Protecting Civilian Aircraft against Shoulder-Launched Surface-to-Air Missiles

Since 1987, 11 such incidents of attacks on civilian aircraft by shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles have been recorded. What can be learned from them? And – the special case that is Israel

Protecting Civilian Aircraft against Shoulder-Launched Surface-to-Air Missiles

The shooting down of Malaysian Airlines’ Boeing 777 aircraft over the Ukraine on July 17, 2014 had once again raised the issue of protecting passenger aircraft against surface-to-air missiles to the global agenda.

To date, Israel is the only country that made a conscious decision to acquire protective systems against shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles and install these systems on the passenger aircraft of its airlines.

Many still refuse to regard that threat as a justification for the installation of protective systems on the aircraft, owing to the cost of the systems and the extra weight involved.

There are those who analyze and conclude the incidents involving attacks by shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles in the context of the installation of such protective systems. Since 1987, 11 such incidents have been recorded.

The opponents of the installation of protective systems against shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles cite two arguments. The first argument maintains that shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles normally hit the engine, owing to the intense infrared radiation it emits. In most cases where the engine is sufficiently distanced from the wing, the damage to the airframe will not be critical. It is claimed that the warheads of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles are too small to inflict any substantial damage on the airframe if the warhead detonates at a distance of more than one meter from the airframe. Accordingly, a large airliner whose engines are suspended under the wings stands a good chance of returning to land even after sustaining such a hit.

The second argument maintains that most of the attacks involving shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles occurred in war zones or in areas not effectively governed by states, such as Rhodesia, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Georgia, the Congo and Kenya, where the circumstances are the result of that basic situation. Hence the demand to keep commercial flights away from such areas.

Three heavier passenger aircraft were either shot down or damaged by air-to-air missiles, and it is argued that the aforesaid protective systems are not effective against missiles of this category. These aircraft include the Korean Boeing 707 hit in April 1978 over Murmansk as the local authorities suspected it was engaged in photoreconnaissance, the Italian DC-9 shot down in June 1980, probably by mistake, and the Korean Boeing 747 shot down over the Japan Sea in September 1983.

Additionally, 3 heavy passenger aircraft were shot down by heavier surface-to-air missiles, mainly owing to identification errors or mistaken interpretation of the pilots’ intentions. An Iran Air A-300 aircraft was shot down by mistake by a US warship in the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988, a Siberian Airlines Tu-154 aircraft was shot down over the Black Sea on October 4, 2001, probably by a Ukrainian S-200 missile, and a Malaysian Boeing 777 aircraft was shot down over the Ukraine in June 2014. It is argued that in all of these incidents, protective systems against shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles would have been irrelevant.

If we focus on the 11 incidents in which shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles were employed, we will be able to reach two practical conclusions: firstly – the threat faced by narrow-body aircraft is more substantial than the threat faced by heavy, wide-body aircraft. Consequently, if protective systems are installed, narrow-body aircraft should be given precedence. Secondly, flying over areas or in the airspaces of countries where fighting involving non-state organizations is under way should be avoided, and war zones where state organizations are engaged in fighting should be bypassed.

Naturally, Israel is a special case. The threat to its aircraft is intentional as opposed to the aircraft of other countries, regarding which the threat is normally random. Israeli aircraft constitute targets threatened by several terrorist organizations and shooting down an Israeli airliner will be regarded as a major achievement by such organizations. Consequently, Israel’s considerations are different, with regard to securing and selecting airports out of which its aircraft operate, as well as with regard to the installation of protective systems against shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.

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