Chief IDF Armored Corps Officer: "Not much has changed since 2006"
"Protection, firepower and mobility – these are the elements of the tank's added value," said Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson. "Can this mobility be reflected on the battlefields of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon? These are our operational profiles"
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 16/05/2017
Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson, Chief IDF Armored Corps Officer, at the 2nd International Ground Warfare & Logistics Conference (Photo: Gilad Kavalerchik)
"The world of the Armored Corps does not change as rapidly as people may think. It is difficult for us, the people, to change. Not much has changed since 2006. The enemy and the environment have remained the same," said Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson, Chief IDF Armored Corps Officer, at the Second International Ground Warfare & Logistics Conference. "We have just signed a mega-deal for the Trophy system. That will make a change.
"To this day we have been busy disrupting the enemy. We have not succeeded in reaching a sufficient degree of lethality vis-à-vis infantry elements. The first time that I had a projectile capable of killing infantry troops was during Operation Protective Edge. That was also the first time when the ground network led to a breakthrough in our capabilities. It is the element that succeeded in leading us to break out of our conceptual boundaries. For the first time, during Operation Protective Edge, the network evolved into a network for the masses."
"Wherever the Human Element is involved in the Firing, the Result is Less Favorable"
"Protection, firepower and mobility – these are the elements of the tank's added value," said Brig. Gen. Hasson. "Can this mobility be reflected on the battlefields of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon? These are our operational profiles. The tank is more mobile and faster, but is it more effective? In mountainous, closed-in and urban terrain, mobility decreases.
"Today, firepower depends on the enemy. The enemy is the initiating party. They choose the moment to emerge and for how long. The tanks must acquire the target and hit it with the first round, as otherwise they will be irrelevant. We are showing a trend of improvement compared to four years ago. Regarding the protection element, in three years' time we will have large protected fleets. Today we are a boutique, and that is not enough. Another advantage of the tank is the energy it delivers to the battlefield. It may be fitted with sensors that the infantry cannot carry.
"Opposite infantry, you need more pin-down elements than assaulting elements. To catch the target as it emerges. The way the battlespace is currently organized is consistent with the classic armor-versus-armor profile – not the armor-versus-infantry profile. It is not consistent with the friction with a disappearing enemy. The enemy will not pop up if we do not arrive, and if we arrive and fail to catch them – we will gain nothing.
"Another aspect is automation. We need automation systems that provide a real added value. Such systems are almost nonexistent at present. I do not want a robot that the enemy will destroy after a minute and a half. I need robots with automatic and semiautomatic modes of operation. Another layer concerns automatic firing. Wherever the human element is involved in the firing, the result is less favorable. The human element has an adverse effect on the precision and timing of the firing. The systems should provide automatic firing. That is the future. The next model of the Merkava tank will have an automatic firing button. The tank will detect and identify the element firing at it and would discharge a round at the source of fire 30 seconds later. You cannot accomplish that with a man in the loop."
On-Line Tank Commander
"We are engaged in a review of the organizational structure of the Armored Corps," said Brig. Gen. Hasson. "The ability to reach an organization of tanks capable of forming up flexible structures. Breaking down and forming up within a short time – that is the future. Our efforts are aimed at a decentralized enemy, through numerous small forces that will affect the entire battlespace. Specifying the flexibility is an organizational challenge. A part of this planning process is the step we took in expanding the officer complement in the Armored Corps.
"The network will also affect the organization of the Armored Corps. The network should be secure, stable and reliable. During Operation Protective Edge, the network demonstrated stability for the first time. The information should be delivered quickly and must be relevant and accurate. We cannot accept an accuracy level of 20 meters. We need an accuracy level of up to two meters. With the network, the commander will be required to live and operate in a technological environment. The human element will have to accommodate the information, including on-line command. How do you make decisions under such conditions? That is a very serious question.
"In conclusion, in order for the tank to evolve into a lethal machine opposite infantry, several elements are required. The basic operational capability – not to lose orientation with the hatches closed, as otherwise a sniper will be able to disable a tank. During Operation Protective Edge, we lost a company commander and a platoon commander in this way. This issue will be provided with a solution by the Merkava Barak variant in 2021. We also need the ability to identify human targets. Today we can identify a tank from a range of 5 kilometers, but a human target is a more complex matter. Without identification, there can be no lethality. To complete the loop closure process, we will have an automatic firing button. The same Trophy system coupled with other sensors will be capable of discharging a projectile autonomously. All of these capabilities will increase the effectiveness and lethality of the tank in the future."
