"In the Cyber Field, We Hold a Noteworthy Global Position"

The IDF GHQ is about to complete the formulation of a new strategy for the IDF. Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, Deputy Chief of Staff, offered a sneak preview

"In the Cyber Field, We Hold a Noteworthy Global Position"

Maj. Gen. Gazi Eizenkot

In a matter of weeks, the IDF GHQ should complete a document that is to be titled "the IDF Strategy." The document was to be derived from a national defense concept sanctioned by the government, but as Israel has not had an official defense concept for decades, the IDF GHQ formulated the document on the basis of the national defense concept as it is currently understood. In 2006, a committee headed by former minister Dan Meridor consolidated a new national defense concept, but that concept was never officially sanctioned owing to the turmoil that followed the Second Lebanon War, and was subsequently archived.

What is the 'IDF Strategy'? What has the IDF GHQ emphasized in its future plans? The new document will be classified Top Secret, but an unusual lecture delivered by Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, offered a sneak preview of the most current trends of thought among Israel's military elite. Maj. Gen. Eizenkot spoke at a special event held by the Institute of Policy & Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Hertzliya. Other speakers at the same event included Professor Alex Mintz, head of the Institute and Dean of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy at the IDC, and Professor Uzi Arad, formerly the head of Israel's National Security Council and Institute founder. This special debate was held as part of the events of the annual Hertzliya Conference, on the 40th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War.

"The threats are changing, and they lead to new directions of though and quite a few dilemmas," Maj. Gen Eizenkot said at the start of his address.

"The Yom-Kippur War was the last war in the world where the (opposing) forces maneuvered against one another and employed massive fire and air power," he added. "Today's (military) essence is different."

According to Maj. Gen Eizenkot, "The prevailing concept during the Yom-Kippur War was the classic defense concept, which included the elements of deterrence, early warning and overbalance, if necessary. About seven years ago, the Meridor Committee introduced another fundamental term, which refers to 'self protection'. This particular concept reflects the way the threats changed as well as the activity of our enemies, who identified Israel's homefront as a weakness, along with their strategic inferiority. They developed a decentralized, clandestine and guided fire capability – the ability to fire continuously at Israel, along with a defensive capability.

"Hezbollah's primary lesson from the 2006 Second Lebanon War was to construct combat zones in the civilian environment, and to develop a steep-trajectory weaponry layout combined with a defense, command and control layout. This modus operandi produced a strategic dilemma for us as a military. How do you operate against a layout designed to fire thousands of rockets, with varying ranges, into the State of Israel? How do you attack it inside a civilian environment? This is an operational and ethical dilemma. The question is how to provide a solution within the shortest possible time and with minimal damage to the Israeli homefront, while maintaining the IDF's moral values.

"When you examine the dilemma produced for us by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, it is very substantial. However, with all due modesty, I think the IDF has developed a very good intelligence capability over the last seven years. This is not a perfect capability, but one that provides a high quality target picture and an excellent target striking capability and the ability to launch combined strikes at the front line as well as deep inside the enemy territory. It further provides an improvement of our ability to protect the population in the homefront, based on a highly impressive multi-layered defensive capability, even if it does not provide a total solution.

"We are currently working on a new multi-year plan for the IDF. The reality is complex - the range of threats has changed dramatically compared to the days of the Yom-Kippur War, and the terminology used in the IDF extends from knife threats (personal terrorism) to the 'Karine' (a cargo ship carrying advanced weapon systems to Gaza, seized in 2002). In between, we have the threat of guerrilla warfare, as well as the conventional threat, which the IDF cannot ignore, even if some parties believe it is diminishing. There are also new threats, such as the cyber threat and the threat of unconventional weapons. The severity of the threat imposed on the population centers in the Israeli homefront will intensify. Even today, we are already referring to a monumental potential of nearly 200,000 rockets of all types within the inner loop around Israel.

"One of the most troubling issues today involves the regional turmoil, which is often reflected in the absence of a state address and the growing strength of terrorist groups in the region. In Syria, for example, we are referring to 800 – 1,000 terrorist and rebel groups, and the reality there has invited Global Jihad elements to the Golan Heights – another source for concern. The reality in the Sinai Peninsula is also problematic as far as we are concerned, although the activity conducted over the last few weeks by the Egyptian military is commendable.

