entire friction beyond that range no longer exists as the enemy has evolved into a "disappearing enemy". Consequently, all of the battlefield engagements taking place within time constants other than immediate friction with exposed enemy elements will be handled by the NSS Canopy, and everything within those time constants will be handled by the combat task force itself.
Special units have evolved into a dedicated element in the employment of force by the Ground Arm. The reason for it stems primarily from the evolution of the enemy. Instead of regular, structured military formations, the enemy currently operates in small, decentralized and independent cells, possessing pin-point capabilities. Against an enemy of this type, the effectiveness of structured military formations decreases and there is a need for specialized units operating in a similar manner, to 'soften' or 'prepare' the enemy through preparatory operations. This "preparatory" activity actually means neutralizing primary friction focal points and disrupting the enemy's chain of command.
In other words, the primary function of the special units is to unbalance the enemy before the combat task forces arrive, and subsequently, at the same time as the operations of the combat task forces, further disrupt the enemy's operations by engaging the enemy's leaders, logistic chain and command centers. For this purpose, the IDF established the Commando Brigade (with regular and reservist units) and the Depth Corps – a GHQ force capable of operating in all of the sectors.
The borders have become an active element in the force employment concept of the IDF Ground Arm. Over the last few years, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) has erected a smart border fence system along the border with Syria, with an extensive range of surveillance, sensing and other resources. This smart fence system enables the IDF to establish a virtual strategic depth with no need to actually deploy forces in Syrian territory. At the Ground Arm they currently ponder the question of how to convert the smart border fence system from a passive resource that collects intelligence into a responding element capable of closing the fire loop on enemy targets as a first response loop.
Some of the ideas being considered include the use of various unmanned platforms that possess strike capabilities. The combination of a smart fence system that provides a strategic depth to a distance of dozens of kilometers during the day and night, with the option of having the sensors activate an unmanned strike layout, could lead to changes in the deployment of the IDF routine security forces in all border sectors.
The combination of the four secondary processes – the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy, the borders, special units and combat task forces – could produce a Rubik's Cube of sorts, capable of adapting itself to numerous scenarios, including adaptation to unforeseen wartime scenarios.
The Goal: Efficiency
It is worth recalling that over the course of the last thirty-five years, since the First Lebanon War, the IDF ground elements have become gradually less necessary, mainly owing to the transition to asymmetrical warfare opposite terrorist organizations, which increased the value of specialist units along with the value of the routine security and policing forces. The Ground Arm, as a force originally charged with the function of capturing enemy territories and transferring the fighting to the enemy's side of the border, found itself in a pointless situation.
With this situation in mind, the IDF Ground Arm initiated the brainstorming process titled "Land Ahoy!" in order to understand how to develop a ground arm that would remain legitimate and relevant in the era of asymmetrical warfare. This process provided the foundation for the Force Build-Up 2030 concept, and was intended to accomplish several objectives: provide the forces with the ability to adapt, in real time, to changing threats; develop cutting-edge capabilities under a shrinking budget framework; minimize the budgetary uncertainty as it applies to war plans (the cost/operational status ratio), and minimize the probability of casualties sustained by our own forces.
The IDF Ground Arm's force build-up plan should develop the ground element of the IDF as an active element that is not only capable of adapting and changing opposite such terrorist organizations as ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah or future organizations, but is also capable of utilizing the dynamic adaptation capabilities of the weapon systems and operational doctrines to determine the situation on the battlefield. Not just to respond – to initiate.
There is no doubt that the IDF Ground Arm's force build-up plan is not isolated from other primary IDF processes, such as combined arms warfare, intelligence-based warfare and the technological empowerment in all of the sectors. On the contrary, the elements of the NSS Canopy, for example, are based on combined arms capabilities and on the spatial concept the IDF has been developing for a number of years (fire space, C4I space, logistic space, etc.). If this plan is implemented as planned, the IDF may find itself evolving into a smaller but much more efficient and lethal military.
The IDF is already hard at work preparing the force build-up plan for the next decade, noting the future strategic threats and challenges
Photo: IDF
At the IDF Ground Arm they have started thinking about the force build-up plan for the next decade, titled "Force Build-Up 2030". Several IDF organs are involved in the planning activity: the IDF Operations Directorate, the IDF Planning Directorate, and the IDF Ground Arm HQ. The Planning Directorate is in charge of developing the reference threat scenarios. The Operations Directorate is in charge of breaking the reference scenarios down to operational scenarios. The IDF Ground Arm HQ is in charge of synchronizing the insights of the Operations Directorate and the Planning Directorate with the actual force build-up activities of the Ground Arm.