"Protection, firepower and mobility – these are the elements of the tank's added value," said Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson. "Can this mobility be reflected on the battlefields of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon? These are our operational profiles"
Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson, Chief IDF Armored Corps Officer, at the 2nd International Ground Warfare & Logistics Conference (Photo: Gilad Kavalerchik)
"The world of the Armored Corps does not change as rapidly as people may think. It is difficult for us, the people, to change. Not much has changed since 2006. The enemy and the environment have remained the same," said Brig. Gen. Guy Hasson, Chief IDF Armored Corps Officer, at the Second International Ground Warfare & Logistics Conference. "We have just signed a mega-deal for the Trophy system. That will make a change.
"To this day we have been busy disrupting the enemy. We have not succeeded in reaching a sufficient degree of lethality vis-à-vis infantry elements. The first time that I had a projectile capable of killing infantry troops was during Operation Protective Edge. That was also the first time when the ground network led to a breakthrough in our capabilities. It is the element that succeeded in leading us to break out of our conceptual boundaries. For the first time, during Operation Protective Edge, the network evolved into a network for the masses."
"Wherever the Human Element is involved in the Firing, the Result is Less Favorable"
"Protection, firepower and mobility – these are the elements of the tank's added value," said Brig. Gen. Hasson. "Can this mobility be reflected on the battlefields of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon? These are our operational profiles. The tank is more mobile and faster, but is it more effective? In mountainous, closed-in and urban terrain, mobility decreases.
"Today, firepower depends on the enemy. The enemy is the initiating party. They choose the moment to emerge and for how long. The tanks must acquire the target and hit it with the first round, as otherwise they will be irrelevant. We are showing a trend of improvement compared to four years ago. Regarding the protection element, in three years' time we will have large protected fleets. Today we are a boutique, and that is not enough. Another advantage of the tank is the energy it delivers to the battlefield. It may be fitted with sensors that the infantry cannot carry.
"Opposite infantry, you need more pin-down elements than assaulting elements. To catch the target as it emerges. The way the battlespace is currently organized is consistent with the classic armor-versus-armor profile – not the armor-versus-infantry profile. It is not consistent with the friction with a disappearing enemy. The enemy will not pop up if we do not arrive, and if we arrive and fail to catch them – we will gain nothing.
"Another aspect is automation. We need automation systems that provide a real added value. Such systems are almost nonexistent at present. I do not want a robot that the enemy will destroy after a minute and a half. I need robots with automatic and semiautomatic modes of operation. Another layer concerns automatic firing. Wherever the human element is involved in the firing, the result is less favorable. The human element has an adverse effect on the precision and timing of the firing. The systems should provide automatic firing. That is the future. The next model of the Merkava tank will have an automatic firing button. The tank will detect and identify the element firing at it and would discharge a round at the source of fire 30 seconds later. You cannot accomplish that with a man in the loop."
On-Line Tank Commander
"We are engaged in a review of the organizational structure of the Armored Corps," said Brig. Gen. Hasson. "The ability to reach an organization of tanks capable of forming up flexible structures. Breaking down and forming up within a short time – that is the future. Our efforts are aimed at a decentralized enemy, through numerous small forces that will affect the entire battlespace. Specifying the flexibility is an organizational challenge. A part of this planning process is the step we took in expanding the officer complement in the Armored Corps.
"The network will also affect the organization of the Armored Corps. The network should be secure, stable and reliable. During Operation Protective Edge, the network demonstrated stability for the first time. The information should be delivered quickly and must be relevant and accurate. We cannot accept an accuracy level of 20 meters. We need an accuracy level of up to two meters. With the network, the commander will be required to live and operate in a technological environment. The human element will have to accommodate the information, including on-line command. How do you make decisions under such conditions? That is a very serious question.
"In conclusion, in order for the tank to evolve into a lethal machine opposite infantry, several elements are required. The basic operational capability – not to lose orientation with the hatches closed, as otherwise a sniper will be able to disable a tank. During Operation Protective Edge, we lost a company commander and a platoon commander in this way. This issue will be provided with a solution by the Merkava Barak variant in 2021. We also need the ability to identify human targets. Today we can identify a tank from a range of 5 kilometers, but a human target is a more complex matter. Without identification, there can be no lethality. To complete the loop closure process, we will have an automatic firing button. The same Trophy system coupled with other sensors will be capable of discharging a projectile autonomously. All of these capabilities will increase the effectiveness and lethality of the tank in the future."