"At the same time, this complex reality has also provided an opportunity. The new geo-strategic reality has enabled the IDF, after 40 years, to complete the cycle and ask questions that would allow us to change the paradigm and introduce second-order change in order to adapt ourselves to future challenges. I think this understanding exists in the IDF. We will take the necessary measures, and a major part of the decisions required have already been made.

"What will be required in the future is an improved intelligence capability at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; an improved defensive layout; improved fire potential on a very large scale; an improved offensive potential, and defensive and offensive capabilities in cyberspace, which is an evolving field where Israel holds a noteworthy global position. We need the ability to operate in the enemy's strategic depth – an ability which has been significantly developed, and a network capability; we currently have advanced capabilities in this field as well, owing to decisions made as far back as eight or nine years ago. Network connectivity capabilities now play a central role in the military, as they are intended to ensure the optimization of the IDF combined arms potential. I would add another key issue that we have had on the agenda for some time – the change in the national scale of priorities, so that all elements of society share the burden. I regard this issue as no less important than the list of military capabilities I've described."

Early Warning and Overbalance

On the issue of deterrence and intelligence early warning required according to the revised concept of the IDF, the Deputy Chief of Staff said that "speaking of deterrence vis-à-vis non-state organizations, the question is how they may be deterred."

"On the matter of early warning, 40 years ago there was a complete concept of 'indicators' of an imminent war. Today, young officers are not familiar with this concept. Early warning, as far as they are concerned, is the need to identify strategic developments and changes, but mainly the need to provide tactical alerts. This is since in the present terminology, a tactical incident such as the abduction of a serviceman can lead to a strategic change within seconds. The intelligence community is intensively engaged in the challenge of preventing such incidents. 

"Speaking of overbalance, even in the present age, we go back to the German philosopher Clausewitz, who assigned the concept of overbalance exclusively to the tactical level, and warned in his books against the use thereof at the strategic level.

"Beyond that, reality has changed. Let's take, for example, the dilemma I am familiar with from the time I served as commander of the IDF Judea an Samaria Division, during the days of the Second Intifada, at the beginning of the last decade. In those days, we operated against many Palestinian terrorist groups over the course of seven years, and we never placed a 'full stop' and said that we achieved an overbalance in a confrontation where more than 1,200 Israelis were killed and more than 12,000 were wounded. We never announced that we defeated terrorism there. It took us many years to reach this situation."

Strategy

"I think that the way Israel and the IDF referred to the solution for the homefront led to a highly significant change in the way we currently provide security to the citizens of Israel. In my viewpoint, the IDF's strategy means knowing how to deter the enemy and keep war away. If the prevailing thought in the past was that the military was in one of two states – either preparing for war or engaged in war, then today this way of thinking is no longer relevant. There is a third state: a full-fledged campaign that takes place under the surface - a clandestine, covert campaign intended to improve the accomplishments of the war and to keep war away. In my opinion, it is a highly significant task that also carries a price tag with regards to the manner in which you utilize the resources and allocate them, for the benefit of routine security, among other things.

"In this campaign between wars, the demands presented to the intelligence community are fantastic. When introduced to this field for the first time, people from the outside are astounded by the breadth and depth of the operations.

"In an emergency, our strategy is to prevent the loss of assets, and in a state of war – to prevent a situation of extensive damage inflicted by steep-trajectory weapons on urban centers and strategic sites in Israel. Should a war be forced upon us, we must strike very forcefully and shorten the duration of the war.

"In my view, the trial the IDF would have to face revolves around the question of whether it fulfilled the objectives of the war as assigned by the political echelon, and whether Israel's strategic status has improved for a long period of time. We do not have the prerogative of allowing the IDF to operate without an up-to-date national defense concept that would support the defense systems and provide them with inspiration."

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The CyberTech 2014 conference and exhibition, produced by Israel Defense, will be held at the Israel Trade Fairs & Convention Center in Tel Aviv, on January 27-28, 2014.

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