The Spherical Threat
The process directing the force build-up effort for the IDF ground forces is titled "Yabasha Ba'Ofek" (= "Land on the Horizon" or "Land Ahoy!"). Four secondary processes that constitute the backbone of the force build-up effort for the ground forces are derived from the primary process. These secondary processes include Combat Task Forces, Special Units, the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy and the Borders. Before elaborating on each secondary process, we should dwell on the general concept regarding the ground threat, titled "The Spherical Threat." Understanding the way this threat is conceived will help us understand the force build-up processes.
The Spherical Threat is unique to the ground forces. It includes the subterranean space, the surface space and the high and low airspaces (drones, steep trajectory). Officers of the IDF Ground Arm explained that the threat facing the troopers on the ground "envelopes them like a sphere." The reality where the maneuvering force faces a set of threats that envelope it compels the IDF Ground Arm to develop the force build-up process on two levels: a general level, intended to provide solutions to the threats generally, and a dedicated level, intended to provide a differential solution to each specific threat.
The IDF Ground Arm HQ attempts to accomplish this by combining the linear development of battlefield platforms (tank, APC, artillery gun, etc.) with the development of modules for those platforms. The platform provides the general solution, while the modules provide the dedicated, specialized solutions. The modules to be used may be selected according to the specific threat.
The Spherical Threat concept, with the emphasis on the terrorism threat, is reflected in the employment of the force and not just in the build-up thereof. The State of Israel is surrounded by different theaters: Egypt in the south, Jordan and Iraq in the east and Syria and Hezbollah in the north, in addition to threats not associated with a common border – like the Iranian threat. The employment of the IDF Ground Arm should, in this context, too, match both the general threat and the specific threat. As with the weapon systems, a general and dedicated (modular) concept was developed for the employment of the force as well.
The force employment concept is based on three loops: a general loop, which consists of the GHQ capabilities – forces that are relevant to all of the different sectors (north, south and east) and may be moved between sectors. The second loop consists of the dedicated sectoral capabilities (IDF regional commands). These forces develop dedicated capabilities that are relevant to the sector for which they are responsible. If they are redeployed to other sectors, their effectiveness will be significantly reduced. The third loop consists of sectoral defensive forces. These forces also operate under the regional commands and possess capabilities that are relevant to their sector, but in line with a defensive approach. In other words – they are trained to provide an immediate response for countering enemy attacks a short distance from the border, and are not intended to engage in deep-penetration maneuvers.
These three loops are intended to function as three parts of a whole. The defensive forces loop deals with the task of blocking enemy attacks within a short distance from the border. The second, sectoral loop joins in and launches a deep-penetration maneuver (transferring the fighting into the enemy's territory), while the defensive loop resumes its defensive posture along the border. The third loop – the GHQ forces – shifts between the sectors as required.
The differentiation between the loops enables the IDF to implement a modular budget policy. The different loops are provided with different – not identical – capabilities. Even within each loop, the individual units are provided with different capabilities. The force build-up process is carried out differentially, according to the expectations from each loop. In this way, public funds may be used more intelligently while improving the effectiveness of the IDF for the same amount of money and possibly even less.
Rubik's Cube
Along with the force build-up and employment, the IDF Ground Arm develops four secondary processes derived from the primary "Land Ahoy!" process, which constitute the backbone of the force build-up of the ground forces. These secondary processes include Combat Task Forces, Special Units, the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy and the Borders.
The combat task forces at the various levels (brigade, battalion and company task forces) are evolving into the primary nuclear entity of land warfare. Having realized that the future wars will take place in urban environments and involve an asymmetrical profile opposite terrorist or guerrilla organizations, the IDF concluded that there is no point in just committing forces to the battlefield. Instead, it is necessary to develop forces possessing diversified capabilities – platforms and infantry elements – so as to cope with terrorist opponents in built-up areas.
The IDF aspires to provide the combat task forces with autonomous surveillance-engagement and independent intelligence collection capabilities, which are to include the lower airspace. At the IDF Ground Arm HQ they do not consider an "Army Air Arm" like that of the US military, but capabilities that include drones, UAVs, towed aerostats and more. In addition to the autonomous capabilities, the combat task force is to be provided with the ability to "order" ordnance so as to minimize the load the troopers have to carry with them.
The idea is for the combat task force to be light, agile, fast and dynamic so as to effectively deal with the enemy's speed of response, which is currently measured by dozens of seconds. When the task force has identified an enemy element, it marks it on a common interactive map and an automatic fire support "tender" process running in the background will decide how to neutralize that enemy element. In this way, the IDF Ground Arm HQ will achieve maximum effectiveness in the employment of the task force opposite a dynamic enemy combat profile. Additionally, the dynamic capabilities of the combat task force will allow it to think how to anticipate and preempt the enemy in a "dense" scenario, instead of thinking about ordnance logistics.
The NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy is the concept according to which the IDF is currently developing the "Fire Support Tender" methodology. This is a state-of-the-art technological solution for the needs of the combat task force at the forward line of friction with the enemy. One of the challenges currently faced by battlefield forces is the tension between the need to maintain friction with the enemy and the tendency to "pull back" the fire capabilities and reassign them to elements deployed at the rear. When the fire capabilities are pulled back from the combat task force and reassigned to external, rear-area elements, the IDF might lose the actual friction with the enemy.
At the IDF Ground Arm HQ they explain that this tension is resolved by retaining friction capabilities for very close ranges. As the opponent is a disappearing enemy and the exposure interval of enemy targets is less than 40 seconds on average, the friction of the combat task force is reduced to this range. The entire friction beyond that range no longer exists as the enemy has evolved into a "disappearing enemy". Consequently, all of the battlefield engagements taking place within time constants other than immediate friction with exposed enemy elements will be handled by the NSS Canopy, and everything within those time constants will be handled by the combat task force itself.
Special units have evolved into a dedicated element in the employment of force by the Ground Arm. The reason for it stems primarily from the evolution of the enemy. Instead of regular, structured military formations, the enemy currently operates in small, decentralized and independent cells, possessing pin-point capabilities. Against an enemy of this type, the effectiveness of structured military formations decreases and there is a need for specialized units operating in a similar manner, to 'soften' or 'prepare' the enemy through preparatory operations. This "preparatory" activity actually means neutralizing primary friction focal points and disrupting the enemy's chain of command.
In other words, the primary function of the special units is to unbalance the enemy before the combat task forces arrive, and subsequently, at the same time as the operations of the combat task forces, further disrupt the enemy's operations by engaging the enemy's leaders, logistic chain and command centers. For this purpose, the IDF established the Commando Brigade (with regular and reservist units) and the Depth Corps – a GHQ force capable of operating in all of the sectors.
The borders have become an active element in the force employment concept of the IDF Ground Arm. Over the last few years, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) has erected a smart border fence system along the border with Syria, with an extensive range of surveillance, sensing and other resources. This smart fence system enables the IDF to establish a virtual strategic depth with no need to actually deploy forces in Syrian territory. At the Ground Arm they currently ponder the question of how to convert the smart border fence system from a passive resource that collects intelligence into a responding element capable of closing the fire loop on enemy targets as a first response loop.
Some of the ideas being considered include the use of various unmanned platforms that possess strike capabilities. The combination of a smart fence system that provides a strategic depth to a distance of dozens of kilometers during the day and night, with the option of having the sensors activate an unmanned strike layout, could lead to changes in the deployment of the IDF routine security forces in all border sectors.
The combination of the four secondary processes – the NSS (Network Surveillance & Strike) Canopy, the borders, special units and combat task forces – could produce a Rubik's Cube of sorts, capable of adapting itself to numerous scenarios, including adaptation to unforeseen wartime scenarios.
The Goal: Efficiency
It is worth recalling that over the course of the last thirty-five years, since the First Lebanon War, the IDF ground elements have become gradually less necessary, mainly owing to the transition to asymmetrical warfare opposite terrorist organizations, which increased the value of specialist units along with the value of the routine security and policing forces. The Ground Arm, as a force originally charged with the function of capturing enemy territories and transferring the fighting to the enemy's side of the border, found itself in a pointless situation.
With this situation in mind, the IDF Ground Arm initiated the brainstorming process titled "Land Ahoy!" in order to understand how to develop a ground arm that would remain legitimate and relevant in the era of asymmetrical warfare. This process provided the foundation for the Force Build-Up 2030 concept, and was intended to accomplish several objectives: provide the forces with the ability to adapt, in real time, to changing threats; develop cutting-edge capabilities under a shrinking budget framework; minimize the budgetary uncertainty as it applies to war plans (the cost/operational status ratio), and minimize the probability of casualties sustained by our own forces.
The IDF Ground Arm's force build-up plan should develop the ground element of the IDF as an active element that is not only capable of adapting and changing opposite such terrorist organizations as ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah or future organizations, but is also capable of utilizing the dynamic adaptation capabilities of the weapon systems and operational doctrines to determine the situation on the battlefield. Not just to respond – to initiate.
There is no doubt that the IDF Ground Arm's force build-up plan is not isolated from other primary IDF processes, such as combined arms warfare, intelligence-based warfare and the technological empowerment in all of the sectors. On the contrary, the elements of the NSS Canopy, for example, are based on combined arms capabilities and on the spatial concept the IDF has been developing for a number of years (fire space, C4I space, logistic space, etc.). If this plan is implemented as planned, the IDF may find itself evolving into a smaller but much more efficient and lethal military.
